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My aim in this work is to provide a comprehensive analysis of Hume’s theory 
of time as it is set out in the Treatise. Mirroring Hume’s own division into two 
parts, this will involve a careful look at both the epistemology of time he 
presents, that is, the idea of time and how this idea is formed, and the 
metaphysics, such as it is, of time itself. I look at two sets of motivating 
problems, for the metaphysics and the epistemology respectively: as regards 
the epistemology of time, I focus on the charge that Hume’s account is 
circular, that he cannot explain the acquisition and formation of the concept 
of time without presupposing the very idea he seeks to explain. This concern 
cuts to the heart of traditional empiricist theories and for many highlights a 
fundamental inadequacy. The second set of problems relate to the temporal 
structure of the world that emerges from his denial of the infinite divisibility 
of space and time. Specifically, whether the simple, durationless moments 
which act as the fundamental constituents of time are capable of playing the 
role Hume requires of them.  
 
I propose a unified response to both sets of challenges, and defend Hume’s 
claim that the two parts of his system are “intimately connected” (T.1.2.4.1; 
SBN 39). I argue that to gain a fully satisfying interpretation and 
understanding of either part we must look to, and be informed by, the other. 
What emerges is a complex theory of mind and a cautious but powerful 
metaphysics guided and informed by his epistemology. His theory of time 
remains grounded in empiricism, but of a form that is more resilient in the 
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1.1. Motivations, Aims, and Methodology  
My aim in this work is to provide a comprehensive analysis of Hume’s 
theory of time as it is set out in the Treatise. This will involve a careful look at 
both the epistemology of time he presents, that is, the idea of time and how 
this idea is formed, and the metaphysics, such as it is, of time itself. I argue 
that we can find in Hume’s account of time an intricate and interesting study 
that can inform our understanding of many other areas of his philosophy. 
What emerges is a complex theory of mind and a cautious but powerful 
metaphysics guided and informed by his particular epistemological 
commitments. 
 
This kind of investigation provides rewards of a number of sorts: firstly, 
Hume’s work on time is fascinating simply in and of itself. The few short 
sections in which Hume tackles the questions of time and our experience of 
it contain an engaging mix of brilliant thoughts, engaging puzzles, and 
apparent problems. His treatment of these topics is quick and 
characteristically assured. However, once beyond the surface and seeking 
underlying principles, all manner of complications arise. In spite of, or 
perhaps because of, the easy manner with which Hume approaches these 
questions, filling out the details of his account involves far more than simply 
reading them off the page. He gives hints and clues, and apparent 
contradictions. He will affirm principles and then immediately present what 
appear to be counter-examples to them. He will reject his opponent’s 
positions as absurd and then seem to embrace the exact features of their 
accounts which he argued were problematic; reading these sections is a 
pleasurable frustration. Certainly though, there is plenty to get lost in and 
spending the time with them offers tempting rewards.  
  
Considering the literature on Hume’s account of time we can see that 
Hume’s work in this area has been interpreted every which way over the 
years. Historically, the sections on time and space (which are presented 
together, for the most part) have tended to be dismissed as possessing little, 
if any, merit. Noxon, for example, stated that the sections on time and space 
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“yielded the least admired part of the Treatise.”1 C. D. Broad went further, 
stating that “there seems to me to be nothing whatsoever in Hume’s 
doctrine of space except a great deal of ingenuity wasted in recommending 
and defending palpable nonsense.”2 More recently, this part of Hume’s work 
has undergone something of a reappraisal and commentators including 
Allison, Baxter, Falkenstein, Frasca-Spada and Garrett, amongst others, have 
all found much more of worth in these sections. Importantly, these authors 
have also shown that, puzzling though these parts of his work are, careful 
consideration of them has the potential to illuminate other problematic 
themes in his work. The self, cognition and the mind, identity, causality, and 
his stance towards an external world can all benefit from being considered in 
light of these sections.   
 
This is the second reason I take such a project to be of both use and value. 
Though I will not pretend that the interpretations I offer are by any means 
conclusive (even leaving aside historiographical concerns, the sections on 
time especially are so brief that such a claim would seem beyond bold). 
However, looking more at this topic does serve to illuminate and to 
challenge. In what follows I will look at one way of addressing the challenges 
that present themselves to Hume’s work on time. I argue that addressing 
these involves reconsidering his position towards a number of other issues 
including, but not limited to, the Copy Principle and the nature and extent of 
his empiricism, the role of the mind and the principles of association, 
simplicity and complexity, and knowledge of the external world. Each of 
which will receive much discussion in what follows.  
 
In light of this potential for re-evaluation, my methodology involves 
allowing the focus to begin with the puzzles of time rather than firm 
commitments regarding Hume’s philosophy more broadly. When we do this 
we find that many of the assumed orthodoxies become less certain: that he 
didn’t engage in metaphysics, that he is a sceptic, an atomist, even the kind 
of empiricism he endorses is questionable. Kail puts the point of this nicely 
when he notes that “There are no - though there often seem to be for many 
                                                 
1 Noxon (1973) p.115.  
2 Broad (1961) p.176.  
11 
 
- fixed points in Hume's thought around which everything must be placed.”3 
If we start our investigation bound to these orthodoxies and assuming 
commitments on his behalf we can be assured of finding them in his work. 
However, the sections on time and space provide a tonic for this; their 
challenging nature encourages us to reject the cruder characterisations of the 
kind of philosopher that Hume was and the sort of philosophy that he did.  
 
Although it is impossible to avoid being influenced by these 
characterisations of Hume’s work, and prioritising only one part of his 
theory without allowing other parts to inform our understanding of them 
would seem to be a reckless form of interpretation, beginning with the 
problems and being open to less rigid categorisations means we can come to 
see that Hume’s position is often far from transparent. A further bonus of 
sifting through these stranger and more apparently conflicted parts of the 
Treatise is that the overall position that emerges is often more nuanced, 
subtle, and interesting than it has sometimes been judged. Finding these new 
angles and seeing how they reflect back upon other areas of his work is a 
further motivation for focusing in on this small but important topic.  
 
However, given that Hume’s work on space and time has gained more 
prominence of late (even if it is still one of the more neglected areas of 
Hume studies), we could still ask whether there is the need for another 
survey. I would suggest that there is in that there still seems to me to be 
interesting terrain that remains relatively unmapped: generally, the focus has 
been on Hume’s account of space (quite natural in that Hume’s own 
discussion focuses far more on space than on time). Though some have 
concentrated specifically on time, discussion of space has tended to 
dominate. I will suggest in what follows that Hume did not, and we should 
not, imagine that the case of time was presented as a simple analogy of 
space. Hume notes some interesting differences and, in what follows, I will 
suggest a few more. The essential nature of time differs to that of space and 
looking at how far this presents additional difficulties is an interesting task in 
and of itself. However, it becomes all the more interesting if one is also 
                                                 
3 Kail (2007b), Introduction, xxviii.  
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seeking to critically evaluate Hume’s treatment. This brings me to the final 
motivation for this project.  
 
I noted above that Hume’s work in this area has tended to be dismissed as 
rather weak. Sometimes the problems are presented as his: loose thinking, 
inconsistent language, shoddy argumentation, assumptions, over-confidence, 
poor mathematical ability – Hume has been accused of much in light of 
these sections. At other times the problems are presented as more down to 
factors beyond his control: advances in thought that he may in part have 
provoked but could not, perhaps, have foreseen. Whether due to his own 
failings or not, Hume’s work on time and space has often been judged 
inadequate: he is deemed unable to truly resolve the issues he found and 
problems he posed. His account is taken to be circular or presumptuous, 
hindered by an overly limited foundational epistemology and a stringent 
insistence on crude basic principles. Part of my interest in delving further 
into these topics then is critical: are we right to judge these sections in this 
way? Or is there something more interesting and more defensible going on? 
In what follows, I will engage in a project that is both interpretive and 
critical. For all its puzzling and difficult elements, the potential rewards of 
further work here make the effort worthwhile.   
 
 
1.2. Hume’s Two-Part System of Space and Time 
The structure of what follows will echo how Hume himself set these issues 
out and so will include discussion of both the nature and structure of time, 
and the nature, structure, and origin of our idea of time. Hume characterises 
his work on time and space as a system consisting of two parts: the first part 
concerns the structure of time and space and is set out in Treatise 1.2.1. and 
1.2.2. The second part concerns the structure and origin of our ideas of time 
and space and is primarily dealt with in 1.2.3. Both parts are illuminated 
further by the objections and replies Hume considers in 1.2.4. and 1.2.5.    
 
The core question of the first part of the system concerns what the structure 
of time and space is like. The line of argument Hume presents has both a 
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negative and a positive element: he employs several arguments against those 
who would take time and space to be infinitely divisible, with an aim to 
undermining this position. His positive proposal instead construes time and 
space as finitely divisible and founded on simple indivisibles; parts in the 
case of space, moments in the case of time. He concludes that since finitely 
divisible space and time is a coherent model and infinitely divisible space and 
time is not, to the extent that we are capable of judging, space and time 
themselves must be finitely divisible and grounded in simples.  
 
Hume’s arguments in this first part are perhaps the most maligned of all and, 
at first glance, they do indeed appear weak. There is a strange tension 
throughout in that he seemingly moves freely between a kind of latent 
realism and a more restrained focus on ideas. This has mystified many and 
provoked at least some degree of dissatisfaction. In seeming to attack the 
very coherence of infinite divisibility in general he appears to make his target 
much too broad. In focusing his arguments on the nature of parts he seems 
to neglect alternative conceptions of divisibility and so perhaps to beg the 
question against his opponent. He briefly considers a seemingly powerful 
objection and then dismisses it as “entirely frivolous.”4 At times his 
approach seems to display fundamental mistakes perhaps indicative of 
serious mathematical error and short-sightedness. The puzzle of this section 
at times seems to be how Hume could possibly have thought these 
arguments convincing at all. Certainly that seems to be the conclusion drawn 
by many commentators on this first part: C. D. Broad suggested that the 
sections on spatial divisibility could be “fairly safely dismissed as rubbish.”5 
Laird characterises the first argument as appearing to be “quite exceptionally 
question-begging” and containing arguments that “would not deceive a 
child.”6 Jacquette calls his arguments against infinite divisibility “perhaps the 
least loved and, until recently, least examined parts of his philosophy.”7    
 
                                                 
4 T 1.2.2.2n1; SBN 30.  
5 C. D. Broad (1961) p.171.  
6 Laird (1932) p. 67 and p.68.  
7 Jacquette (1996) p. 61.  
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Historically then, this part of his theory of time and space has drawn much 
flak. Commentators have mostly focused on the discussion of space rather 
than that of time (though, as noted, Hume too has this tendency, he does 
include an additional argument in the case of time that has not received as 
much attention as it should), and the reception has been, for the most part, 
overwhelmingly negative. However, more recently there have been 
challenges to this dismissal of these sections from a number of different 
angles.8 In my discussion I focus on a kind of metaphysical re-evaluation 
that these sections have received, examples of which can be found in 
Holden and Baxter.9  
 
Deep criticisms also arise for the positive proposal that emerges from this 
part of Hume’s system. In what follows I focus my critical discussion on two 
old problems for Hume: the problem of composition (how simple moments 
can form something which has duration) and the problem of union (how 
simple, indivisible components can come together to form unions without 
collapsing into one). These problems explore two sides of a simple concern: 
that for all his arguments against the proponent of mathematical points, 
Hume appears to embrace in his own solution a feature of points that he 
himself notes introduces trouble: their simplicity. In his discussion and 
response of these challenges at T 1.2.4. he does not provide illustration in 
the case of time and so we must do some degree of reconstruction from his 
discussion of the case of space. In the case of his simple spatial parts he 
appeals to their colour and tangibility. However, the suggestion that merely 
attributing colour or tangibility to these simples resolves the difficulties 
inherent in mathematical points has provoked no small degree of confusion 
and a little bit of scorn.  
 
These problems provide my main focus in assessing Hume’s positive 
proposal partly for interpretive reasons: they were problems Hume explicitly 
addressed and took himself to have overcome. He discusses both, albeit 
briefly, and presents his own account as beating these challenges where 
                                                 
8 For a three very different approaches to re-evaluating these sections see: Franklin (1994), 
Frasca-Spada (1998; chapter 1, 1990) and Waxman (1996).   
9 Holden (2002), Baxter (2008), see especially chapter 2.      
15 
 
physical points and mathematic points could not. This presents one of the 
most immediately puzzling challenges in these sections (and has been a 
consistent target for critics) because it is far from clear how his own 
proposal differs to these in a way that would make it fare better; being 
simple, Hume’s moments appear to be just as susceptible to these challenges 
as the mathematical points he rejects and for the same reason.  
 
In chapter 2 I will focus on the negative arguments against infinite 
divisibility and in chapter 3 I will reconsider the positive proposal in light of 
the composition and union problems. I propose an alternative interpretation 
of the negative arguments which appears to offer a firmer grounding for his 
positive proposal and offers a means by which to show how it is that 
Hume’s account differs from the ones he rejects in a way that results in 
greater success in the face of these challenges. The set-up Hume offers in T 
1.2.1 is gloriously opaque and my reading of the text here is not 
uncontroversial. Then again, the sheer number of ways this section has been 
read gives me some heart in pursuing this route. Furthermore, this avenue of 
interpretation bears rewards: it offers a unified response to the positive and 
negative elements of his theory in this first part and, by so doing, offers 
illumination on some of these stranger puzzles. The picture that emerges is 
one on which Hume’s account neither begs the question against his 
opponent, nor engages in thoroughgoing incompetence. Instead we might 
think he is firmly and consistently motivated by certain core principles as set 
out in T 1.1. His understanding of complexity and his rejection of 
abstraction by separation (of which more in a moment) all come to the fore 
in interesting and surprising ways. They equally inform the concept of time 
itself that will be developed and elaborated in the second part of his system.  
 
The second part of Hume’s system concerns the nature and origin of the 
ideas of time and space and is primarily set out in T 1.2.3. (though again, 
additional elements are addressed in T 1.2.4. and T 1.2.5.). Here he tells us 
these ideas are ideas of the “manner of appearance” of existing things, with 
the idea of time being “deriv’d from the succession of perceptions of every 
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kind.”10 My concern here is primarily with what sense we can be said to 
derive this idea of time from experience. Hume presents the process as 
broadly occurring in two stages: first, we form ideas of particular times, that 
is, particular temporally complex ideas, then we form a general functionally-
abstract idea of time itself by association in virtue of the perceived 
resemblance these ideas bear to each other.  
 
At both stages in the formation of this idea Hume’s theory has been met 
with understandable opposition. The charge is made that his approach is 
constrained by a too-crude rule of appropriate derivation: the so-called Copy 
Principle, first expressed as the claim that “all our simple ideas in their first 
appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to 
then, and which they exactly represent.”11 Within the bounds of this 
principle it is argued that he cannot account for our possession of the idea 
of time without circularity. In chapter 4 I present the challenges for forming 
ideas of particular times from simple impressions, alongside an argument 
that the nature of our experience of time and its essential successiveness 
threatens a further level of difficulty: that, because experience only presents 
us with simple moments, forming an idea of temporal complexity from these 
moments requires us to interpret as temporally complex content that is 
actually temporally simple. This act of interpretive spin seems beyond us 
given we are seeking to explain our very first ideas of time. I argue these 
problems are powerful and provide us with strong reasons to consider 
broadening or reinterpreting our understanding of the Copy Principle. 
 
In chapter 5 I examine two ways we might do this: firstly, the route 
advocated by Frasca-Spada on which the ideas of time and space are 
violations of the Copy Principle, and the principle itself is afforded a guiding 
role. In the case of the ideas of time and space, the principle shows us which 
aspects of our experience are not traceable to impressions (and so which we 
can infer to have been contributed by the mind). Secondly, I explore the 
approach proposed by Falkenstein, amongst others, on which the Copy 
Principle admits of an extension to allow for complex ideas to be copied 
                                                 
10 T 1.2.3.6; SBN 34-5.  
11 T 1.1.1.7; SBN 4.  
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from complex impressions. On this extension, the idea of time requires us to 
copy not only content but arranged content, not only impressions but their 
manner of appearance. I challenge the second route and argue that the 
amendments required to shore it up press us closer towards the first in at 
least one significant respect: whichever way we go, there is no denying a 
pronounced role for the mind in the formation of these ideas.  
 
In chapter 6 I present a set of challenges to the second stage of forming the 
idea of time, that is, how we move from ideas of particular times to a general 
idea of time itself. Hume, like Berkeley before him, rejected the possibility of 
indeterminate ideas. In his discussion of abstract ideas, presented at T 1.1.7. 
he instead argues that “all general ideas are nothing but particular ones” and 
so each idea is fully determinate in its features.12 Hume rejects the possibility 
of forming abstract ideas by separation, that is, by stripping some particular 
idea of its particular features until it is capable of generally representing. 
Instead he espouses general representation achieved in virtue of 
resemblance-association. We perceive a number of particulars and, upon 
feeling a resemblance between them, come to associate them together (in 
line with the instinctive association the principles of association provoke). 
As such, thinking of one has the power to call to mind other, resembling 
instances. We apply a term to the collection of resembling perceptions and, 
by these means, further cement the habit of thought. With the habit in place, 
on each occasion of thought (or upon hearing or using the relevant term) we 
have in our mind a particular idea. However, because it is so associated with 
other resembling particulars it is capable of standing for many other, 
different, particular ideas. By these means Hume fashions functionally-
general ideas out of particular ones and, by association, founds abstract ideas 
on particular ones.        
 
In the process of forming general ideas then, resemblance is key; it is 
resemblance which provokes the requisite associations. In chapter 6 I look at 
problems facing the idea of time in light of this: specifically, that the 
requisite resemblances are elusive and cross-modal. In the case of time I 
                                                 
12 T 1.1.7.1; SBN 17.  
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suggest we do not have obvious access to classes of non-resembling 
particulars, as such special challenges arise for the idea that time that are not 
shared by that of space. Again then, if we address only space or present a 
uniform account for both, work is left undone. I finish chapter 6 by arguing 
that we can find a relative contrast class if allow again an enhanced role for 
the mind. In chapter 7 I explore further the varied phenomenon of 
resemblance in Hume’s writing. By exploring in greater depth the intricacies 
of what can provoke resemblance-association, I argue there is a kind of 
resemblance available that Hume notes which may help us account for the 
idea of time without circularity. As before though, it involves recognising the 
intricacies of cognition and the role of the mind. In every part of my 
examination of time and its idea then, the role of the mind is truly 
significant.   
 
As above, I do not pretend the interpretations offered here count as the final 
word on these matters nor that Hume can avoid every problem that arises in 
this part of his work. However, what does seem to be true is that there are 
far more complex and nuanced principles in play than is often assumed. I 
also propose that the details that emerge are of far more interest and merit 
than these sections have frequently been judged as containing. Seemingly 
straightforward principles become fuzzier and more complex, the role of the 
mind becomes more pronounced. Whatever else Hume’s theory of time is, it 
is neither bumbling nor shallow. He seems well aware of and acutely 
sensitive to the challenges involved in formulating an account of time in all 
its complexity. If we are sensitive to this the reward is a more interesting, 
more innovative and, I suggest, more defensible theory overall.  
 
 
1.3. The Relationship Between the Two Parts 
One of the more interesting interpretive challenges in this area of Hume’s 
work concerns not only the content of each part of his system but the 
relationship between the two parts themselves. In summarising his work on 




Our system concerning space and time consists of two parts, which are 
intimately connected together. The first depends on this chain of reasoning. 
The capacity of the mind is not infinite; consequently no idea of extension or 
duration consists of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas, but of a 
finite number, and these simple and indivisible: ’Tis therefore possible for 
space and time to exist conformable to this idea: And if it be possible, ’tis 
certain they actually do exist conformable to it; since their infinite divisibility 
is utterly impossible and contradictory.   
 
The other part of our system is a consequence of this. The parts, into which 
the ideas of space and time resolve themselves, become at last indivisible; and 
these indivisible parts, being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable when 
not fill’d with something real and existent. The ideas of space and time are 
therefore no separate or distinct ideas, but merely those of the manner or 
order, in which objects exist: Or, in other words, ’tis impossible to conceive 
either a vacuum and extension without matter, or a time, when there was no 
succession or change in any real existence.13 
 
The two parts then are “intimately connected” and the second part is 
presented as a consequence of elements of the first. Since there are such 
deep puzzles regarding the content of each part, reconsidering them results 
in reconsideration their relationship to each other. We are told they are 
connected, but in what way and in virtue of which elements?  
 
In evaluating the two-part system, commentators have offered a number of 
views both on the content of each part and on the relationship between them, 
and it is not unusual to stress the apparent difficulties in unifying the two 
parts and explaining how they connect. Allison stresses a “deep tension” 
between them, Fogelin argues that the two parts have “opposite 
tendencies.”14 Fogelin suggests that Hume begins with a part-whole theory 
arriving at extensionless and durationless points and then, upon realising that 
these parts could never sum to a finite whole (for the reasons suggested 
above in relation to the composition problem), alters his approach in T 1.2.3. 
to a relational account of time. And yet, if this is so then it seems at odds with 
                                                 
13 T 1.2.4.2; SBN 39-40. 
14 See Allison (2008) p. 60; Fogelin (1985) p. 35.  
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the way Hume presents and discusses the composition problem. Occurring 
immediately after his characterisation of his system of time and space as a two 
part one, he introduces the composition problem by stating “The first of 
these objections, which I shall take notice of, is more proper to prove this 
connexion and dependence of the one part upon the other, than to destroy 
either of them.”15 If his aim was to subtly shift focus in light of a tension 
revealed by this very problem it seems inexplicable why he would make this 
claim. Again, complex and interesting puzzles become apparent that tug at the 
interplay between epistemology and metaphysics for Hume.  
 
In offering an account of each part I also aim to offer some illumination on 
the relationship between them. Certainly I think we should be motivated by 
Hume’s contention that they are intimately connected and look for an 
interpretation that could make sense of this. I will suggest that a unified 
approach is available and that to gain a fully satisfying interpretation and 
understanding of either we must look to, and be informed by, the other. The 
connection between the two parts exists partly in virtue of their shared 
motivating commitments, many of which emerge in T 1.1. and have impact 
throughout both. What we finish with is a complex and interesting theory: a 
deliberately limited, but nonetheless powerful, metaphysical project and an 
epistemological investigation in which human nature and our very mode of 











                                                 
15 T 1.2.4.3; SBN 40.  
21 
 
2. The Structure of Time: Hume’s Arguments against 
Infinite Divisibility 
2.1. Introduction 
In T 1.2.1. and T 1.2.2. Hume forwards several arguments against infinite 
divisibility and, through this, his positive proposal of the nature of time and 
its moments emerges: that the complexity of durations is grounded in simple 
and ontologically fundamental moments. However, as noted above, how to 
understand Hume’s arguments and their aims, as well as how to understand 
what principles motivate them has been an issue of great contention. In the 
next chapter I will examine in more depth the positive proposal and the 
challenges it faces. In this chapter I will focus on the arguments against 
infinite divisibility and their negative conclusions.  Throughout my 
examination of this first part of Hume’s two-part system, I will appeal to a 
re-evaluation of his methodology with the aim of shedding light on the 
puzzles that emerge.   
 
In what follows I will draw out three arguments presented against infinite 
divisibility; the first two apply equally to space (though I will not discuss the 
second until the next chapter), the last is an additional argument intended 
only to apply to time. I present and consider the standard reading of Hume’s 
first argument and its historic dismissal arguing that, should we read him as 
forwarding an argument against the very possibility of infinite divisibility in 
general, we will indeed be disappointed (and perhaps even confused) by the 
moves he makes. Next I will consider the strength of interpreting Hume as 
engaged in metaphysics. I focus on Holden’s re-evaluation of Hume’s first 
argument in light of an underlying commitment to actual parts. There are, I 
think, good reasons to understand Hume as being engaged in metaphysics 
and as being concerned with the composition of external objects rather than 
simply the phenomenal array. However, Holden’s account itself fails to be 
explanatorily adequate if we are concerned to make sense of each of the 
three arguments against infinite divisibility. In particular I will argue that his 
approach does not do justice to either the first or the third arguments. Since 
my focus here is on time I am especially concerned to make sense of the 
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third and, if an account is available that can explain them both together, it is 
to be preferred.  
 
Motivated by this, I strive to offer a more explanatorily adequate 
interpretation. In attempting this I am informed in part by Hume’s claim 
that the two parts of his system of time and space (which, as discussed 
above, I take to concern the metaphysics and the epistemology of time and 
space, respectively) are “intimately connected.”16 I propose an alternative 
interpretation that uses elements of the second part of the system to 
illuminate moves he makes in the arguments of the first. However, what will 
emerge is a picture on which the fundamental driving force comes from the 
principles set out in T 1.1., in particular his rejection of abstraction by 
separation. I finish by arguing that the metaphysical commitments that 
motivate him here are not merely assumed orthodoxies of his time and so he 
does not simply beg the question against the proponent of infinite divisibility 
by assuming from the start things his opponents might be inclined to reject. 
Instead, on this reading, his arguments are motivated principally by core 
commitments derived from his empiricism and constrained by his concept 
of time. By arguing in this way I suggest we can not only avoid historic 
charges of blundering ineptitude, but also offer a richer explanatory story 
that shows that he is consistently motivated by fundamental commitments 
drawn from his epistemological standpoint.     
 
 
2.2. Hume’s “Lead” Argument   
In introducing his arguments, Hume forwards his positive proposal as to the 
structure of time and space via a number of negative arguments against the 
infinite divisibility of finite extensions and durations.17 As discussed above 
how to divide the discussion into arguments has been contentious: however, 
there is a recognisable tendency to focus on the first argument Hume 
                                                 
16 T 1.2.4.1; SBN 39.   
17 As in all parts of this thesis, note that I will be using “time” and “duration,” and “space” 
and “extension,” as synonyms, just as Hume appears to. Note that in doing this Hume is 
not using “duration” in the more traditional sense, that is, as a measure of the unchanging 
as well as the changing. As will be discussed in this chapter (and others), in Hume’s sense, 
both duration and time require a changing succession of moments.   
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offers.18 Holden, for example, calls it his “lead” argument. Given this, in 
presenting the orthodox view on Hume’s work in this area I will initially 
focus my discussion accordingly.    
 
 
2.2.1. The “Lead” Argument and its Historical Dismissal  
Hume’s first argument can be formulated as follows:  
 
i. Whatever is capable of being divided in infinitum, must consist of an 
infinite number of parts” (T 1.2.1.2; SBN 26) […] Every thing capable of 
being infinitely divided contains an infinite number of parts. (T 1.2.2.2; SBN 
29) 
 
ii. [T]he idea of an infinite number of parts is individually the same idea 
with that of an infinite extension;…no finite extension is capable of 
containing an infinite number of parts. (T 1.2.2.2; SBN 30) 
 
iii. [Therefore] no finite extension is infinitely divisible. (T 1.2.2.2; SBN 
30)  
 
Hume’s argument relies on the impossibility of any finite thing containing an 
infinite number of parts on the basis that anything with an infinite number 
of parts must be infinitely large. Since no finite thing can be infinitely large, 
we must conclude that no finite thing can be infinitely divisible. Historically, 
this argument has tended to be read as applying equally to the bare 
mathematical possibility of infinite division and has been judged as being 
correspondingly weak. Here I will present three influential objections:  
 
Firstly, critics oppose premise i. which maintains that anything capable of 
being infinitely divided must contain an infinite number of parts. Frasca-
Spada notes that there are many excellent reasons for saying it is “entirely 
mistaken.”19 Fogelin damns it as amounting to a “conceptual confusion.”20 
                                                 
18 For authors who focus on the first argument see Ainslie (2010), Baxter (2008), Flew 
(1976), Fogelin (1988), Holden (2002, 2004b), Laird (1932). For authors who put the focus 
on the other arguments see Broad (1961), Jacquette (1996), and Lennon (1985).  
19 Frasca-Spada (1990) p.397.   
20 Fogelin (1988) p.51.    
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Flew states that this “misguided premise” is “mistaken twice over” and 
“without qualification false.”21 He puts the core objection this way:  
 
[T]o say that something may be divided in infinitum is not to say that it can be 
divided into an infinite number of parts. It is rather to say that it can be 
divided, and sub-divided, and sub-divided as often as anyone wishes: 
infinitely, without limit. That this is so is part of what is meant by saying: 
‘Infinity is not a number!’22 
 
Here Flew appeals to the idea of a potential infinity which Hume seems to 
have neglected. To say that something contains a potential infinity of parts is 
to say that it can be divided and that this division can continue ad infinitum: 
however, at any point in this division it will only contain a finite number of 
parts.  
 
Secondly, commentators have also zeroed in on Hume’s apparent 
contention that anything that contains an infinite number of parts must be 
infinitely large as found in premise ii. The rub here is that, although anything 
that contains parts of all the same size would be infinitely large, something 
that contains an infinity of proportional parts which diminish in size need 
not be. Fogelin, for example, presses this point:  
 
It is true that if we take a finite extension (however small) and repeat it ad 
infinitum, we will get an infinite extension. That, however, is quite beside the 
point, because the argument for infinite divisibility depends on the possibility 
of constructing ever smaller finite extensions, as in the sequence [½ , ¼ , 1/8, 
etc.] whose sum approaches, but does not exceed, 1.23 
 
This objection to Hume’s line of argument is particularly interesting because 
he actually notes the distinction between aliquot (same-sized) and 
proportional parts (parts which diminish proportionally) in a footnote, 
making this elusive comment: “[w]hether these parts be call’d aliquot or 
proportional, they cannot be inferior to those minute parts we conceive; and 
therefore cannot form a lesser extension by their conjunction.”24 From this, 
                                                 
21 Flew (1976) p. 260.  
22 Flew (1976) p. 260 
23 Fogelin (1988) p.51.  
24 T 1.2.2.2n1; SBN 30.  
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he dismisses the distinction between these two kinds of parts as “frivolous.” 
This quick dismissal seems, at first blush at least, especially inappropriate 
since this is exactly the way that his opponents are most naturally inclined to 
press him.   
 
Thirdly, commentators have also challenged Hume on the grounds that, 
along with these specific mistakes, he has failed to see a more general point 
about the coherence of the model of infinite divisibility itself. That is, the 
model proposed by infinite divisibility theorists is a coherent one even if we 
reject it: as such his attempts to find contradictions in the very idea of 
infinite divisibility in the abstract are woefully misplaced. Franklin puts it this 
way:  
 
The infinite divisibility of space and time is possible. (This is because there is 
a consistent model that incorporates infinite divisibility, namely the set of 
infinite decimals.) It follows that all supposed proofs of the impossibility of 
infinite divisibility, whether mathematical or philosophical, are invalid.25     
 
Interpreted in the broadest sense, that is, as applying to the general model of 
infinite divisibility Hume’s argument seems to contain some fairly obvious 
oversights, some made all the more baffling by the fact that he clearly 
recognised and appeared to understand the conception of parts that 
defenders of infinite divisibility might be inclined to counter his arguments 
with (that is, by appeal to proportional parts) and yet failed to see or ignored 
its consequences for his arguments. Interpreted in this broad sense his 
argument seems inadequate and his grasp of mathematics perhaps a little 
lacking.     
 
 
                                                 
25 Franklin (1994) p.87. Franklin defends Hume’s arguments to the extent that the 
availability of a consistent model for space as not being infinitely divisible (something Hume 
aims to demonstrate) equally tells against those who suggest infinite divisibility is a priori 
demonstrable. Franklin takes the existence of consistent empirical models for both 
opposing sides to show that each will fail if they try to prove their point a priori. Hume was 
right then to argue that his opponents had failed to prove infinite divisibility to be 
demonstrable, however, he was wrong to call the opposing proofs he suggests 
demonstrable. For Franklin, empirical investigation alone can settle this dispute and so a 
priori demonstrations are misguided. For a review and critique of Franklin’s view see 
Waxman (1996).   
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2.2.2. Holden’s Metaphysical Re-evaluation 
If we interpret Hume as forwarding an argument aimed at the very 
possibility of infinite division then we may be disappointed with the results 
and indeed confused by his line of argument. What could justify his rejection 
of proportional parts? What could justify the claim that anything infinitely 
divisible contains an infinite number of parts? Interpreted in this way his 
claims seem rather question-begging. However, there are good reasons not 
to interpret Hume as engaged in this kind of project. Instead of viewing his 
argument as aimed at the infinite divisibility of quantity in general, there has 
been a recent push towards contextualising his arguments, though which 
context they should be viewed in is debateable.  
 
Firstly, some have argued that Hume’s aim is only to account for 
phenomenal time and space. Motivated both by the apparently perceptual 
examples Hume gives, they see his as targeting the infinite divisibility of the 
experiential manifold.26 Secondly, some have taken him to be engaged in a 
more metaphysical project. We might put more weight on his Hume’s 
section titles, noting that he moves from discussing “The Infinite Divisibility 
of our Ideas of Space and Time” in T 1.2.1. to discussing “The Infinite 
Divisibility of Space and Time” in T 1.2.2. These commentators take Hume 
to be engaged in a metaphysical project aimed against the infinite divisibility 
of extended and enduring objects should they exist beyond our 
perceptions.27 In what follows the methodology I argue Hume is employing 
suggests the second approach. I argue that, although the metaphysics Hume 
does is cautious, it is metaphysics nonetheless and the apparent division 
between phenomenal space and time and a spatio-temporal world should be 
noted. This route will require defence and it will receive it below. For now 
though I will consider what could be added by contextualising these 
arguments in either of these ways. That is, what strength can be afforded to 
them if we no longer view Hume’s arguments as aimed at infinite divisibility 
in the abstract and instead see them as focused on the possibility of infinitely 
                                                 
26 For commentators who argue in this way see Falkenstein (1997) and Jacquette (1996).   
27 For commentators who attribute this approach to Hume in some form see Baxter (2008) 
especially chapter 2, Holden (2002), Laird (1932) pp. 67-8.   
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dividing real extensions and durations (construed either phenomenally or in 
terms of an external world of physical things).  
 
Firstly, I will look at Holden’s account which argues Hume’s arguments 
must be seen as making metaphysical claims about physical quantities with 
concrete, actual parts.28 In light of these points he rejects the dismissal of the 
lead argument as discussed above. To him, Hume is “a clear case of a major 
Enlightenment philosopher charged - quite unjustly […] - with the most 
grotesque mathematical blundering.”29 Certainly it would be presumptuous 
to refuse to accept Hume is capable of grotesque blundering if there were 
overwhelming evidence that he were engaged in it. However, that he 
recognised and so was certainly aware of some of these responses to his 
arguments should surely give us pause for thought if only in virtue of a 
principle of charity.  
 
In his re-evaluation, Holden’s core claim is that Hume’s arguments must be 
viewed in the context not of a critique against infinite divisibility in the 
abstract but instead in light of a debate over the nature and composition of 
actual physical things:  
 
The early modern debate depends crucially on a body of metaphysical 
doctrine concerning the ‘filling’ or ‘stuffing’ of actual physical continua - a 
body of doctrine that dominates the natural philosophy of the period and that 
sets the background for the debate over infinite divisibility…once we 
appreciate this, we will see that the paradoxes are not so readily dismissed.30 
 
Holden argues we must understand Hume as writing against the background 
of the distinction between actual and potential parts. This distinction sets 
out two ways of understanding the metaphysical structure of material things. 
In order to make his account clear we need then to first clarify the 
distinction between actual and potential parts. Construed in terms of actual 
                                                 
28 Holden (2002) is the most focused example of this as applied to Hume’s philosophy. NB. 
Holden concentrates on the case of extension or space. However, there is good reason to 
think that Hume took duration or time to be equally an ordering of objects. To the extent 
that we are encouraged, and I think we should be, to see time as a sequence of existing 
things there is no reason why such an interpretation couldn’t also be extended to time as 
well as space.   
29 Holden (2002) p. 4.  
30 Holden (2002) pp. 3-4.  
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parts then, any divisible entity is divisible in virtue of possessing parts and it 
possesses parts prior to any act of division. These parts are distinct entities 
and division merely unveils or discovers the structure that was inherent in 
the whole from the start so divisible wholes are complex prior to division.31 
An act of division, on this view, “merely separates [the parts], it does not create 
them.”32  
 
In contrast with this is the potential parts view, which has its roots in 
Aristotelian lines of thought. On this view the parts into which a body may 
be divided are merely potential until actualised by an act of division. We can 
characterise talk of parts in terms of talk of the modal properties of the 
whole but the whole itself is not a complex until divided. If we think in this 
way division creates or actualises parts, it does not discover them. As 
Holden puts it “the parts of bodies are merely possible or potential existents 
until broken down, but do not exist other than as aspects of the whole until 
a positive act of division actualizes them as so many independent entities.”33  
 
Armed with this distinction between actual parts and potential parts Holden 
argues we should reconsider Hume’s “lead” argument and the objections 
raised against it. Firstly, we might think that the third objection fails. This 
objection was that, given there exists a coherent mathematical model for 
infinite divisibility, Hume was simply misguided when he argued the very 
notion of infinite divisibility is contradictory. If he was arguing this it seems 
the existence of a coherent model would be a problem for him. However, if 
we interpret him as arguing against the infinite divisibility of actual physical 
entities then this objection seems to fall wide of its mark. If Hume’s target is 
not the infinite divisibility of quantity in general but the infinite divisibility of 
only one class of things, that is, concrete physical things, the fact that there 
is a coherent model for infinite divisibility is irrelevant. One benefit of 
reading Hume in this way then is that it provides one way of making sense 
of why he neglected to consider what would otherwise seem to be a rather 
                                                 
31 A contemporary analogue of this view would be the doctrine of arbitrary undetached 
parts.  
32 Holden (2004b) p.2.  
33 Holden (2004b) p.2.  
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obvious counter-example; if this re-interpretation is correct, he did not 
consider it because it is not a counter-example. So, if we read him as aiming 
to offer a metaphysical account concerned with the possibility of infinitely 
divisible concrete existing things then perhaps the third objection can be 
dispelled.   
 
We can also see that, if it is true that Hume was committed to an actual parts 
view of the world, premise i. of the lead argument makes more sense as well. 
Premise i. maintained that anything capable of being infinitely divided must 
contain an infinite number of parts. If Hume was committed to a 
conception of the structure of material things in terms of actual parts, this 
premise seems only to be the expression of that commitment. If division 
into parts is not a process of creating new parts but only of discovering the 
distinct parts already present in the whole, then something’s being infinite 
divisibility does entail it has, before any act of division, an actual infinity of 
parts. If Hume was committed to a world-view where extended and 
enduring things have actual parts then he would presumably reject an 
objection grounded in the possibility of potential parts as at odds with this 
commitment. Of course, such a rejection without further defence might still 
strike us as unwarranted but at least on this way of seeing things we can 
explain why Hume would make it.    
 
Consider now the second objection: that it is not the case that anything that 
contains an infinite number of parts must be infinitely large. Holden argues 
that a commitment to actual parts bears upon this as well. On a potential 
parts reading, it seems perfectly possible that a finite thing could contain an 
infinite number of parts. We might, for example, appeal to proportional 
parts, as Fogelin did above. If we think in terms of proportional parts then 
there seems no reason to think a finite thing could not be infinitely divisible, 
for we may divide and divide ad infinitum and this does nothing to contribute 
to the size of the divided entity. However, if one is committed to actual 
parts, one might not reason so quickly. To say that something is infinitely 
divisible is to say that is contains an actual infinity of parts. These parts are 
prior to the aggregate and, if they have any magnitude at all, the addition of 
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these parts would seem to create a greater sum. The addition of an infinity 
of such parts would indeed create something infinitely large. A commitment 
to actual parts may go some way towards making the claim of this premise 
plausible, however, I am hesitant to suggest that it fully accounts for it. In 
his discussion Holden does indeed bring in an additional element; he argues 
that Hume’s commitment to simple ultimate parts comes in to play. It is 
worth looking at his reasoning more closely.  
 
Holden suggests that we view Hume’s second argument against infinite 
divisibility (T 1.2.2.3; SBN 30), as an argument aimed at providing support 
for premise ii. (that nothing finite can contain an infinite number of parts). I 
will not discuss the second argument in depth until the next chapter but in 
essence the argument relies on the position that complex things (being 
numbers of things) exist in virtue of the existence of simple things. Without 
these simple things, Hume suggests, we could never ground complexity. If 
one is committed to infinite divisibility, one rejects the idea that there are 
simples, instead at every level we always find complexes. So, if one is 
committed to infinite divisibility, one cannot allow for the foundational layer 
of simple things that ground the existence of the complex whole. As such, 
Hume rejects infinite divisibility and supposes that complex things exist in 
virtue of the existence of a simple bedrock layer of indivisibles. These 
indivisibles are ontologically foundational and act as the requisite grounds 
for the existence of the complex.    
 
By using this second argument as support for the second premise of the first 
argument, Holden appeals to more than a mere commitment to actual parts 
then. Substituting in the additional idea that the actual parts are, for Hume, 
simple ultimate parts he points out that simple parts are, so to speak, all the 
same size. As a result of this he suggests that Hume is not able to go the way 
of proportional parts as proportional parts diminish in size. Given he cannot 
(or at least will not) appeal to proportional parts, Hume instead must say 




I have a three reservations with this treatment of the argument. Firstly an 
interpretive concern: if, as Holden suggests, Hume’s commitment to 
ultimate parts rules out proportional parts whilst accepting aliquot ones, it is 
unclear to me why he would call the distinction between the two 
“frivolous.” After all, if one accepts one formulation and rejects the other 
one might think it key to keep the two apart and make clear that they are 
different. Secondly, even if we reject proportional parts and suppose that any 
infinitely divisible thing exists in virtue of the existence of an infinitude of 
same-sized parts, this still does not seem to give us an infinitely large thing 
unless we also suppose these parts have some magnitude. Hume’s moments 
are simple and possess no duration, his spatial parts are simple and so 
possess no extension. It is not clear that an infinite number of these would 
give you something infinitely large. Even if we allow Holden the addition of 
the second argument and the idea that the actual parts for Hume are simple 
ultimate parts, this still seems to fall short of explaining the second premise 
for it does not explain why a finite thing could not contain an infinite 
number of parts.34   
 
My third concern is that Holden’s way of viewing the second argument 
seems both somewhat unmotivated and potentially problematic. Holden 
states that the second argument is “clearly intended to support the second 
premise.”35 Each of Hume’s arguments seems capable of standing alone and 
the second seems on equal ground with the first. It is possible that Hume 
intended the second argument as support for the second premise of the first 
but, if that is the case, he was not explicit about this. More troublingly 
perhaps is how question-begging the first argument seems to become if we 
treat it in this way. If we are meant to supplement the second premise of the 
first argument with the conclusion of the second argument, that is, with the 
idea that the parts we are to be concerned with are simple, ultimate parts, we 
seem to entirely beg the question against the infinite divisibility theorist. If 
                                                 
34 In the next chapter I will discuss the interesting question of why Hume might think that 
simple moments which possess no duration could ever compose a duration. I will go on to 
argue that his theory has the resources to face this challenge (though I suggest it involves an 
appeal not to actual parts but to the intrinsic features of moments and parts themselves). 
Leaving that aside for now though, it still seems that a mere commitment to actual parts is 
not sufficient. 
35 Holden (2002) p.12.  
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we must suppose simple ultimate parts in order to argue against infinite 
divisibility it seems hardly worth making the argument for we have already 
employed in the premises something the proponent of infinite divisibility 
would entirely reject. If this is the reasoning Hume is engaged in then it 
seems so much the worse for him.  
 
For these reasons I think Holden’s reinterpretation fails to make sense of 
Hume’s reasoning in the second premise of the first argument. However, to 
its credit, adopting this route does at least make sense of the first premise 
and seems also to see away the third objection regarding the coherence of 
Hume’s project in general. Appealing to a commitment to actual parts may 
help to some extent then. Although such a commitment could only be called 
implicit at best (as Hume certainly does not make this commitment clear), if 
Hume was committed to a metaphysics of concrete entities in terms of 
actual parts we might think his argument makes more sense. We might, 
however, ask why such a crucial element as this commitment would be left 
merely implicit. Holden’s response is to argue that a commitment to actual 
parts was reasonably well accepted at the time, at least as a conception of 
matter if not of space itself. Such a view had largely usurped the broadly 
Aristotelian approach which is better aligned with potential parts and 
Holden cites thinkers including Bayle, Descartes, Isaac Barrow, Leibniz, and 
Newton in support of this claim.36  
 
For Holden then, Hume’s arguments should be read alongside an implicit 
commitment to actual parts, a commitment that would, Holden suggests, be 
shared by many of his readers. If one takes an entity to be composed of 
distinct actual parts, Hume’s argument aims to show that this entity cannot 
also be infinitely divisible. And if we interpret Hume in this way then his 
argument seems to make more sense: taking any finite extension, the 
potential parts theorist might maintain that it is possible for it to be infinitely 
divisible because, though any process of actual division will be finite and 
give one a finite number of parts, there is no end point to the possible 
divisions and so anything finite contains a potential infinity of parts. The 
                                                 




actual parts theorist can then respond that, for it to be possible that the 
process of division continue ad infinitum, it must be possible for there to be 
an infinite number of parts in the thing divided. If it is not possible for any 
finite thing to contain an actual infinity of parts, it is equally impossible for 
there to be finite things which are infinitely divisible.  
 
 
2.3. Two Problems of Explanatory Adequacy 
Hume does not explicitly state a commitment to the doctrine of actual parts. 
In the later parts of this chapter I will give my reasons for withholding such 
a view from him. However, for now it is worth noting that, if this was his 
commitment, Holden has offered us a route to viewing Hume’s project as 
metaphysical and grounded by metaphysical commitments and this in turn 
allows us a means to explain why seemingly obvious mathematical 
objections were ignored. Regardless of whether the resulting arguments are 
sufficient to convince, at least on this reading they make sense and we do 
not have to attribute such serious mathematical ineptitude to him.     
 
However, we might still worry that the arguments seem somewhat 
unconvincing. Unconvincing enough, I suggest, for us to return to the text 
seeking a deeper explanation. To elaborate on this there are a couple of 
worries that I want to stress here. Firstly, an interpretive critique which 
strikes me as damning given Holden’s aims: that a commitment to actual 
parts does not explain Hume’s reasoning in his arguments. I discussed above 
the concern that appeal to actual parts alone was not sufficient to explain his 
reasoning in the first, “lead” argument. My contention was that in order to 
explain why something that had an infinite number of parts must be 
infinitely large we required not only a commitment to actual parts but also a 
commitment to those parts possessing properties that would allow them to 
compose an infinitely large aggregate by addition. This concern with the 
explanatory adequacy of a mere appeal to actual parts in explaining the first 
argument seems further strengthened by the fact that a commitment to 
actual parts also seems questionably at best in explaining Hume’s third 
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argument which is concerned with the infinite divisibility of time, which I 
will now turn to.  
 
As mentioned above, how to cut Hume’s discussion into arguments is 
contentious. To make my position explicit: I take the “lead” argument 
discussed above to be the first of three offered. The second I take to be the 
argument Hume attributes to Malezieu which I will discuss in the next 
chapter. These first two arguments, though tending to be explored in terms 
of spatial examples, are said to apply equally to time. However, in the case of 
time we are also offered an “additional” argument, set out in T 1.2.2.4. One 
might reasonably think this argument implies something special about the 
nature of time in contrast to the nature of space and, indeed, that is how 
Hume presents it. The argument relies on the idea that, unlike the parts of 
space, the parts of time (that is, the moments) cannot coexist.37 By arguing 
that infinite divisibility entails coexisting moments Hume forwards a reductio 
against the proponent of infinite divisibility. However, I contend that merely 
supposing a commitment to actual parts cannot explain his reasoning here. 
As such, if we are interested in accounting equally for his account of time as 
well as of space, a commitment to actual parts offers only an incomplete 
explanation of Hume’s arguments. To draw this out it is worth giving 
Hume’s third argument in full:  
 
’Tis a property inseparable from time, and which in a manner constitutes its 
essence, that each of its parts succeeds another, and that none of them, 
however contiguous, can ever be co-existent. For the same reason, that the 
year 1737 cannot concur with the present year 1738, every moment must be 
distinct from, and posterior or antecedent to another. ’Tis certain then, that 
time, as it exists, must be compos’d of indivisible moments. For if in time we 
could never arrive at an end of division, and if each moment, as it succeeds 
another, were not perfectly single and indivisible, there would be an infinite 
                                                 
37 The extent to which space and time actually are disanalogous cases here is interesting. As 
will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5, so long as we frame the question in a genuinely 
analogous way, we might think there is problem for space here too: just as the parts of time 
cannot coexist, i.e. exist in the same time, so to the parts of space cannot coexist in the 
sense of existing in the same place. The parts of space can coexist in time and the parts of time 
can coexist in space (i.e. an event consisting of different moments can unfold in one and the 
same place), however, neither can coexist in the other sense. Hume appears to neglect to 
note this and presents space and time as disanalogous in spite of this. Thanks to Jasper Reid 
for highlighting this point.    
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number of co-existent moments, or parts of time; which I believe will be 
allow’d to be an arrant contradiction.38   
 
Holden does not consider this third argument, indeed, as mentioned above, 
it receives very little discussion in the literature. However, if, as Holden 
suggests, it is a commitment to actual parts that is the covert driving force in 
Hume’s arguments we might think that this commitment should be able to 
help us explain this argument too. Here I will suggest some reasons for 
thinking it cannot. The core question seems to be why it is that Hume 
thought that the coexistence of moments was a contradiction. I will argue 
that a commitment to actual parts does not seem to account for this in that a 
commitment to actual parts does not rule out that the actual parts in an 
entity overlap or, in time, coexist. If, as Holden suggests, we see the doctrine 
of arbitrary undetached parts as a contemporary analogue of the actual parts 
doctrine this becomes clear: there is no contradiction in supposing that the 
actual part which is the cat’s head and the actual part which is the cat’s 
whiskers at least partly overlap and, so to speak, coexist.    
 
To be fair we should ensure that we are exploring a case of temporal parts 
but again, it does not seem that any contradiction arises. Within the year of 
1983 we can discern the actual parts which are the month of February and 
the day of the 26th. These actual parts partly overlap and, on the 26th of 
February, the day, the month, and the year all, to use Hume’s terminology, 
coexist. However, Hume tells us the coexistence of the moments of time is 
an “arrant contradiction.”    
 
Merely supposing actual parts does not seem to be enough then. However, 
given Holden’s approach above, we can imagine a response he might be 
inclined to make and whether that would be stronger. As discussed above, 
Holden has already employed the second argument defending simple 
ultimate parts to make sense of the first argument and we might do that 
again here. If we take the relevant actual parts to be the simple ultimate parts 
then we could reject the counterexample of the day, the month and year 
coexisting. If the actual parts are the ultimate parts then they all exist on the 
                                                 
38 T 1.2.2.4; SBN 31. 
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same foundational level for they are the simple, indivisible, ontologically 
basic elements of durations. The day, the month, and the year are not, so 
they are not an appropriate analogy.  
 
I think this response has some merit. If we limit our thinking to the simple 
ultimate parts perhaps it is a given that, since there just are so many distinct 
cuts you can make at the foundational level, there is no coexistence of 
moments. Equally, since these parts are simple we might reason that there 
can be no question of them overlapping. As Hume notes later in T 1.2.4., as 
they possess no parts simples cannot overlap at all without completely 
overlapping and that seems to amount to the annihilation of one by the 
other.39 Hume does explain why simple things cannot overlap then, but only 
much later. If we suppose a commitment to ultimate parts, and we fill in the 
results of this later argument, it seems we could explain why the parts of 
time do not coexist.  
 
Although this response gets us to the right place, it seems to do it in a rather 
round-about manner. It involves an appeal to ultimate parts which, as 
before, seems to involve attributing a rather question-begging line of 
reasoning to Hume. Furthermore, Hume’s given example is of years which 
he says cannot coexist, ultimate parts do not seem to illuminate that. This 
appeal also requires us to have Hume only eventually giving us support for 
this claim much later in his discussion, two sections after the argument. It 
seems a cumbersome explanation of his reasoning here to employ this later 
point. As a final concern, although bearing in mind that simples cannot 
overlap would allow us to explain why the moments of time do not coexist, 
it does not quite seem to explain why their coexistence is a contradiction. 
Hume stresses the impossibility of the parts of time coexisting; it is called an 
“arrant contradiction.” Merely supposing a commitment to actual parts does 
not explain this but even if we also substitute in an additional supposition of 
ultimate parts we do not seem to reach this very strong claim of 
contradiction. Again then, an analysis in terms of actual parts does not seem 
to be sufficient in explaining Hume’s reasoning. This third argument seems 
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to tell us it is something special about the nature of time that means its parts 
(and not even just its simple momentary parts) cannot coexist, but Holden’s 
route does not give us this result. If we can, it would be better to find an 
interpretation that addressed all these issues. Fortunately I think one is 
available.   
 
I said above I would offer two challenges. The first is the summation of 
these interpretive worries: that it is not clearly explanatorily adequate in 
either of the arguments to merely appeal to actual parts. The second 
challenge is more critical: even if an appeal to actual parts were explanatorily 
adequate, it is not clear that it strengthens Hume’s arguments themselves 
unless independent motivation for accepting actual parts is given. I should 
stress that Holden recognises this, indeed, he thinks the most effective line 
of objection to Hume’s argument involves adopting a potential parts 
standpoint which would simply undermine an argument that relied on 
assuming actual parts from the off. Hume may have thought this argument 
was strong because he was committed to actual parts: however, if no 
justification for actual parts is given, such an argument will feel fatally 
question-begging to a proponent of potential parts. There seems something 
unsatisfying in allowing an underlying commitment which is neither stated 
nor defended to do so much work in explaining Hume’s reasoning.  
 
In what follows I will argue for an interpretation which brings into the fold 
some additional elements and, in so doing, I reinterpret Hume as forwarding 
a more complex line of attack than a mere commitment to actual parts 
would allow. I believe in doing this we also find something more critically 
defensible. Motivated by these concerns I will finish this chapter by aiming 
to provide a more inclusive interpretation which is sensitive to these 
requirements. I will argue Hume’s commitments are well grounded in his 
epistemology and his own brand of empiricism. As such, not everyone will 
find them palatable. However, they are explored and defended and so he is 





2.4. Hume’s Conditional Metaphysics  
In making my case I will firstly consider Hume’s stated methodology. I will 
argue this gives us good reason to see Hume as engaged in a metaphysical 
project, albeit one strongly restrained by his epistemology and commitments 
he presents in T 1.1. To the extent that his arguments are metaphysical and 
aimed at a concrete external world, should it exist beyond our perceptions, I 
suggest we have reason to contextualise them in a way that means that the 
broadest objection that Hume fails to see that infinite divisibility admits of a 
coherent model does not apply. This removes the first barrier to the 
adequacy of his arguments against in the same manner that Holden and 
others have.   
 
In reconsidering his metaphysical methodology here I will take seriously 
Hume’s claim that the two parts of his system concerning time and space 
(the metaphysics and the epistemology, respectively) are “intimately 
connected.”40 Spurred on by this I will use the second part of Hume’s 
system to illuminate the problem and to fill out an interpretation of the 
nature of time and its moments that goes beyond a structural commitment 
to actual parts and tells us something of the nature of the parts of time 
themselves. I will argue that viewing moments in this way allows us to 
explain Hume’s reasoning in the third argument as well as the first.  
 
Having shown that a unified interpretation is available that makes sense of 
both the first and the third arguments I will finish by addressing the 
challenge that Hume begs the question against a potential parts theorist by 
proceeding with a parts-first methodology. I argue that, although his 
approach does rely on a parts-first conception of the world, this is not in 
virtue of a mere assumption of actual parts. Instead we can explain Hume’s 
methodology by appeal to deeper principles inherent in his account. This 
might explain to some extent why such an apparently important point as a 
commitment to actual parts could remain unstated: because the real driving 
force here is not such a commitment at all. Instead we can account perfectly 
well by appeal only to the principles set out in T 1.1., principles and 
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arguments that Hume does make perfectly explicit and defends with 
argument. To the extent that these principles are defended in arguments, not 
mere assumptions, he does not then simply beg the question.    
 
 
2.4.1. Hume’s Metaphysical Methodology: Ideas as Adequate 
Representations  
To begin then I will say more to defend the view that what Hume is 
fundamentally engaged in is metaphysics when he forwards his arguments 
against infinite divisibility. And, indeed, in the metaphysics of a world 
beyond our perceptions, should there be one.41 Such a view is not 
uncontentious. Motivated by Hume’s apparent agnosticism regarding the 
existence of an external world, and his claim that we cannot conceive 
anything “specifically different” to perceptions, many are inclined to 
interpret him as a phenomenalist. In spite of his apparent dismissal of the 
phenomenalist position as one held by only the most “extravagant sceptics” 
he does seem to accept that direct experience is limited to phenomena:42   
 
Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all 
ideas are deriv’d from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, 
that ’tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any 
thing specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our 
attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chace our imagination 
to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really 
advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but 
those perceptions, which have appear’d in that narrow compass. This is the 
universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there 
produc’d.43  
 
Perceptions are seemingly the only objects of experience. If there exists a 
world beyond them we seem to be epistemically cut off from it in an 
important way. If I am to maintain, as I do, that the arguments of T 1.2.2. 
are intended to restrain the possible nature of any world beyond perceptions, 
                                                 
41 The conditionality of the “should there be one” part is important. I will say more to 
defend this in what follows but broadly, although I Hume to remain officially agnostic 
about the reality of an external world, I also take him to think us capable of concluding 
various facts about the possible ways it can be structured if it does, in fact, exist.   
42 T 1.3.2.49; SBN 214.  
43 T 1.2.6.8; SBN 67-8.   
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there must be reasons to think both that Hume was willing to countenance 
the existence of an external world and that he thought there was a way to 
bridge this epistemic gap such that we could be in a position to say anything 
positive about it. The interpretation I forward of T 1.2.1. involves him doing 
both these things.  
 
The discussion of T 1.2.1. “Of the Infinite Divisibility of our Ideas of Space 
and Time” provides the groundwork for T 1.2.2. “Of the Infinite Divisibility 
of Space and Time.” And this might at first seem surprising. To the extent 
that the second section is apparently aimed at space and time themselves, 
beginning with a consideration of our ideas of space and time might seem an 
unusual route. However, this starting point does important work. Not least 
because the discussion that follows appears to involve an implicit but 
notable appearance/reality divide.   
 
Hume begins by noting some apparent epistemic limitations which we face 
in investigating the substructure of the world. Our senses “represent as 
minute and uncompounded what is really great and compos’d of a vast 
number of parts.”44 We can only perceive at such a level and yet nature is 
capable of “prodigious minuteness” seemingly far beyond that level.45 Our 
senses, we might think, are simply too blunt an instrument for any 
investigation into the structure of the world since “sound reasoning 
convinces us that there are bodies vastly more minute than those, which 
appear to the senses.”46 And this seems to be a limitation that applies equally 
to investigation of the smallest moments of time as it does to the ultimate 
parts (should there be any) of space. Consider his appeal to the example of 
the whirling coal:   
 
If you wheel about a burning coal with rapidity, it will present to the senses 
an image of a circle of fire…because ’tis impossible for our perceptions to 
succeed each other with the same rapidity, that motion may be 
communicated to external objects…we have no notion of time, even tho’ 
there be a real succession in the objects.47 
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In this case our senses are not able to pick up on the real succession in the 
object, that is, the complexity of the situation outruns our sense faculties. 
Comments such as these appear to implicitly recognise a world of some 
description beyond our perceptions that is spatially and temporally complex 
beyond that which we can perceive.  
 
Hume also presents our capacity to discern in thought as being limited in an 
analogous way, that is, we are not capable of infinite intellectual discernment 
either: “whatever we may imagine of the thing, the idea of a grain of sand is 
not distinguishable, nor separable into twenty, much less into a thousand, 
ten thousand, or an infinite number of different ideas.”48 Just as we are 
incapable of any very great (and far less infinitely great) degree of sensory 
perception, we are equally incapable of any very great refinement of ideas. 
Hume notes that, as regards both ideas and impressions, the mind arrives 
fairly quickly at a smallest perception and we seemingly are stuck there: “the 
imagination reaches a minimum, and may raise up to itself an idea, of which it 
cannot conceive any sub-division, and which cannot be diminished without 
a total annihilation.”49  
 
Although his comments here certainly provide reasons to suppose our 
perceptions are not infinitely divisible, they equally seem to provide support 
for thinking that our perceptions are not even as refined as the things in the 
world. Thus a form of appearance/reality divide appears to be in play 
between our perceptions and something external to those perceptions: the 
world, whatever that turns out to be. In spite of his official agnosticism 
regarding the existence of the external world, there is a thread of 
commitment to something beyond perceptions that runs through this 
section and its discussion. Certainly, Hume accepts in terms of our beliefs 
that we are incapable of ridding ourselves of a belief in an external world 
entirely and so one might expect it to inform our thinking in this area. He 
notes that “’tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, 
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42 
 
which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.”50 However, in light of 
the comments above one might be tempted to conclude that, tempting 
though this belief is, we are ill-equipped to investigate the world, especially 
in terms of its substructure. If we are unable to form different ideas of the 
grain of sand and something ten thousand times smaller than it, we might 
think that we are simply in no position to proceed into an examination of 
the smallest parts of the world, or indeed into whether the world admits of 
smallest parts at all.  
 
However, Hume’s conclusion is more optimistic: He accepts that we are 
unable to experience the smallest parts of the world should there be any. 
However, he does suggest that our perceptions are capable of serving as so-
called “adequate representations” of these smallest things. The smallest 
possible things, should the world be such as to have a smallest possible level, 
will be the simple things, those things which are indivisible. And, in virtue of 
their simplicity, our smallest perceptions are perfectly well able to represent 
this lowest level, should it exist, for these perceptions are themselves simple. 
Hume concludes that: “Nothing can be more minute, than some ideas, 
which we form in the fancy; and images, which appear to the senses; since 
there are ideas and images perfectly simple and indivisible.”51 Insofar as they 
are simple, our perceptions can enable us to represent hypothetical simples 
we cannot experience. 
 
The lesson Hume seems to propose from this is to ensure we proceed in our 
investigations with caution. To recognise the respects in which our 
perceptions are capable of representing accurately and the respects in which 
they could lead us astray. To the extent that they are simple our simple 
perceptions allow us to think about the smallest possible things if there are 
any and, when a perception is an adequate representation of an object, it can 
allow us a kind of access to objects that we cannot experience. Thus Hume 
begins the next section (T 1.2.2.) with a general principle summing the 
results of T 1.2.1. and this principle will guide his investigation from here on 
in:  
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Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, 
contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects; 
and this we may in general observe to be the foundation of all human 
knowledge. But our ideas are adequate representations of the most minute 
parts of extension; and thro’ whatever divisions and subdivisions we may 
suppose these parts to be arriv’d at, they can never become inferior to some 
ideas, which we form. The plain consequence is, that whatever appears 
impossible and contradictory upon the comparison of these ideas, must be 
really impossible and contradictory, without any farther excuse or evasion.52   
 
This is the epistemological groundwork that underlies Hume’s metaphysical 
methodology. When our investigation is grounded in ideas which adequately 
represent their objects in the respect that matters for our reasoning, we can 
proceed. We can do metaphysics then, but we must proceed from what we 
do have access to (our perceptions) and be cautious in carrying any results 
over to the world. Adopting this route does not involve violating Hume’s 
comments above that we cannot conceive of anything specifically different 
to our perceptions. To the extent that we conceive only perceptions we 
suppose nothing illegitimate. These simple perceptions though provide a 
way to think about simple things more generally, including the simple things 
in the world, should there be any.53   
 
Importantly, reading T 1.2.1. in this way does not involve supposing that our 
ideas represent external objects (should there be any) in any other respects 
than their simplicity. Though we have reasons to suppose our ideas may 
adequately represent impressions, we do not have reasons for imagining our 
impressions to be capable of adequately representing external objects in 
                                                 
52 T 1.2.2.1; SBN 29.  
53 When Hume states that “my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, 
or explain the secret causes of their operations…we can never pretend to know body 
otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses” (T 
1.2.5.25; SBN 64) we can take him seriously. For he is not suggesting that we can know 
bodies by any other means. In fact, this reading of adequate ideas is not in conflict with this 
view but an instance of it, for here we pretend to knowledge of body through the external 
properties which discover them to the senses.  When Jacquette cites this passage in his 
critique of the presence of an appearance/reality reading he states that “Hume is officially 
skeptical about idealism and realism...from a skeptical, empirically circumspect methodology 
we can only look to our impressions and ideas for truths about the world.” (1996) p. 73. I 
suggest this is exactly right and yet, I do not think it tells against what I propose here. In 
certain limited senses, I take it that Hume thought we were capable of using our ideas to 
think about things that exist beyond them, should there be any such things. This point will 
be discussed and defended further in chapters 3 and 8. 
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many respects. In his discussion of adequate representations and the 
problem of deriving conclusions regarding the separability or connections 
between external objects from the separability of our impressions and ideas, 
Kail highlights this apparent unknowability of whether our perceptions are 
adequate and argues Hume was aware of and sensitive to this.54 He proposes 
this should be viewed as an epistemic roadblock rather than a metaphysical 
one (that is, a result of a lack of the kind of epistemic access to external 
objects rather than the sort of failure of representation that might be 
thought to occur if there were nothing to represent) and highlights Hume’s 
avocation of caution in light of our inability to know if our impressions are 
adequate representations or not. However, even Hume’s cautious notes 
seem to contain a kind of optimism:   
 
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, 
in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and ’twill always be 
impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the 
object, or are produc’d by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv’d from 
the author of our being. Nor is such a question any way material to our 
present purpose. We may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions, whether 
they be true or false; whether they represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the senses. 
[My italics].55 
 
Hume is clearly wary of the unknowability of whether our impressions 
represent the world well or badly. It seems we are in no position to know. 
However, in spite of this, we still may draw certain inferences. This suggests 
to me that, when employed cautiously and in only limited respects, Hume 
allows us use of these perceptions as tools for thinking about an external 
world. 
 
We cannot ignore this caution though. In light of it, I suggest two things we 
need to keep in mind: firstly, as I will elaborate on below, our use must be 
conditional. Secondly, we can take perceptions to represent only in certain 
limited respects. In his discussion at T 1.2.1. I take Hume to suggest that, in 
respect of their simplicity, our simple perceptions allow us a handhold on 
                                                 
54 For more discussion of adequate representations, and the difficulties they present see Kail 
(2007a).  
55 T 1.3.5.2; SBN 84.  
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thinking of simple things more generally, which include things which may be 
beyond our experience. However, in this case it is in this respect only that he 
allows us to employ our perceptions. In virtue of their simplicity they serve 
as adequate representations of simple things. However, in many other 
respects, perceptions will not allow us the least grip on external objects, 
should there even be any. Hume highlights not just the difficulty but the 
danger of moving beyond perceptions, suggesting that “[i]f we carry our 
enquiry beyond the impressions to the appearances of objects to the sense, I 
am afraid, that most of our conclusions will be fill of scepticism and 
uncertainty.”56 I agree. However, I am inclined to emphasise the “most.” In 
some limited respects, I take Hume to be accepting of a kind of use for 
perceptions in virtue of the ways in which they can adequately represent. 
This use is limited, but it affords us a tool here nonetheless.57  
 
Interpreted in this way, T 1.2.1. provides a methodology for proceeding in 
metaphysical investigation. It also supports a reading of T 1.2.2. as an 
investigation into space and time (as Hume’s section title implies) should 
they exist externally to our perceptions, not merely our ideas of space and 
time. This section then both provides reasons to think there is an 
appearance/reality gap and a tool by which we might cross that gap. To the 
extent that our ideas are adequate representations they can help us think 
about the world. I suggest we read Hume’s methodology as conditional, as 
suggested by the “wherever” in “Wherever ideas are adequate 
representations of objects, the relations, contradictions and agreements of 
the ideas are all applicable to the objects.” We are not offered a guarantee 
that our perceptions are adequate representations in all respects and indeed 
are offered evidence that they are not truthful representations in some 
respects (hence their representing as “minute and uncompounded what is 
really great and compos’d of a vast number of parts.”58). The parts of the 
world need not bear any other qualitative resemblance to our ideas, however, 
in some limited respects are perceptions are tools we can use, as such, we are 
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57 For further discussion of adequate ideas in Hume and some links and contrasts between 
his use and the use of them by Descartes and Locke, see Ainslie (2010).  
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not barred from engaging in metaphysics nor pressing our investigations 
deeper.  
 
Returning briefly to the first argument, which occurs immediately after 
Hume has made his claim about ideas as adequate representations, we can 
see that he does indeed adopt this use of perceptions. Specifically here it is 
used to illustrate his contention that nothing finite could contain an infinite 
number of parts: “[t]hat this latter supposition [that a finite thing have an 
infinite number of parts] is absurd, I easily convince myself by my 
consideration of my clear ideas.”59 Hume proceeds in the following way:   
 
I first take the least idea I can form of a part of extension, and being certain 
there is nothing more minute than this idea, I conclude, that whatever I 
discover by its means must be a real quality of extension. I then repeat this 
idea once, twice, thrice, &c. and find the compound idea of extension, arising 
from its repetition, always to augment, and become double, triple, quadruple, 
&c… were I to carry on the addition in infinitum, I clearly perceive, that the 
idea of extension must also become infinite. Upon the whole, I conclude, that 
the idea of an infinite number of parts is individually the same idea with that 
of an infinite extension; that no finite extension is capable of containing an 
infinite number of parts; and consequently that no finite extension is 
infinitely divisible.60    
 
I leave aside for now further explanation of whether Hume’s thinking here 
can be justified, that is, how and whether such simple parts could possibly 
compose a greater aggregate by their addition. This concern is an interesting 
and complex issue that I will take up in the next chapter. For now though, 
we can see that Hume’s methodology of investigating ideas is very much at 
the fore when he begins making his arguments against the infinite divisibility 
of space and time.  
 
 
2.4.2. The Nature of Parts and Moments    
In the above quotation I suggested we saw an instance of this particular 
methodology. Returning to the argument being forwarded now, this 
quotation also seems to show us something else as well. The role that the 
                                                 




idea of a part is playing seems to trade on something more than just its 
distinctness within the whole. Supposing actual parts will give you distinct 
parts, but Hume seems to require not only distinct parts, but parts with 
properties that enable them to compose aggregates by addition: we begin by 
thinking of a part and, from that idea and others like it, question what many 
parts would create. Hume does not tell us what the additional properties are 
but it is my contention that distinctness alone does not cut it.61 Similarly, in 
the third argument we need to explain why it is that the coexistence of the 
moments of time is a contradiction: what it is about moments that means 
their coexistence is a contradiction? And why and how do several moments 
sum to a duration? These questions will be resolved in tandem. What seems 
required in order to address them is a deeper look into the nature of parts 
and moments.  
 
In order to understand what a part of space or a moment of time must be, 
Hume turns as per his methodology to the consideration of our ideas. In this 
investigation a crucial role is played by his commitment to all ideas being 
particular. In order to illustrate the way this applies to the ideas of parts and 
moments it will be helpful to appeal to the arguments of T 1.2.3., which 
concern the ideas of time and space and the ways we come to form these 
ideas. Using these elements might seem problematic since they occur after 
the arguments which I am using them to understand. However, although 
this section provides the clearest exploration of the nature of parts and 
moments, the argumentation that provides us with this analysis of them 
occurs before any of the sections on space and time. Primarily it is presented 
in T 1.1.7. where Hume expresses his distrust of “abstraction by separation”, 
that is, the formation of an abstract idea by the process of stripping away 
particular features until an indeterminate idea capable of representing a 
variety is reached. These commitments are at his disposal in T 1.2.1. and T 
                                                 
61 This feeling that distinctness alone does not quite cut it might also arise when we look 
again at Hume’s “frivolous” distinction: “[w]hether these parts be call’d aliquot or 
proportional, they cannot be inferior to those minute parts we conceive; and therefore cannot 
form a lesser extension by their conjunction.” (T 1.2.2.2; footnote 1, SBN 30). Distinctness 
does not seem to enter the picture, what matters seems to be something about the part and 
its properties. Specifically, however we conceive it we must think of is as something, and the 
addition of something to something gives you something greater. For further discussion of 
this footnote, its derivation, and an alternative reading of its role, see Frasca-Spada (1998) 
pp. 33-38.   
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1.2.2. even if the fullest application of them to parts and moments does not 
occur until T 1.2.3. I suggest considering them here provide us with a way of 
understanding and illuminating his arguments against infinite divisibility.  
 
There are two ways in particular I suggest his rejection of abstract ideas 
comes in to play in T 1.2.3. Firstly, it requires us when thinking of a part or a 
moment to maintain an idea of each as fully determinate in their properties. 
Secondly, it informs the very concepts of time and space, and sets certain 
bounds on the kinds of intrinsic nature that parts and moments must have in 
order to collectively instantiate extensions and durations.   
 
Firstly then, Hume’s prescribed methodology had us begin with ideas and 
use them as a tool for thinking about things beyond ideas. And Hume 
follows Berkeley in his commitment to all ideas being particular and fully 
determinate in their quantities and qualities. Taking any given idea, if we 
strip away its particular properties then we lose the idea itself. This is a 
thought that drives his rejection of abstraction by separation but it also 
means we must think of ideas as propertied in order to think of them at all. 
In light of this, in order to think of a part or a moment, even when we think 
of a part or moment in general, we must nonetheless think of some 
particular, and this particular will be fully determinate in its properties.  
 
This comes to the fore in the discussion of T 1.2.3. In the case of extension 
Hume highlights the necessity of the experience of extension being an 
experience which has certain qualities in order to count as an experience of 
extension at all. The same goes for experiences of time. Crucially, this 
requirement means our ideas of the parts of space and the moments of time 
must also be certain ways:     
 
There is nothing but the idea of their colour or tangibility, which can render 
them conceivable by the mind. Upon the removal of the ideas of these 
sensible qualities, they are utterly annihilated to the thought or 
imagination…The same reasoning will prove, that the indivisible moments of 
time must be fill’d with some real object or existence, whose succession 
forms the duration, and makes it be conceivable by the mind.62 
                                                 




And later: “[t]he parts, into which the ideas of space and time resolve 
themselves, become at last indivisible; and these indivisible parts, being 
nothing in themselves, are inconceivable when not fill’d with something real 
and existent.”63 
 
Applying this to the first “lead” argument of T 1.2.2. is illuminating. We 
begin by considering our ideas, namely the least idea we can form. If this 
idea is an adequate representation of the smallest possible part of the world 
then we can consider it and see if anything follows regarding those smallest 
parts. But when we consider this idea of a part we find that we cannot think 
of a part at all (or anything else for that matter) unless we think of it as 
having some particular nature, that is, some particular properties. Our idea 
of a spatial part need not be blue, or red or green, or even coloured (so long 
as it is tactile). However, if we do not think of it as having some properties 
(be they visual or tactile) we lose the idea of a part entirely.  
 
When we further consider our idea of a part, we find that these qualities 
make these parts little somethings, and two little somethings make a larger 
thing. We might think this is exactly his point when he discusses how the 
union of a blue and a red point create an extended, two-tone complex.64 The 
qualities of these ideas of the smallest parts allow them to form sums or 
aggregates and, if we keep adding them, the aggregate will grow. If we were 
capable of adding ideas to our bundle infinitely (though Hume argues in T 
1.2.1. that we are not) then we would have an aggregate of infinite size. This, 
I suggest, is the reasoning that Hume is engaged in when he forwards his 
first argument. The distinctness of the parts is key but they are distinct in 
virtue of their intrinsic properties.  
 
That their distinctness is reliant on their properties is even clearer in the case 
of the moments of time. Hume tells us that our ideas of time and space are 
ideas of the “manners of appearance,” “manner of disposition” or “order of 
arrangement” of existing things: “[t]he idea of time is not deriv’d from a 
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64 T 1.2.4.7; SBN 41.   
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particular impression mix’d up with others, and plainly distinguishable from 
them; but arises altogether from the manner, in which impressions appear to 
the mind, without making one of the number.”65 
 
Time is not a sixth impression, distinct from the five notes played on the 
flute. Instead the idea of time is the idea of the succession of notes. Time, 
for Hume, is “nothing but the manner, in which some real objects exist.”66 
Applying his rejection of abstraction by separation to our ideas of moments 
it seems that our idea of a moment, in itself, is nothing over and above what 
exists within it. For this reason, any thought of a moment will be a thought 
of some particular grouping of coexistents (whatever exists at that time). We 
can form a functionally abstract idea of a moment by association in virtue of 
perceived resemblance as we can with other general ideas, but our idea of 
any particular moment is nothing over and above the idea of the things that 
exist at that time. Each idea of a moment then must possess determinate 
properties, it must be an expression of some existing things. 
 
We also see in the above that succession, conceived of in terms of change, is 
integral to the concept of time or duration, indeed, Hume holds that nothing 
unchanging can really be called temporal:   
 
[T]ime, in a strict sense, implies succession, and that when we apply its idea to 
any unchangeable object, ’tis only by a fiction of the imagination, by which 
the unchangeable object is suppos’d to participate of the changes of the co-




The ideas of space and time are therefore no separate or distinct ideas, but 
merely those of the manner or order, in which objects exist: Or, in other 
words, ’tis impossible to conceive either a vacuum and extension without 
matter, or a time, when there was no succession or change in any real 
existence.68  
 
                                                 
65 T 1.2.3.10; SBN 36.  
66 T 1.2.4.28; SBN 64.  
67 T 1.4.2.29; SBN 200-1 
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An idea of time without change is, in quite a strong sense, simply not an idea 
of time. In order that we have an idea of time or duration then we must have 
ideas of (at least) two moments and these moments must differ. Only if 
there is difference could the moments collectively instantiate the 
successiveness that is conceptually required by the idea of time Hume 
embraces. Given that the idea of a moment is nothing over and above the 
idea of a set of existing things, a difference between two moments means we 
require a difference in what exists in those moments. 
 
Although these comments are stated in the context of our ideas of time and 
space, if my interpretation of T 1.2.1. is correct then these ideas are also the 
only tools we possess in order to think about time and space themselves. If 
our ideas are the only way we can hope to approach questions about the 
world then they are also our best bet in saying well-grounded things about 
that world. Not only are these our only tools then: it also seems to be the 
case that our very ideas cannot help but set certain bounds on what we seek 
in our investigation. Specifically, on what can be appropriately construed as 
spatial or temporal given our understanding of those concepts. Hume tells 
us that  
 
the idea of duration is always deriv’d from a succession of changeable objects, 
and can never be convey’d to the mind by any thing stedfast and 
unchangeable. For it inevitably follows from thence, that since the idea of 
duration cannot be deriv’d from such an object, it can never in any propriety 
or exactness be apply’d to it, nor can any thing unchangeable be ever said to 
have duration.69 
 
Our idea of time is derived from successions and can only be applied 
appropriately to certain kinds of structures, namely changing, successive 
ones. The idea of time is nothing over an idea of successiveness so to apply 
such an idea to something unchanging is incoherent. These are conceptual 
claims, but they seem to impact on the possible nature of the external world 
as well: if this is what our concepts mean, then it is simply mistaken to 
imagine that our concept of time could have application to a world that is 
not of this sort. As such, if the world is to be considered as temporal at all, 
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that is, as an appropriate subject of that concept, then it must also have this 
structure. It remains open of course that the world does not have this 
structure, in which case our concept of time is inapplicable to it but, if that is 
the case, that also means the world is not temporal. In order to think of the 
world as temporal, we must think of it as successive or changing, and to 
think of it as successive or changing, we must think of its moments as being 
different to each other. This requires more than distinctness imposed in 
virtue of a prior metaphysical commitment; in order for the moments of the 
world to differ there must be a difference in what exists in the world, for our 
understanding of a moment just is an idea of a grouping of existing things.  
 
As discussed above, this is what I take the something more that the first 
argument seems to hint at to be. It is important that the parts discussed are 
distinct but, more fundamentally, they must bear properties. When a part is 
thought of as a particular with determinate properties, it has a certain reality 
that merely distinct parts do not necessarily have. If we consider our ideas 
we find that parts of this sort do indeed form aggregates by addition. And an 
infinity of these parts would seem to result in something infinitely large. 
Again though, what does the work is the idea of a part as propertied. In the 
case of moments we find this point is even more pronounced in that the 
distinctness of moments is a function of their differing intrinsic properties: 
time requires succession, so moments must exhibit difference. Since we have 
no reason to think that moments are anything over and above slices of 
existing things (and I will treat these existing things as determining what we 
might think of as the intrinsic properties of moments), succession requires 
that we think of the world as exhibiting change in what exists with each 
momentary slice differing to what came before and what comes after. With 
this in mind I suggest we can now make sense of the third argument against 







2.4.3. Reconsidering the Third Argument: Contradictory 
Moments  
Hume’s third argument maintained that it was an “arrant contradiction” for 
the parts of time to coexist. I argued that a commitment to actual parts does 
not explain this. However, if we think of moments in the way I have 
suggested that Hume’s rejection of abstraction and discussion of the concept 
of time encourages us to, we can make better sense of this. Given that each 
moment is, on this view, a sum of determinate existing things and succession 
requires difference between moments, to have two moments coexisting will 
require the coexistence of contrary states of affairs: this is what generates the 
contradiction. To say that two moments coexist is to suggest two 
contradictory states of affairs occur at the same time. Contiguous moments 
may strongly resemble each other in myriad ways but, in order to speak of 
two moments at all, there must be some difference between them. If there is 
no difference then what we have does not exhibit succession and so our 
concept of time is simply inapplicable. However, if there are differences in 
what exists, then no two moments can coexist merely in virtue of what 
moments fundamentally are.   
 
From this we can see more clearly that the distinctness of moments is 
parasitic on their intrinsic properties (which, as above, one might think of 
simply as the things that exist at that time). If you have two contiguous 
moments which do not differ in any way, there are no grounds from within 
Hume’s conception of time to say you have two moments not one. Only 
difference between moments can give you the succession required and that 
is also exactly the feature which will entail two moments cannot coherently 
coexist. Distinction, then, supervenes on the intrinsic features of moments 
and, if moments did not possess these intrinsic properties, we could not 
speak of them as moments, let alone as distinct moments. This is the sense 
in which I take a sole concentration on actual parts to be a distraction. If we 
shift the concentration to the intrinsic features of moments instead we not 
only get an interpretation which explains the contradiction appealed to in the 
third argument, we also get the only means available to afford moments their 
distinctness. And all without presupposing assumptions or implicit 
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commitments on Hume’s part for we do not need to do so – his explicit 
commitment to a certain concept of time and his rejection of abstraction by 
separation suffice on their own.      
 
All of this is rooted firmly in Hume’s epistemology and our understanding 
of moments and of time. However, his methodology has clear implications 
in this case: To do metaphysics at all Hume told us we must ensure our 
thinking is grounded in clear ideas. His investigation into the concept of 
time resulted in his tightly binding the concept of time to that of succession. 
So tightly that he concludes that the idea of time without change is 
incoherent. This does not tell us that the world exhibits succession and so is 
temporal. However, it does tell us that, if it does not exhibit succession, 
there is no sense in our calling it temporal.  
 
Relatedly, an idea of a moment only has content when it is thought of as a 
particular determinate set of existing things. There may be coexisting 
“moments” in the world if you construe moments in a different way: but if 
we want to know whether the moments of the world, as we understand 
moments, can coexist, Hume will tell us that they cannot. Equally this 
reasoning offers to explain why two different years or two different days 
could not coexist: a day and a year equally express some way the world is in 
those times, the way the world is through the course of one year will likely 
differ from the way the world is through the course of another, if this is the 
case they cannot coexist. These ideas are of course only ideas. However, 
ideas are also the fundamental tools we have by which to investigate the 
nature of the world and, when adequate, “the relations, contradictions and 
agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects.”70 It is possible that 
the world does not conform to these ideas in which case I think we would 
have to conclude that it simply was not temporal. However, if it is temporal, 
Hume will tell us certain things must be true of it and this includes that its 
moments cannot coexist.  
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In this I hope to have suggested several things: firstly, that Hume’s 
arguments against infinite divisibility are better understood in the context of 
the concepts of time and space, and moments and parts that emerge in T 
1.2.3. than in the context of a commitment to actual parts. Secondly, that the 
distinctness of moments which a commitment to actual parts requires is only 
coherent in the context of the intrinsic properties of moments anyway. As 
such, we cannot avoid discussing this element of them even if we only 
wanted to focus on distinctness. From this it seems that, even if actual parts 
theorising was sufficient to explain his arguments (and I have argued it is 
not), we could only get core elements of an actual parts reading off the 
ground by appeal to the sorts of features of moments I have outlined above. 
For these reasons it seems better to allow the nature of parts and moments 
and their intrinsic properties to come to the fore in thinking about Hume’s 
arguments here. Doing so simply has greater explanatory power.    
 
An interesting consequence of this is that, just as Hume tells us, the parts of 
his system are “intimately connected.”71 If this is right it is not only because 
they rely on each other: his rejection of abstraction by separation does the 
real work in both. However, they are connected in that considering each part 
of the system in the light of the other provides illumination. This is perhaps 
hardly surprising given the epistemically-driven metaphysical methodology I 
have presented Hume as forwarding in T 1.2.1.  
 
Finally, if we think it is these commitments regarding ideas and the resulting 
concepts of time and space, and moments and parts that best explain his 
reasoning in the arguments of T 1.2.2., we can also argue that his arguments 
do not depend merely on a latent commitment to an assumed orthodoxy of 
his era. Instead, his reasoning can be explained well by appeal to other 
principles and commitments that he does defend. Motivating his arguments 
in this way allows us to explain how it is deep commitments from within his 
conception of time that do a lot of the work here, not just assumptions he 
unthinkingly adopted from his contemporaries. Instead, he is using his own 
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2.5. Does Hume Beg the Question?   
I want to finish by returning to the second objection considered above: that 
Hume begs the question against the potential parts theorist. Firstly, it is 
perhaps already clear that I do not think he begs the question in the sense 
that Holden discussed above. To the extent that I have argued he is not 
motivated by a commitment to actual parts, I also do not think that he 
assumes actual parts and so begs the question against the potential parts 
theorist in that sense. However, does he do it in any other sense? In 
particular, does he assume a parts-first approach in his manner of 
proceeding in the first argument: “I first take the least idea I can 
form…whatever I discover by its means must be a real quality of 
extension.”72 Here it seems we are asked to think about the nature of the 
whole by thinking about the nature of a part. This might seem to involve 
something the potential parts theorist would reject as presumptuous. Here I 
will give some reasons for thinking he does not presume too much. 
However, he is motivated by principles that are deeply Humean, and which 
his opponent may not accept.  
 
I have argued that what primarily motivates Hume in his discussion is the 
concept of time as requiring change or difference in what exists. What is 
required in order that our idea of time be applicable is that there be 
difference between what exists in time. This difference grounds the division 
of the whole into moments. However, this does not depend on distinct 
moments so much as a propertied whole. Once we accept a propertied 
whole that exhibits difference in what exists, Hume’s understanding of 
complexity enters the picture. Hume introduces the simple/complex 
distinction as follows: “Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such 
as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to 
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these, and may be distinguished into parts.”73 Importantly then, his 
characterisation of what it is to be complex does not require that a complex 
thing already consist of parts. Instead, to be complex as opposed to simple is 
just to “admit of distinction into parts.” 
 
To be complex is to be distinguishable into parts. It appears then, that 
something can be complex even before its parts have been distinguished. To 
the extent that it admits of possible distinction it is complex. When, then, is 
something distinguishable into parts? Hume’s answer to this has come to be 
known as his “Separability Principle.” This principle crops up in a number 
of places and seems to motivate his thinking here and elsewhere. It is 
certainly present in the discussion of time and space and is integral in his 
characterisation of the idea of time as nothing over and above an idea of an 
ordering of existing things. The fullest expression of the principle is given in 
his discussion of abstract ideas which immediately precedes his discussion of 
time and space:  
 
[W]hatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that whatever objects 
are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination. And we may 
here add, that these propositions are equally true in the inverse, and that 
whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable, and that whatever 
objects are distinguishable are also different. For how is it possible we can 
separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different?74 
 
Difference, for Hume, entails distinguishability and separability in thought. 
And to be complex for Hume is simply a matter of being such that you can 
be distinguished into parts. It seems that durations of time are complex in 
virtue of exhibiting difference, not in virtue of consisting of distinct parts. 
The way he defines complexity does not presuppose distinct parts and even 
a potential parts theorist could accept that a whole can be distinguishable 
into parts prior to any act of division. They would only contest that it 
actually consists of these distinct parts before such division has occurred.   
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In a way there is no interesting difference between the potential parts view 
and the actual parts view given Hume’s commitments. It does not matter 
whether the parts exist in the whole from the start or whether the whole 
possesses parts only potentially. What matters are the properties of the 
whole and these alone are sufficient to ensure a complex whole prior to 
division. The sense in which a duration is complex for Hume is not one the 
potential parts theorist would necessarily reject. They might even be happy 
to allow that the whole is complex in Hume’s sense, since they can happily 
accept that a unified whole is nevertheless at least potentially divisible into 
parts. The sense in which Hume’s moments are in a duration from the start 
then is only the sense in which the duration has properties which can be 
characterised in terms of distinct moments.  
 
I contend that, whether we think in terms of a propertied whole, or in terms 
of propertied parts, what matters and what is doing all the work, are the 
properties exhibited. These ground the complexity of the whole as well as 
any possible distinction of parts within that whole. I do not want to suggest 
that there is no sense in which Hume also thinks the parts are prior to the 
whole, after all, his second argument (to be explored in the next chapter) is 
effectively aimed at establishing this. What I do think we should note though 
is that a commitment to the ontological priority of the parts is the result of 
argument, not an underlying assumption. We can explain the way that Hume 
argues in the first and the third arguments without appealing to any such 
underlying assumption and, indeed, by appealing only to a way of 
characterising the situation that is not obviously at odds with a potential 
parts reading. It is perfectly possible for the properties of the whole to do 
the work required without presupposing distinct elements within it prior to 
division.   
 
If this is right then thinking in terms of actual parts is again to miss the real 
driving force in play. If the world is temporal then it contains differences in 
what exists. We do not need to say that it actually consists of parts, distinctly 
present in the whole from the start. If it contains difference then it already is 
such as to admit of distinction and separation in the minds of creatures like 
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us. It contains all that is required without presupposing actual parts. We will 
see in the next chapter that Hume also thinks that anything complex exists 
in virtue of the existence of parts and so he also accepts a much deeper form 
of priority of the parts. However, accepting this deeper commitment is not 
required in order to motivate the arguments under consideration. As such, I 
think it entirely possible that Hume can avoid the charge of simply begging 
the question.  
 
On this interpretation, it seems to me that Hume does not beg the question 
against the potential parts theorist. Instead his approach somewhat 
undermines the distinction between actual and the potential parts. The work 
is done by his understanding of what it means to be complex and by the 
Separability Principle. This principle receives fairly little defence, and what it 
does is mostly empirical confirmation from introspection, for example, he 
states “there are not any two impressions which are perfectly 
inseparable…Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among 
ideas, it can easily produce a separation.”75 What justifies this principles is 
perhaps, for the most part, the way that Hume views the world and the 
essential lack of necessary connexions in it. At the heart of it all then is a 
very Humean world-view that his opponents might oppose for other 
reasons. However, the underlying motivation comes not from an 
assumption of ontologically prior parts: instead the claims are defended and 
explicable in virtue of other core commitments he holds.    
 
Hume’s opponents may still contest his concept of time as requiring change, 
or indeed, his separability principle, neither are beyond contention. 
However, I hope nonetheless to have shown a few important things: firstly, 
that we have every reason to think Hume is engaged in a kind of 
metaphysics (albeit a conditional one) and one that is concerned with 
propertied things. As such, I do not think he is best characterised as arguing 
against the broadest sense of infinite divisibility, instead I see his arguments 
as aimed quite specifically at time and space, and aiming to characterise what 
a spatial or temporal world could be like. Metaphysics perhaps then, but a 
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very cautious type. Both the methodology and the conclusions are deeply 
informed by epistemic considerations and find core motivation from them. 
His particularism about ideas, the Separability Principle, the simple/complex 
distinction: all these elements inform his account and illuminate the patterns 
of his reasoning. Alongside this we can see that the ideas of time and space, 
and of parts and moments, which are not elaborated upon until the second 
part of his system, are nonetheless in play in the first part. That both parts of 
the system are grounded and motivated by elements set out in Book 1, Part 
1 of the Treatise seems to be one instance of the “intimate connection” 



























3. The Structure of Time: Hume’s Positive Proposal 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Through his arguments against the infinite divisibility of finite extensions 
and durations, Hume forwards his positive proposal as to the spatial and 
temporal structure of the world, should it be such as to have spatial or 
temporal structure. He argues that space and time are not infinitely divisible; 
as such they must have ultimate parts. In the case of time these are 
moments. These moments are ontologically fundamental, playing this role in 
virtue of being simple and indivisible. For Hume, their simplicity entails that, 
though they compose durations, they themselves possess no duration.   
 
As per the line of argument I forwarded in the previous chapter, I will take 
this to be making claims about the world (not just our experience) and the 
structure it must have if it has temporal structure at all. When evaluating 
Hume’s positive proposal there are two problems that have dominated the 
discussion which I will refer to here as the composition problem and the 
union problem. The composition problem concerns how it is that 
unextended parts could compose something with extension, or, as I will be 
focusing on time, how it is that durationless moments can compose 
something with duration. The union problem concerns how it is that the 
ultimate parts of the world, be they spatial or temporal, can be positioned 
contiguously so as to form extensions and durations. The first problem is 
one of how to get something with duration from moments which have 
none. The second concerns the difficulty in characterising how simples can 
be arranged: spatial points, for example, are simple and so lack inner and 
outer parts so they would seem to have no surfaces. Given this, they would 
seem unable to touch in the way required in order that they form a union. 
Equally, as moments have no earlier and later parts it is not clear how to talk 
about the sequences they need to be able to form in order to constitute 
durations. If any given moment has no earlier or later parts, how can we talk 




Part of what makes these problems interesting is that Hume explicitly 
addresses them in T 1.2.4. “Objections Answer’d.” They are the first two 
objections he considers and he dismisses them swiftly and with relatively 
little discussion (the first receives only one paragraph of comment, the 
second only three). What discussion does occur is centred on space and the 
temporal analogue is not addressed though we might think that Hume 
intends an analogous solution to hold. On the whole, these brief remarks 
have left commentators unsatisfied. Not only is it not clear how his 
proposed solution addresses the problems, it is not even entirely clear how 
his proposal differs to alternatives that he rejects as inadequate. Part of my 
aim in addressing these problems then is interpretive: why did Hume think 
his responses adequately addressed these problems? If, as some have 
suggested, his account is so obviously flawed, why did he take himself to 
have dealt with these concerns? This puzzle alone might be enough to 
encourage us to reconsider what is going on and seek a more charitable 
interpretation. After all, the interpretation we hold him to might not be 
watertight, but it should not be obviously flawed.  
 
In exploring these issues I will first draw out Hume’s theory of moments, 
with particular focus on the properties that supposedly make the spatial and 
temporal parts of the world problematic. Next I will present the two 
objections above in more depth looking at how they are levelled at the 
account he offers. I will argue there has been one very promising line of 
response to them (at least to them as they apply to phenomenal time and 
space) and suggest that this constitutes a route by which Hume might avoid 
these problems at least as they concern phenomenology. However, since my 
concern is metaphysics, this resolution is not available without work to me.  
 
Instead, to resolve these issues we have to show that the metaphysical case 
can be addressed in an analogous way. To suggest a way this might be done I 
appeal once again to Hume’s methodology and the notion of ideas as 
adequate representations as explored in the previous chapter. By these 
means I aim to provide a way by which we can successfully extend this 
solution beyond phenomenology to metaphysics. By doing this, we find that 
63 
 
Hume’s moments are capable of playing the role he requires of them. I 
conclude that Hume’s theory need not be viewed as confused: instead, it can 
be seen to offer and interesting and defensible solution to these troublesome 
problems.   
 
 
3.2. The Properties of Moments 
To begin then, we need to consider some further details of Hume’s theory 
regarding the nature of moments. There are two features in particular that 
are important here. The first is that moments are simple. In the previous 
chapter I considered two of Hume’s arguments against the infinite 
divisibility of space and time. In these, he aimed to demonstrate difficulties 
that emerge if we suppose infinite divisibility: that it would entail coexisting 
moments of time, and impossibly large finite extensions and durations. 
Hume’s solution to the difficulties he sees infinite divisibility as entailing is 
to posit an ontological base layer of indivisibles: these indivisibles are what 
end the process of division. The key feature of Hume’s moments, then, is 
that they are simple and indivisible. We can see from the discussion of the 
Separability Principle at the end of the previous chapter that these two 
concepts will be tightly bound together for Hume. Once again, the 
Separability Principle holds that:  
 
[W]hatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that whatever objects 
are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination. And we may 
here add, that these propositions are equally true in the inverse, and that 
whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable, and that whatever 
objects are distinguishable are also different. For how is it possible we can 
separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different?76 
 
Something is divisible in virtue of having elements within it which are 
different in the relevant way, for this is what makes distinguishing and 
separating possible. As before, this notion is connected to and contained 
within Hume’s simple/complex distinction: “Simple perceptions or 
impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. 
The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into 
                                                 
76 T 1.2.7.3; SBN 18. 
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parts.”77 Something is complex in virtue of admitting of distinction into 
parts, and something admits of this in virtue of having elements which are 
different. In the case of time this tells us the way in which durations are 
complex: any given duration is complex because it is successive, that is, it 
has earlier and later parts which are distinguished by being different to each 
other.  
 
So, to the extent that anything is successive, it can be conceptually divided 
into earlier and later moments. The nature of moments and their simplicity 
can now be seen: A moment is simple in that it is uniform, that is, 
unchanging and so not successive. Being unchanging, moments contain 
none of the difference that could enable further distinction into parts and so 
they themselves possess no earlier and later parts. They are not successive 
and so, for Hume, have no duration.78 A temporal world, should there be 
one external to our experience, emerges as a discrete series of these 
temporally simple moments.  
 
Not only does Hume think that any duration must resolve itself into 
indivisible ultimate moments, he is also committed to a further claim 
regarding the fundamentality of these moments compared to the complexes 
they compose in arrangement. This commitment is brought out in his 
second argument against the infinite divisibility of matter, a “strong and 
beautiful” argument which he attributes to Malezieu.79 Interestingly enough, 
in Malezieu’s formulation we are offered demonstrations on both sides, that 
is, both against the possibility of infinite divisibility and against ultimate 
parts. Malezieu’s conclusion is that we should be modest in our aims for 
understanding. Hume focuses on only the second part of Malezieu’s 
                                                 
77 T 1.1.1.2; SBN 2. 
78 Moments then are temporally simple. However, although they possess no duration, 
nothing in my characterisation of them would prevent them from being spatially complex. I 
suggested in the previous chapter that Hume’s attitude towards abstraction encourages us to 
think of time as an ordering of existents and moments as sums of these existents. If we 
think of moments in this way it seems that each moment may very well include spatial 
complexity. On the flip side: a spatial simple is simple insofar as it is not extended, however, 
nothing seems to prohibit it from existing through different moments of time and so 
possessing duration.  
79 Nicolas de Malezieu (1650-1727). A pupil of Rohault and teacher to the Duke of 
Burgundy. For discussion of Malezieu and Hume’s use of the argument see Frasca-Spada 
(1990) pp. 382-391 and Ryan (2012). 
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discussion, quite possibly because that was the only part he encountered.80 
He expresses his formulation of the argument (set out as it is in terms of 
extension not duration) as follows:  
 
i. [’Tis evident that] existence in itself belongs only to unity, and is never 
applicable to number, but on account of the unites, of which the number is 
compos’d. (T 1.2.2.3; SBN 30)  
 
ii. ’Tis therefore utterly absurd to suppose any number to exist, and yet 
deny the existence of unites. (T 1.2.2.3; SBN 30)  
 
iii. [If extension is infinitely divisible then any extension is always a 
number not a unit, it] never resolves itself into any unite or indivisible 
quantity. (T 1.2.2.3; SBN 30)  
 
iv. [If extension is infinitely divisible] it follows, that extension can never 
at all exist. (T 1.2.2.3; SBN 30)  
 
Here we have another proposed reductio of infinite divisibility. Anything 
which is complex is many things not one thing, and can only exist if the 
individual things that constitute it exist. Something which is infinitely 
divisible will, Hume contends, always be many things not one thing and so 
at no level can we find the individual things required to explain the number. 
If the world contains temporal complexity at all then, and so is such as to 
instantiate time, the implication is that a proponent of infinite divisibility 
cannot account for this.  
 
Leaving aside for now the strength of the argument, we can see it shows key 
features of Hume’s position regarding composition and the nature of 
moments: complexes exist in virtue of the existence of the simple things that 
compose them. Without simple things there could be no complex things and 
it is exactly that they are simple (and so not a number of things) that allows 
moments to play this ontologically fundamental role of grounding complex 
things. Simples, unlike anything complex, can exist alone. Whereas anything 
complex requires the existence of the things that make it complex: “the 
unity, which can exist alone, and whose existence is necessary to that of all 
number, is of another kind, and must be perfectly indivisible, and incapable 
                                                 
80 Ryan (2012) makes a case for this.     
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of being resolved into any lesser unity.” 81 From this Hume concludes that, if 
reality is complex at all, its most fundamental level must be simple. For were 
it not, there could never be complexity.   
 
In extracting Hume’s commitments from this argument, once again, 
contention rules. Here the key lines of disagreement cut along whether we 
interpret him as asserting merely an asymmetric dependence relation: that is, 
that extensions and durations, being complexes or aggregates of things (or as 
Hume puts it here: “numbers”), depend on the units that compose them such 
that, were there no units, there could be no complexes. Or whether we 
interpret him as maintaining that, in truth, there are no complex things, only 
aggregates of simples.  
 
On the first avenue we can talk of complex things as existing but their 
existence is dependent on more foundational units. We can find an 
interpretation of this sort in McRae when he states that “[a]ll pluralities 
derive their reality from the units of which they are composed.”82 One might 
think this is all Hume needs in order for this argument to go through. This 
characterisation also seems to gel with the way Hume sets out his argument. 
He tells us, for example, that existence is “never applicable to number, but on 
account of the unites, of which the number is compos’d,” and “[t]wenty men 
may be said to exist; but ’tis only because one, two, three, four, &c. are 
existent.” The emphasis in the first quotation is mine but the tone seems to 
be conditional: if there is a complex, then there must be simples. It is not 
perhaps that we must deny that complexes exist, it just is not an option to 
take complexes to exist and to deny the existence of simples. If we take him 
to be asserting the conditional claim that the existence of a complex implies 
the existence of simples, then he is far from denying the existence of 
complexes.     
 
However, some have been inclined to press for something stronger and 
argue that Hume is committed not just to the dependence of composites on 
their units but to the non-existence of composites. Baxter takes a strong line 
                                                 
81 T 1.2.2.3; SBN 31.  
82 McRae (1980) p. 121.  
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of elimination on this, taking Hume to be committed to what he calls the 
Existence Assumption that “only single things really exist.”83 As evidence he 
cites Hume’s statement that “’Tis evident, that existence belongs only to 
unity, and is never applicable to number [but on account of the unites, of 
which the number is compos’d].” (T 1.2.2.3; SBN 30). Here Baxter cites only 
the first part of the quotation: however, I have kept the rest in brackets for it 
seems relevant. Baxter goes on to expand on this:   
 
Something that is many things does not literally exist (singular). It is not an it; 
it is a they. “It exists” said of it is literally false. “They exist” is what is literally 
true. So, for example, to say “A crowd exists” (or perhaps more idiomatically 
“There is a crowd”) is not literally true. We take it to be true because we take 
it to convey something that is literally true, namely, “Many people each exist 
and are close together” (or more idiomatically, “There are many people close 
together”).84 
 
If we look at Hume’s language he does indeed discuss the fictitious nature of 
certain “units,” these are better thought of as collections in the mind rather 
than unities in the world:  
 
’Tis in vain to reply, that any determinate quantity of extension is an unite; 
but such-a-one as admits of an infinite number of fractions, and is 
inexhaustible in its sub-divisions. For by the same rule these twenty men may 
be consider’d as an unite. The whole globe of the earth, nay the whole 
universe may be consider’d as an unite. That term of unity is merely a 
fictitious denomination, which the mind may apply to any quantity of objects 
it collects together; nor can such an unity any more exist alone than number 
can, as being in reality a true number.85 
 
We can talk of any collection as a unit: however, it seems we need to 
recognise that this is merely a way of talking. We can talk as though many 
things are one and it will often be convenient to do so: however, the 
metaphysical principles that ground the existence of things are such that this 
will be merely a way of talking. We might talk as though a collection is a 
unit, but this is merely a useful way of speaking. Perhaps in truth no 
complex is a unit; instead it is always many things. Even given this though, 
                                                 
83 Baxter (2008) p.26.  
84 Baxter (2008) p.26.  
85 T 1.2.2.3; SBN 30.  
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this does not seem to support the very strong form of reductionism Baxter 
suggests. Certainly Hume’s attitude towards abstraction would seem to 
encourage us not to posit complexes as anything over and above 
arrangements of simples. However, thought of just as arrangements of 
simples, I do not see good reason to exclude them. Complexes are not 
thereby nothing, even if they are dependent. Equally, they are not nothing 
even if they are, in fact, many things. What Hume primarily seems to object 
to in the above is not the existence of complex things, but the idea that a 
complex thing is a true unit. True units, as discussed, can exist alone. True 
units are ontologically foundational.   
 
I am inclined to err more on the side of complexes as having their existence 
dependently, rather than as being excluded from existence entirely. For my 
purposes here though, nothing hangs on this. To summarise, for Hume the 
world is not infinitely divisible temporally or spatially. Every duration exists 
in virtue of the existence of its ultimate parts, that is, simple moments. These 
moments are simple in that they are not successive and so lack duration 
themselves. They are ontologically fundamental in that they are required to 
ground the existence of everything else.   
 
 
3.3. The Challenges: Composition and Union 
Now that the key features of Hume’s moments are clear, two problems 
immediately present themselves. Here I will present the problems alongside 
Hume’s responses to them. Both seemingly arise whether one interprets 
Hume as discussing phenomenology or the external world and what 
becomes apparent is that it is unclear exactly how Hume’s approach fares 
better than alternatives he rejects. Firstly, the composition problem.  
 
 
3.3.1. The Composition Problem 
The composition problem centres on the simple question of how it could be 
possible to get something that has extension from parts that have no 
extension or, in the case of duration, how durationless moments can 
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compose something that has duration. Concerns that Hume’s solution fails 
to avoid this problem arise in a number of places, but Johnson sums them 
up nicely: 
 
[Hume] cannot generate extensions out of the multiplication of extensionless 
points. Thus on his theory there can be no space. A similar conclusion can be 
reached about time. Time is composed of ultimate parts that, being 
indivisible, have no duration. From such durationless moments it is 
impossible to generate duration. Once again, no multiplication of nonentities 
can create an entity. So, on Hume’s view, time cannot exist.86 
 
Johnson takes this problem to be devastating for the very reality of time for 
Hume. To the extent that extensions and durations exist, he suggests that 
Hume cannot account for them. The implication for him is that, given the 
nature of moments, Hume’s time could only ever collapse down into a 
durationless instant.  
 
As I mentioned above, the composition problem is not new. Concerns 
relating to it seem to motivate Hume in his rejection of mathematical points 
and his approach seems to be intended to avoid it. It is the first objection he 
considers in his “Objections answer’d” at T 1.2.4. He sets it up in one 
paragraph and dismisses it in the next. However, in spite of this swift 
dismissal, it remains opaque as to exactly how Hume’s solution is intended 
to address the problem.  
 
Given that Hume addresses this concern we should naturally look at his 
response. His comments are limited to the case of extension but he clearly 
takes himself to have offered a solution. In this he broadly follows Bayle’s 
way of setting out the difficulty as a trilemma, where each horn is 
unacceptable. Extension it is suggested is either i. infinitely divisible, or ii. 
has ultimate parts. By this point (T 1.2.4.) Hume has argued at length against 
infinite divisibility and so is left with the option of ultimate parts. If there are 
ultimate parts then either these ultimate parts are iia. extended or iib. simple. 
Hume argues the parts cannot be extended on the grounds that, if they were, 
they would be divisible and so fail to be the simple foundational units that 
                                                 
86 Johnson (1995) p.96.  
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are required to ground complex things. On these grounds he dismisses 
physical points as “too absurd to need a refutation.”87 Ultimate parts must 
be simple and yet Hume also rejects simple mathematical points. 
Mathematical points, though unextended and so simple, cannot generate 
extensions; they are “non-entities” and seemingly it is sensitivity to the 
challenge of the composition problem which results in Hume rejecting them 
as absurd as well. He then suggests a “medium” between the extremes as a 
route out:   
 
It has often been maintain’d in the schools, that extension must be divisible, 
in infinitum, because the system of mathematical points is absurd; and that 
system is absurd, because a mathematical point is a non-entity, and 
consequently can never by its conjunction with others form a real existence. 
This wou’d be perfectly decisive, were there no medium betwixt the infinite 
divisibility of matter, and the non-entity of mathematical points. But there is 
evidently a medium, viz. the bestowing a colour or solidity on these points; 
and the absurdity of both the extremes is a demonstration of the truth and 
reality of this medium. The system of physical points, which is another 
medium, is too absurd to need a refutation. A real extension, such as a 
physical point is suppos’d to be, can never exist without parts, different from 
each other; and wherever objects are different, they are distinguishable and 
separable by the imagination.88 
 
Between the two extremes, then, lies an acceptable alternative: points which 
possess certain qualities. In the case of space he talks of “the bestowing a 
colour or solidity on these points.” Though not extended, since they possess 
these qualities, they are also not to be “non-entities.” By these means he 
apparently intends them to be capable of composing extension where simple 
mathematical points could not.  
                                                 
87 To add to fun of interpreting Hume’s moves here, it can be noted that, in the Enquiry, 
Hume expresses an apparent commitment to physical points again, stating “[w]hatever 
disputes there may be about mathematical points, we must allow that there are physical 
points,” (EHU 12.18N1; SBN 156). Some have taken this to mark a change of heart from 
his rejection of them in the Treatise (Kemp-Smith, for example, appears to read this in this 
way, see his 1941, pp. 268-9). However, importantly, Hume goes on to say of these points 
that they are “parts of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by the eye or 
imagination. These images, then, which are present to the fancy or senses, are absolutely 
indivisible.” (Ibid.) His language of indivisibility here, as well as the use of visual imagery 
again, make it hard to read this as a shift in view. Being indivisible these points are clearly 
not the physical points he rejects in the Treatise. Instead, in spite of his language, they come 
out sounding rather a lot like the points he espoused there. For more discussion and 
defence of this see Frasca-Spada (1998) pp. 30-32.     
88 T 1.2.4.3; SBN 40. For the discussion in Bayle see his (1965), footnote G to the article 




Firstly, it is clear that Hume’s example here appeals to phenomenal qualities: 
one might immediately worry then that this solution can be of no real 
bearing on the issue as I am interested in it. I am concerned to address these 
issues as they relate to the ultimate parts of time and space should there be 
any but, as discussed in the previous chapter, Hume thinks we do not have 
to go far smaller or shorter than normal experience to go beyond what our 
senses can perceive. I take the arguments of T 1.2.1. to show that Hume is 
committed to ultimate parts which may be entirely imperceptible to us so 
what sense can we make of thinking of them as coloured or as tangible? This 
is an interesting question and one I will address in section 3.5.1. where I 
suggest that we can make perfect sense of Hume’s comments here if we 
view them as working as a kind of analogy or example model. For now 
though, I will set this issue aside in order to examine the ways that Hume’s 
proposed solution has hitherto been evaluated in the literature.   
 
So, Hume both recognises the composition problem and forwards an 
alternative apparently intended to address it. However, Johnson is not the 
only commentator to worry about the viability of this alternative. Doubts 
about this part of Hume’s theory are extremely common and are partly this 
part of the Treatise seems to be viewed as especially weak.89 The sense of 
lingering dissatisfaction is expressed nicely by Allison:  
 
[I]t is unclear how the attribution of color or tangibility to these points makes 
the difference on which Hume insists and provides the basis for an answer to 
the classical objection against mathematical points. For whatever non-
extensive qualities these points may possess, as far as extension is concerned, 
it still seems like an attempt to make something out of nothing.90 
 
That the points are coloured or tangible does not seem to be enough. Nor is 
this is a new concern: Bayle himself comments that “several nonentities of 
extension joined together will never make up an extension.”91 The problem 
is that they need to be extended, or Hume needs to tell us how these points 
                                                 
89 For a couple of more recent examples see Allison (2008) pp. 40-44 and Baxter (1988) pp. 
134-5.    
90 Allison (2008) p. 41. 
91 Bayle (1965) pp. 359-60.  
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can form an extension. One might think that to do that he needs to talk 
about the relational properties of the parts, not their intrinsic qualities. It is 
surely not the colour or tangibility of these points that allows them to form 
extensions but their extrinsic properties of being related to each other in 
such a way that collectively they take up space or time. By focusing on their 
intrinsic qualities perhaps Hume is fighting a losing battle; the intrinsic 
properties of the points may explain how it is that the extension is a coloured 
array, but they cannot explain how it is an array.   
 
 
3.3.2. The Union Problem 
The union problem concerns how it is that the parts that Hume proposes, 
given their specific natures, can be arranged in the way required. Specifically, 
how they are capable of forming the kinds of unions that extensions or 
durations seem to be. To have an extension, say, it is not enough to have 
coloured or tangible points, these points need to be ordered in a spatial 
arrangement. Seemingly, they need to stand in relation to each other such 
that their contiguity enables them to form an extension and yet, to do this, 
one might think that they need to touch. Unfortunately, it is far from clear 
how simple points could touch with destroying one another. Being simple 
they presumably possess no left nor right sides, no upper or lower bounds, 
essentially, no surfaces. Again, Hume discusses this problem, this time in the 
context of mathematical points. However, being just as simple, one might 
think his coloured points are just as problematic. In the case of time it seems 
equally clear that the component moments need to form an ordered series. 
Any given moment is preceded by one before and followed by another, and 
yet this seems to introduce a kind of complexity into the moment in virtue 
of having something like a beginning and an end. If this makes more 
complex moments then it would seem very problematic, for moments 
cannot be complex in this way. Hume’s concept of time and space as 
“manners of appearance” or “orders of disposition” make this element of 
arrangement key. However, one might worry that this question of how these 
simples can be in any sense contiguous in time or space does not have an 




To explain the specific nature of the union problem in more depth it is 
helpful to look at the options Hume dismisses in his own discussion. As 
with the composition problem, Hume was aware of and sensitive to the 
union problem. Again, he dismisses mathematical points on this basis:  
 
A simple and indivisible atom, that touches another, must necessarily 
penetrate it; for ’tis impossible it can touch it by its external parts, from the 
very supposition of its perfect simplicity, which excludes all parts. It must 
therefore touch it intimately, and in its whole essence, secundum se, tota, & 
totaliter; which is the very definition of penetration.92 
 
Here Hume is talking about mathematical points, but one might have 
worried he was talking about his own spatial and temporal simples. Parts and 
moments are simple and indivisible, so why do they not suffer the same 
problem? For he certainly seems to take them to form unions: “[f]rom the 
union of these points there results an object, which is compounded and 
divisible, and may be distinguish’d into two parts, of which each preserves 
its existence distinct and separate, notwithstanding its contiguity to the 
other.”93 
 
If Hume’s points are simple, and he stresses that they are, then they share 
the exact property of mathematical points that makes these points so 
problematic. Hume’s simples also have no parts, so no surfaces, and no left 
and right sides. If mathematical points would annihilate each other upon 
contact, resulting in a collapsing down into a single point regardless of how 
many are added, surely Hume’s simple elements would do the same? Again, 
it is not clear how Hume’s simples are meant to fare better than the rejected 
mathematical points.  
 
This problem of forming unions is taken to apply equally to the case of the 
moments of time, though neither Hume nor those who comment on this 
problem tend to spell out in detail what the parallel case would be. 
Nevertheless we might imagine it to work something like this: any duration 
                                                 
92 T 1.2.4.4; SBN 40-41.  
93 T 1.2.4.6; SBN 41. 
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is an ordered series of successive moments. Moments are simple, meaning 
they do not have earlier parts and later parts. Since they do not have earlier 
and later parts, how can we make sense of their being connected in a series? 
Take the series of moments a, b, c: moment a terminates with the 
commencement of b, while moment c commences with the termination of b. 
But that would seem to imply that we can distinguish an earlier and a later 
part of b for how else could we make sense of its position in the series and 
the relations it bears to the other moments? By its nature it cannot have 
these earlier and later parts, and yet, without them, explaining its place in the 
series is a challenge. If we must think of Hume’s moments as connected in a 
series, and the moments Hume describes cannot be so connected, then it 
looks like Hume’s theory is inadequate. Just as in the case of the 
composition problem, it is alleged that Hume has failed to provide a viable 
alternative to the alternatives he argues that we should reject.  
 
Once again, this is a problem that Hume explicitly recognised and took 
himself to have dealt with. And, once again, it is seemingly by appeal to their 
intrinsic qualities that Hume mounts his defence. He reiterates that these 
spatial simples are endowed with colour and solidity. Because of this he 
argues they are not annihilated upon contact: “A blue and a red point may 
surely lie contiguous without penetration.”94 So the quality of possessing 
colour is forwarded as a means of denying the total penetration, eclipse, and, 
essentially, annihilation that he takes mathematical points to fall victim to:   
 
I ask any one, if he sees a necessity, that a colour’d or tangible point shou’d 
be annihilated upon the approach of another colour’d or tangible point? On 
the contrary, does he not evidently perceive, that from the union of these 
points there results an object, which is compounded and divisible, and may 
be distinguish’d into two parts, of which each preserves its existence distinct 
and separate, notwithstanding its contiguity to the other.95 
 
Once again, commentators remain unimpressed with this attempt at 
resolution. Taking it that no things that lack surfaces could touch, C. D. 
Broad considers the possibility that Hume’s points are in fact separated by 
                                                 
94 T 1.2.4.6; SBN 41.  
95 Ibid.  
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an intrinsically minimal distance such that the points could not be nearer 
than this. Broad seemed to think this view was rather a push, though more 
recently Allison has been friendlier to it.96 Leaving aside whether we can 
even make sense of what a gap between moments could be, one cannot help 
but feel that, if this is what Hume had meant, he really could have said. In 
summary, both the composition and the union problems are considered and 
apparently addressed by Hume but it seems the way he addresses them is, at 
best, opaque and, at worst, inadequate. He recognised the problems but it is 
not clear why the positive solution he proposes fares any better against them 
than the alternatives he condemns.  
 
 
3.4. Falkenstein’s Account of Phenomenal Space 
Both of the problems above might be seen to press a similar thread of 
concern: that Hume’s solutions appear to appeal to intrinsic qualities (e.g., 
colour, tangibility) but that what needs to be explained is not intrinsic 
qualities but extrinsic, relational qualities. Hume tells us that our ideas of 
time and space are ideas of the orders of arrangement or disposition, or 
manner of appearance of other things. It is their arrangement that needs to 
be explained and explaining this involves not just telling us about the 
intrinsic features of what is arranged but about how they are arranged. To 
the extent that his proposed solutions focus only on the intrinsic features we 
might think they are failing to explain what even Hume recognises as a core 
element of these structures.    
 
One approach that is sensitive to this concern is offered by Falkenstein.97 
Although his focus is on phenomenal time and space, that is, the spatial and 
temporal structure of experience (rather than the world should it exist 
beyond our experiences), his response to the problems above (as directed at 
phenomenal time and space) is illuminating. By appealing to the discreteness 
of the experiential manifold, Falkenstein argues that we can make sense of, 
                                                 
96 See C. D. Broad (1961) p. 169 and Allison (2008) p.42-3 for more on this. 
97 Falkenstein (2006). For discussion on this see also Allison (2008, chapter 2, esp. p.41). A 
broadly similar (though less fully developed) response along the same lines as Falkenstein is 
discussed in Jacquette (1996) pp.72-3.   
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and defend, Hume’s positive proposal. Due to the differences in our starting 
points it is clear that the success or otherwise of this will not carry over 
straightforwardly to the problem as it applies given the way I have set things 
out. However, I will argue Hume gives us the resources to extend such an 
account in this way and for that reason a successful resolution in the case of 
phenomenology certainly bears upon the problems at hand here. Firstly 
though, I will set out Falkenstein’s approach.   
 
Falkenstein’s focus is on phenomenal space and the spatial structure of 
experience. For ease of explanation, he limits his discussion to visual space 
and so his concern is with the visual array which Hume tells us is essentially 
a flat painted screen or coloured array: “’Tis commonly allow’d by 
philosophers, that all bodies, which discover themselves to the eye, appear as 
if painted on a plain surface.”98 
 
Hume tells us in T 1.2.1. that our senses are not capable of infinite 
discernment; instead there is a minimum beyond which we cannot perceive. 
This tells us that the visual field is not infinitely divisible. Since the visual 
field is not infinitely divisible we can conclude it has ultimate parts and these 
parts, that is, these smallest visual perceptions, are ultimate in that they are 
simple. We can discern no parts within them and they cannot be divided 
without annihilation. From this, Falkenstein argues that the visual field itself 
must be discrete, composed of innumerable (but, as per the Separability 
Principle) distinct points of colour. This discreteness is to be the foundation 
of his defence of Hume.     
 
If we remember that Hume thought of the visual field in this way, 
Falkenstein argues we can re-evaluate Hume’s contention that “[a] blue and 
a red point may surely lie contiguous without any penetration or 
annihilation.”99And indeed, that two or more points so-positioned form an 
extension even though none of the component points are extended. Within 
a discrete manifold, contiguous points can create an extended block of 
                                                 
98 T 1.2.5.8; SBN 56.   
99 T 1.2.4.6; SBN 41.  
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colour in spite of their individual simplicity, we need only place them 
contiguously:  
 
Because the visual field is not infinitely divisible, one colored point can be set 
immediately alongside another to produce an unbroken, compound 
impression that is double the size of a single, pointal impression. Adding a 
third point produces a compound that is triple the size. And only a finite 
number of points need to be added to make the compound exceed any given 
limit.100 
 
On this way of thinking, the size of a complex thing is not simply the sum of 
the size of its parts. Instead, its size is determined by locations taken up by 
its parts on the set framework that is our visual field: “extension is not the 
product of the mathematical summation of its parts; it is the product of their 
manner of disposition.”101 By lying contiguously within this discrete 
manifold, simple points can form complexes even though they are simple. 
Within a discrete manifold then, such as Hume’s phenomenal space, 
unextended points can form an extension. So, Falkenstein argues, Hume can 
avoid the composition problem if we appeal to the way that simples are 
ordered in experience.  
 
These simples must lie contiguously in order to arrange still. However, 
Falkenstein also appeals to the discreteness of the manifold as the key to 
avoiding the union problem of how two simple things could lie contiguous 
to each other without annihilation. Focusing on the question of how it may 
be that spatial points can touch even though they have no surfaces, 
Falkenstein points out that, within a discrete space, there is a further option 
available in virtue of the discreteness of the manifold:  
 
But in a discrete manifold the notion of touching is equivocal. Two bodies 
can touch either by overlapping at a point or by being immediately adjacent 
without overlapping. Either way there is no intervening point or gap. 
Consequently, in a discrete manifold, b can touch a by having a as its 
immediate predecessor, and can touch c by having c as its immediate 
successor without overlapping with either and without having to be ascribed 
                                                 
100 Falkenstein (2006) p.61.  
101 Falkenstein (2006) p.63.  
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distinct parts, one of which overlaps with a and the other of which overlaps 
with c.102 
 
Falkenstein does not give the temporal analogy but it seems his account 
could be extended to offer one. One might think that, just as our visual 
experience can only be so fine-grained, our experiences in time are only so 
fine-grained. We might think Hume’s discussion of the whirling coal is 
evidence that he thought something like this was the case: “’tis impossible 
for our perceptions to succeed each other with the same rapidity, that 
motion may be communicated to external objects.”103 There is a limit to how 
many frames per second, as it were, we can experience. From this it seems 
our phenomenal experience of time will also break down into moments 
(rather than being infinitely divisible), where the smallest experiential 
moment is the smallest discernible change in the content of our experience. 
If this is true then, just as two unextended points which lie contiguously can 
form an extension, two unchanging (and so durationless) moments which 
occur contiguously in our experience, can form an event with duration.  
 
Being creatures capable only of finite sensory discernment it simply is not 
the case that between any two phenomenal moments there is a further 
moment: at a certain level we reach the highest number of moments per 
interval we can experience and that these moments are contiguous in time in 
our experience does not prevent them from forming a perceptual event 
which has duration so long as their contents differ (in that difference is 
required for the succession that means what we have is a duration not a 
single simple moment).  
 
On this approach, the discreteness of the phenomenal manifold means that 
points with the qualities Hume ascribes could avoid the challenges of the 
composition and union problems, at least as they apply to phenomenal space 
                                                 
102 Falkenstein (2006) p.63. Falkenstein’s take on Hume’s rejection of the 
proportional/aliquot distinction as frivolous is also rooted in these features of the visual 
field. He notes that it is not the case that one can continue to generate proportional parts 
beyond a certain point because the visual field is not infinitely divisible, thus 
“Mathematicians can invoke the notion of proportional parts if they want, but because that 
notion is not validly applied to points on the visual field it cannot be invoked to prove that 
the visual field is infinitely divisible.” (2006) p.62.   
103 T 1.2.3.6; SBN 35. 
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and time. This approach clearly does not yet address these problems as they 
might apply to the spatial and temporal structure of a world beyond our 
perceptions. However, if the interpretation I offer in the previous chapter is 
correct then I suggest we have every reason to think that such an extension 
to metaphysics is both possible and well-grounded by Hume’s methodology.  
 
 
3.5. From Phenomenal Time to Time Itself 
Falkenstein’s arguments provide a way of defending Hume’s account of 
phenomenal space and time but, as per the previous chapter, my concern is 
with the structure of time and space construed in terms of a world beyond 
our perceptions. In his arguments against the infinite divisibility of space and 
time I take Hume to be making claims (albeit conditional ones) about the 
spatio-temporal structure of the world, not only of our experience. To the 
extent that the composition and union problems can be levelled at the world 
as much as at phenomenology a defence only of phenomenology cannot be 
a sufficient defence for me. In what follows, then, I will set out an account 
of how we might extend such a defence to concern the spatio-temporal 
structure of the world itself, should it be such as to have one.  
 
Firstly, I will argue that Hume’s commitments to adequate ideas’ being a tool 
for investigating the unperceived opens up a natural route by which we can 
extend the account Falkenstein offers from the phenomenal to the 
ontological in a way that preserves its success. In particular my line of 
argument will be to suggest that the moments of time possess the intrinsic 
features necessary to compose within a discrete manifold. It will also be 
important, then, that the temporal manifold of the world, should it have 
one, is discrete. I will argue that the intrinsic properties of moments grant us 
this. If this is correct, then there is a means by which to argue that both the 
moments and the manifold possess the qualities required for unproblematic 
composition and unions. What is more, these two elements are, once again, 
connected. As the manifold is nothing over and above the succession of 
moments, the discreteness of the manifold supervenes on the qualities of the 
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moments. As in the previous chapter these two elements emerge as two 
sides of the same coin.  
 
Furthermore, thinking in this way might offer a more satisfying response in 
that it offers to explain why Hume focused on intrinsic features when 
responding to what seems like a problem of extrinsic relations: because 
discreteness relies on these intrinsic features, it is the intrinsic properties of 
moments that allow them to compose in the way they need to. In this I 
propose we find again this sense in which the two parts of Hume’s system, 
the epistemology and the metaphysics, are “intimately connected”: the 
intrinsic features of moments and the structure of time are connected 
because the structure exists in virtue of the intrinsic features. Once again 
then, seeing the connections between the parts of Hume’s system and 
allowing each part to illuminate our understanding of the other, opens the 
door to making more sense of both.  
 
 
3.5.1. Adequate Ideas and the Extension to Time Itself  
In order to show how an extension from the phenomenal to the 
metaphysical is possible I will return briefly to the methodology I defended 
in the previous chapter. I argued that Hume is committed to there being a 
potential mismatch between experience and reality. As examples like the 
whirling coal show, we are capable only of a certain level of sensory 
refinement and the world is capable of more fine-grainedness than we can 
perceive. However, we are still able to investigate the world at these hidden 
levels through the perceptions we do have access to when they are adequate 
representations:  
 
Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, 
contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects; 
and this we may in general observe to be the foundation of all human 
knowledge. But our ideas are adequate representations of the most minute 
parts of extension; and thro’ whatever divisions and subdivisions we may 
suppose these parts to be arriv’d at, they can never become inferior to some 
ideas, which we form. The plain consequence is, that whatever appears 
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impossible and contradictory upon the comparison of these ideas, must be 
really impossible and contradictory, without any farther excuse or evasion.104 
 
When our ideas are adequate representations we can use them to think about 
the things we cannot experience. We must proceed with extreme caution, 
naturally, and we must ensure that we consider the ways in which our 
perceptions are adequate representations and the ways in which they are not. 
Here Hume tells us we can use simple perceptions to think about the 
ultimate parts of the world should it turn out to have ultimate parts. 
However, our perceptions only represent these smallest things to the extent 
that the smallest things (if there are any) are simple: it would seem to be 
unjustified to assume our ideas truly represent these smallest parts in all their 
features. Given that I take T 1.2.1. to suggest that the smallest possible 
things are very plausibly beyond our perception, we would be less justified, 
say, in concluding that these smallest things are coloured merely because our 
smallest perceptions are.  
 
However, if we take him seriously as trying to talk about imperceptible parts 
of the world, and we take his responses to the composition and union 
problems as given in T 1.2.4. as expressing something about these parts, it 
seems we must imply this is exactly what Hume does. He appeals to colour 
and solidity to explain how two simple points can form an extended union. 
This surely is exactly the sort of attribution of phenomenal properties to the 
imperceptible layers of the world that would be problematic given the 
cautious methodology of ideas as adequate representations take I take him to 
prescribe. An interpretation that had him doing this would seem to be 
problematic. However, especially in light of the previous chapter, we might 
think there is something more interesting going on. Or at least this is what I 
will argue.  
 
My argument in brief is this: given Hume’s metaphysical methodology of 
appealing to the cautious use of ideas as tools for thinking about the world, 
the examples appealing to the behaviour of coloured points given at T 1.2.4. 
are best viewed as analogies to help us think about that which we cannot 
                                                 
104 T 1.2.2.1; SBN 29. 
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experience. Insofar as they are simple, simple perceptions can help us think 
about the smallest possible parts of the world because they too would be 
simple. Analogously, insofar as it is discrete, the experiential manifold that 
these perceptual points create can help us think about the temporal and 
spatial structure of the world at its deepest levels because this too, for 
Hume, is discrete. In his arguments against infinite divisibility Hume exploits 
these lines of analogy. I suggest we entertain the idea that he also exploited 
these same lines of analogy in addressing the problems he considers at T 
1.2.4.  
 
Along these lines I suggest there is a fairly straightforward way of extending 
the response from phenomenology to ontology. Thought of in this way, 
Hume’s examples of coloured points show us that two simple things existing 
in a discrete manifold can form something extended because the size of the 
compound is not a function of the size of its components. Similarly, in a 
discrete manifold, there is no reason why two points cannot lie contiguously 
without annihilating each other because in a discrete manifold they can lie 
contiguously without the overlap that would result in collapse. If this is true 
of our perceptions, and our perceptions truly are adequate representations of 
the world, then we can see that such a model is possible for the world too. If 
such an extension is indeed available it opens the door to our avoiding the 
composition and union problems not only for phenomenology but also for 
metaphysics. Here is one way of expressing the thought:   
 
i. Our simple ideas are, insofar as they are simple, adequate 
representations of the simple parts of the world (be they temporal moments 
or spatial parts).  
 
ii. Our experiential manifold is, insofar as it is discrete, an adequate 
representation of the discrete spatio-temporal structure of the world.  
 
iii. “Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, 
contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects…” 
(T 1.2.2.1; SBN 29) 
 
iv. Therefore, if a solution of this sort provides a successful model in the 





If this holds, we might think Hume’s metaphysics can be defended in the 
face of these challenges. However, at this point one might raise the 
following objection: the discreteness of the manifold and the simplicity of 
the perceptions do not seem to be the only things that entail the successful 
result in the phenomenological case. Although the addition of colour or 
solidity alone did not seem to be capable of addressing the composition or 
union problems, the fact that the points possess these intrinsic features does 
seem to play a role. That the coloured points are coloured is not what 
enables them to form an extension in one respect (as Falkenstein argued, 
they form an extension because of how they are positioned in a discrete 
manifold): however, it is clearly important in that, were they not coloured 
they could not take up any position within the manifold. In fact, were the 
points neither coloured nor tangible, we would have neither points nor a 
manifold at all.  
 
In his arguments against the extensionality of vacuum and the temporality of 
time without change, Hume makes it clear that our concepts of time and 
space are only applicable to certain kinds of things. In the case of time, 
duration requires succession. Just as I interpret Hume as accepting spatial 
parts too small to be perceived, so too I take him to accept moments too 
brief to be perceived. If this is the case then the smallest parts of space and 
time cannot just be attributed phenomenal qualities. However, they still need 
some intrinsic features in order to compose a manifold which can be 
correctly said to be temporal or temporally structured. Something must be 
said about their intrinsic features, then, and how these ensure the right kinds 
of extrinsic relational structure.  
 
 
3.5.2. The Interplay between the Intrinsic and Extrinsic 
Features of Moments 
Before addressing these questions regarding the nature of moments it is 
necessary to highlight once again the conditionality I raised during the 
previous chapter: in order to makes sense of the world as temporal at all, 
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given what it is for anything to exhibit a temporal structure on Hume’s 
account, certain things must be true of the world. As such, I will operate on 
the assumption that, whatever else the world beyond our perceptions is like, 
if it is to be temporal at all, it consists of existing things of some sort and 
what exists is not always the same. Only if this is so do we have something 
which can appropriately be called temporal. If the world is not like this then 
it will simply be the case that our concept of time fails to apply. This is not 
to assume the existence of an external world, nor is it to assume the 
temporality of the world: instead it is a nod to the conceptual requirements 
Hume’s theory places on the possible ways something can manifest temporal 
structure and the kinds of things that can appropriately be called temporal, 
given our concept of time. It may well be that there is nothing beyond our 
perceptions (though Hume notes the extremism of such a view in his 
dismissal of phenomenalism as the domain of only the most “extravagant 
sceptics”).105 Equally it may well be that whatever is beyond our perceptions 
does not change and so is not successive. If this is the case then the world 
simply is not the kind of thing that can have our concept of time applied to 
it. If the world is to be temporal at all though (given our only understanding 
of what it is to be temporal), it must exhibit these features in order that our 
concept be applicable. If it does not exhibit these features then all bets are 
off.  
  
Returning to the nature of the moments of time then, we can again consider 
their intrinsic features, this time in relation to the composition and union 
problems. Can the intrinsic features of moments, even if they are not 
phenomenal, support the capacity of these moments to compose and form 
unions within a discrete manifold? In the previous chapter I argued that 
Hume’s rejection of abstraction resulted in certain constraints on our ideas 
of time and of moments: our idea of time is nothing over and above a 
                                                 
105 See T 1.3.2.49; SBN 214, where he notes that phenomenalism (as he puts it “rejecting the 
opinion of a continu’d existence” or the continued existence of objects even during 
interruptions of our perceptions of them) “has been peculiar to a few extravagant sceptics; 
who after all maintain’d that opinion in words only, and were never able to bring themselves 
sincerely to believe it.”   
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complex idea of successively occurring perceptions.106 Similarly, a moment is 
nothing over and above what exists at a point in that succession. Or, more 
broadly, our idea of time is an idea of an ordering of existents and our idea 
of a moment is nothing over and above an idea of some coexisting existents. 
In Hume’s words: time is “nothing but the manner, in which some real 
objects exist.”107 As such, it is the presence of existing things that enables the 
applicability of the concepts of time and moments to experience. If we have 
an unchanging experience then we have an experience of a moment of time. 
As soon as there is a change, however small, in our experience, we have an 
experience of duration because (again employing the Separability Principle 
and Hume’s simple/complex distinction) we have an experience that can be 
broken down into distinct earlier and later parts. This all concerns the 
concept of time. However, as I have argued there is a sense in which the 
concept of time constrains the kind of world that could properly be called 
temporal.  
 
As a toy illustration, imagine a universe in which all that exists is a red cube, 
which is replaced by a blue cube. (For this example it does not really matter 
whether we think of it as change or replacement). This simple world history 
has duration in that it can be broken down into an earlier part (consisting of 
the red cube) and a later part (consisting of the blue cube). For now, ignore 
how and whether we would interpret this as temporal – that is an epistemic 
issue. Here we can just stipulate that in fact this is what the universe consists 
of at the stages in its history. In this simple universe, there are two and only 
two moments, the moment consisting of the red cube and the moment 
consisting of the blue cube. Each moment is nothing over and above what 
exists at that stage in the succession, which is the cube, particular in its 
properties. Each moment, then, is spatially complex to the extent that the 
cube is, but nevertheless temporally simple: for in this universe only one 
change occurs so there is only one line of division into moments that is 
                                                 
106 One thing that makes the picture slightly more complex than I state it here is that the 
idea is also a general idea and so has a more complex structure. The nature of the general 
idea will be discussed at much greater length in chapters 6 and 7: however, we can safely 
leave this complexity aside at this point in order to make the minimal point required. 
107 T 1.2.4.28; SBN 64.   
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possible and this division is only possible because of the properties of the 
things that exist.    
 
Scaled up to a world like ours we can think of the situation in terms of 
moments which are likely to be extremely spatially complex: however, again, 
they will be temporally simple. And they will consist of all and only what 
exists at that particular stage in the succession of the world, particular in all 
its details. These temporally tiny chunks of the world may change at a rate 
far beyond what humans can perceive and so, to that extent, any particular 
moment and indeed, any contiguous pair of moments might be indiscernible 
to us. However, each moment is distinguished from the moment before and 
after by a change in what exists. Change introduces difference, allowing the 
only grounds upon which we can characterise the situation in terms of 
earlier and later parts.  
 
This is the sense in which I suggest that the moments of a temporal world 
have intrinsic features: they have them because they are sums of determinate 
existing things. Importantly, we can now see that these intrinsic features 
enable the moments of time to form durations in a way that is essentially 
analogous to the way in which being coloured enabled the blue and the red 
point to form an extension in Hume’s example considered above. In both 
cases the nature of the component parts dictates something about how these 
components can exist in relation to each other. Two coloured points cannot 
coexist without one being annihilated. In the case of time, the fact that each 
moment expresses a distinct way the world is, and the differences between 
moments, also entail that they cannot coexist. It is once again the intrinsic 
features that matter here, but those intrinsic features dictate something of 
the possible extrinsic relations these elements can fall into. Specifically, 
because they express contradictory states of affairs, the intrinsic features of 
moments dictate that they cannot coexist.  
 
Taking a duration composed of two moments, each moment is a total state 
of the world, which we can think of as the set of all things that coexist at 
that time, complete in all their particularities. However, in order to say that 
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we have two moments not one, there must be differences between these sets 
of existents. Otherwise they would not be distinct moments. However, if 
there are differences between them then they cannot coexist because the 
world cannot be two different ways at the same time. In the case of the red 
cube replaced by the blue cube the change in qualities of the cube entailed 
the existence of two distinct moments, each characterised by what exists and 
its qualities. The two moments consist of the world in two contradictory 
states. As such they exclude each other from their own “space” as efficiently 
as the red point and the blue point do in Hume’s example at T 1.2.4. The 
moments may lie contiguous to each other and occur successively, but they 
cannot coexist because the world cannot be in two contradictory states at 




The intrinsic qualities of moments (along with the Humean conceptual truth 
that duration (essentially two or more moments) requires succession and so 
difference between what exists at different moments in the duration) dictate 
something of how moments can compose: moments cannot coexist and so 
they must exist successively.108 Given this, I suggest that Hume’s intention to 
meet the composition and union problems by appeal to the intrinsic features 
of the elements involved was not actually so misguided. The simplicity of 
moments and their intrinsic features dictate both that any temporal manifold 
must be discrete and that the moments of this manifold cannot coexist. This 
is why the moments of time cannot collapse down into a single atemporal 
instant as Johnson feared above. What prevents this collapse is the reality of 
what exists itself, for moments are nothing over and above what exists in the 
world. Moments compose, then, in virtue of their intrinsic features and the 
way that these features dictate they exist in relation to each other. And given 
these intrinsic features, there seems no barrier to composition, nor to 
                                                 
108 To link these thoughts once again to the previous chapter, this is essentially the point I 
think Hume is making in his third argument against infinite divisibility. The charge is that 
infinite divisibility entails coexisting moments; however, due to the very nature of moments, 
it is a contradiction to suppose they coexist. In order to see why this is a contradiction I 
argue we must consider what a moment is for Hume. If we do this though, we see that they 
truly cannot coexist, for the reasons I give here.  
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simples forming a union. Collapse being ruled out means there is no bar to 
simple things existing contiguously, nor is there any reason why simple 
things cannot, by contiguity, compose something which has duration. For all 
that is required that there be a duration is that there be two successive 
moments.  
 
In summary, I have argued that, contrary to the challenges set out above, the 
simplicity of Hume’s moments does not prevent them from playing the role 
required of them. That one cannot have an empty moment and that no two 
moments can coexist are conceptual truths derived from the very idea of 
time as we know it. As above, it may be that this concept of time is not 
applicable to the world. However, if the world is such as to be called 
temporal at all, Hume will tell us we can know this much about its structure. 
What is more, given the nature of moments, just as two simple coloured 
points exclude each other from coexisting and yet, by lying contiguously, can 
form an extended union, so too do two moments of time exclude each other 
from their times and yet, by occurring successively, can form a duration. 
Hume’s example as given in T 1.2.4. appeals to the behaviour of perceptual 
points in a phenomenal manifold; however, we can also read it as an analogy 
and see that the lesson it suggests carry over to an external world, should 
there be one. 
 
Read in this way, Hume’s theory of the metaphysical structure of time and 
space is integrated and defensible. Rather than taking his comments at T 
1.2.4. to constitute a confused solution that fails to address problems he 
explicitly recognised and aimed to avoid, we can interpret these comments as 
fitting into a broader methodology of using adequate ideas as tools for doing 
cautious metaphysics. When we do so, I suggest we can see that the nature 
of moments is less problematic than it initially seems, and that they may be 
capable of playing the role required of them. Having taken himself to have 
seen off the viability of infinitely divisible space and time, Hume’s approach 
emerges as a clearly distinct option when compared to the alternatives he 
rejects: unlike physical points his elements are simple, unlike mathematical 
points they possess all the reality of the world that are, in fact, the parts of. 
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In this way the properties of the existing things grant them a kind of 
substantiality that mathematical points do not enjoy.   
 
The interpretation of the first part of Hume’s system I have argued for 
suggests a unified picture of his aims and methods as well as a kind of unity 
in the thinking that underlies his solutions. Intrinsic features of moments 
and the discreteness of the manifold they compose both play a role, but 
these features are in effect two sides of the same coin, for the discreteness of 
the manifold is ensured by these very same intrinsic features. What we also 
find is that both sets of arguments are motivated by core principles set out 
in the first part of the first book of the Treatise. His rejection of abstraction 
by separation, the Separability Principle, and his characterisation of the 
simple/complex distinction all play central roles. These elementary 
principles also motivate and inform the concept of time which he sets out in 





















In forming the idea of time, Hume tells us we proceed through two stages: 
first, we form ideas of particular times, that is, ideas of particular temporally 
complex events. Second, upon coming to feel a resemblance between these 
particular ideas, we associate them together and, by these connections in 
thought, form a functionally-abstract general idea of time. Hume’s depiction 
of this process is neat and quick, seeming to follow on nicely from the 
discussion of abstract ideas which ended the first part of book 1 at T 1.1.7. 
In spite of the neatness, when one presses for detail the brevity and 
smoothness of his explanation become something of a hindrance: at each 
stage in the process we find questions and concerns but in order to fill in the 
details it becomes necessary to look further afield.  
 
Even before pressing for details one might think there are challenges that are 
apparent closer to the surface. One pressing interpretive question that arises 
is in seeing how the ideas of time and space sit alongside the so-called Copy 
Principle, which can sometimes feel like the inviolable core tenet of Hume’s 
empiricism. Hume references this principle in the opening section of his 
discussion of these ideas and highlights its role as a tool in our 
investigation.109 And yet the ideas that emerge appear to be strangely in 
tension with this principle; certainly not the clear exemplification that one 
might expect to immediately follow a reiteration of it. Some take the  ideas 
of time and space to constitute a flat-out violation, Kemp-Smith, for 
example, suggests that the section on these ideas “opens with a 
recapitulation of the principles insisted upon in the opening sections of the 
                                                 
109 He also notes the idea of extension as an example of something to which the principle 
might usefully be applied in his very first mention of the Copy Principle, “We may observe, 
that in order to prove the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do 
nothing but shew, that they are conveyed by our senses.” T 1.1.1.12; SBN 7. This seems to 
further cement the idea that he did not think these ideas to be fundamentally in tension with 
at least the spirit of the Copy Principle.  
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Treatise, and it closes with teaching out of keeping with these principles.”110 
Using these ideas to think about Hume’s empiricism and the Copy Principle 
is a rewarding, if challenging, interpretive activity.  
 
This challenging relationship with the Copy Principle exists at both stages of 
the process of idea-formation, that is, in forming initial ideas of particular 
times, and in forming the functionally-abstract general idea that emerges 
from these. In this chapter and the next I will consider the status of our 
ideas of particular times, in chapters 6 and 7, I will consider the status of the 
general idea. My main aim here is, in line with the methodology discussed in 
the introduction, to allow the idea of time to inform our understanding of 
the Copy Principle as much as to allow the Copy Principle to constrain the 
idea of time. This is to take Hume’s reminder of the principle in this section 
seriously and yet to be charitable in our search for an interpretation. It is 
possible that he stated a principle and then immediately gave a violating 
instance (Hume does seem to have past form on this score with the missing 
shade of blue case often construed as an instance of this behaviour111). 
However, if this is so we can still ask why he would do this. If this is what he 
intended, what did he mean us to conclude about the principle? Does it 
admit of exceptions, or perhaps it is broader than it initially appears, does it 
allow for far less straightforward cases then we might have thought? If we 
find a conflict, what did he intend us to conclude about the ideas of time 
and space?   
 
In what follows, I will explore the lines of this apparent tension at both 
stages of the process of idea-formation. One thing that will become 
apparent in these four chapters focused on the epistemology of time is that, 
although many of the interpretive challenges apply as much to the idea of 
space as of time (which serves the tendency that has existed to treat them 
analogously, as Hume often seems to), some difficulties seem all the more 
pressing in the case of time. A secondary interpretive aim will be to evaluate 
to what extent the idea of time presents greater challenges than the idea of 
                                                 
110 Kemp-Smith (1941) p. 273.  
111 The similarities have encouraged some to draw links between the missing shade of blue 
case and the ideas of time and space, for an example of this see Pappas (1981) p.170.  
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space and what implications this must have in our analysis. As the previous 
two chapters noted, the moments of time, unlike the parts of space, cannot 
coexist. Throughout this chapter and the next I will consider this apparent 
asymmetry between our experience of time and space and the degree to 
which it introduces additional challenges for the idea of time that do not 
arise for the idea of space. Although we could react to the sparse nature of 
his account here and its apparent tensions by setting it aside as a blunder, 
deeper examination offers the chance at a deeper understanding of other 
core themes in Hume’s work and so has the promise of interpretive value. 
Equally, to the extent that his empiricism has frequently been judged too 
blunt an instrument to account for the ideas of time and space, considering 
which mechanisms in his framework might be required to allow us to form 
such ideas not only offers a richer understanding of Hume’s work: it also has 
the potential for allowing a richer understanding of empiricism and its 
adequacy. In short, tempting rewards are on offer.  
 
  
4.2. Forming the Idea of Time: Hume’s Arguments 
Firstly then, it is worth looking in more depth at the treatment Hume does 
offer regarding this process of forming the idea of time, in order to see 
better exactly where the problems may or may not arise. The discussion of 
this process occurs in T 1.2.3. “Of the other qualities of our ideas of space 
and time” and, as is often the case, the origin story Hume tells us is 
illustrated more by consideration of our idea of space than of time. 
However, Hume does give us a brief outline of the story for time and it is 
presented, as with the idea of space, as having its origins in experience. 
Unlike the idea of space though, which is derived from visual and tactile 
experiences alone, the idea of time has a broader basis. It is “deriv’d from 
the succession of our perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, 
and impressions of reflection as well as of sensation.”112  
 
                                                 
112 T 1.2.3.6; SBN 34-5. 
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As I mentioned above, Hume begins his examination of our ideas of time 
and space by reminding his reader of the Copy Principle and reaffirming its 
value as an investigative tool:  
 
No discovery cou’d have been made more happily for deciding all 
controversies concerning ideas, than that abovemention’d, that impressions 
always take the precedency of them, and that every idea, with which the 
imagination is furnish’d, first makes its appearance in a correspondent 
impression.113 
 
So, in seeking to understand our ideas better, which themselves are often 
“obscure,” we should look to see from which impressions these ideas are 
derived. In its first statement, the Copy Principle is presented as a “general 
proposition” that “all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d 
from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they 
exactly represent.”114 In his restatement of the principle at T.1.2.3. though, 
Hume does not specify the restriction to simple ideas and simple 
impressions, appearing to reintroduce the principle in slightly broader terms 
instead. This point may prove important or it may just be a looser form of 
expression. Given that he has already specified the principle with exactness, 
perhaps Hume only wanted here to remind the reader of it and felt no need 
to express it in its fullest terms. However, within the context of the ideas of 
time and space, the absence of a limitation of the case to simple impressions 
and ideas opens up an alternative avenue: that of tracing a complex idea to a 
complex impression. However, although worth highlighting, detailed 
discussion of such a view must wait until the next chapter.  
 
Leaving this aside for now then, Hume proceeds from reaffirming this 
guiding principle to an investigation of the origin of our ideas of space and 
time through a method of elimination. For the sake of giving a complete 
picture I will replicate his argument in full here including the development 
from ideas of particular extensions and durations to the general ideas of 
extension and duration. To restate though, my focus in this chapter and the 
next is not the development of the general idea, but instead the formation of 
                                                 
113 T 1.2.3.1; SBN 33.  
114 T 1.1.1.7; SBN 4. 
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the first stage of the idea, that is, ideas of particular extensions and 
durations. Here then is Hume’s argument: 
 
i. [E]very idea, with which the imagination is furnish’d, first makes its 
appearance in a correspondent impression. (T 1.2.3.1; SBN 33) 
 
ii. Upon opening my eyes, and turning them to the surrounding objects, I 
perceive many visible bodies; and upon shutting them again, and considering 
the distance betwixt these bodies, I acquire the idea of extension. (T 1.2.3.2; 
SBN 33) 
 
iii. As every idea is deriv’d from some impression, which is exactly similar 
to it, the impressions similar to this idea of extension, must either be some 
sensations deriv’d from the sight, or some internal impressions arising from 
these sensations. (T 1.2.3.2; SBN 33) 
 
iv. Our internal impressions are our passions, emotions, desires and 
aversions; none of which, I believe, will ever be asserted to be the model, 
from which the idea of space is deriv’d. (T 1.2.3.3; SBN 33) 
 
v. The table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea 
of extension. This idea, then, is borrow’d from, and represents some 
impression, which this moment appears to the senses. (T 1.2.3.4; SBN 34) 
 
vi. But my senses convey to me only the impressions of colour’d points, 
dispos’d in a certain manner. If the eye is sensible of any thing farther, I 
desire it may be pointed out to me. But if it be impossible to shew any thing 
farther, we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing 
but a copy of these colour’d points, and of the manner of their appearance. 
(T 1.2.3.4; SBN 34) 
 
This is perhaps our explanation of one idea of some particular extension. 
However, as he is seeking to explain the ideas of extension and duration 
generally, as opposed to only ideas of particular extensions and durations, 
Hume proceeds to explain how we form a general idea from these particular 
ones. Having experienced extensions of many different colours and 
  
vii. [F]inding a resemblance in the disposition of colour’d points, of which 
they are compos’d, we omit the peculiarities of colour, as far as possible, and 
found an abstract idea merely on that disposition of points, or manner of 
appearance, in which they agree. (T 1.2.3.5; SBN 34) 
 
And this resemblance we find appears to extend beyond the objects of sight 




viii. Nay even when the resemblance is carry’d beyond the objects of one 
sense, and the impressions of touch are found to be similar to those of sight 
in the disposition of their parts; this does not hinder the abstract idea from 
representing both, upon account of their resemblance. (T 1.2.3.5; SBN 34) 
 
ix. [Thus] [a]ll abstract ideas are really nothing but particular ones, 
consider’d in a certain light; but being annexed to general terms, they are able 
to represent a vast variety, and to comprehend objects, which, as they are 
alike in some particulars, are in others vastly wide of each other. (T 1.2.3.5; 
SBN 34) 
 
And finally, we are given the story for the case of the idea of time. In spite 
of being a more “abstract” idea in that it is derived from a greater variety of 
sources, the formation process for it is presented as being analogous to that 
of the idea of space:   
 
x. The idea of time, being deriv’d from the succession of our perceptions 
of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reflection as 
well as of sensation, will afford us an instance of an abstract idea, which 
comprehends a still greater variety than that of space, and yet is represented 
in the fancy by some particular individual idea of a determinate quantity and 
quality. (T 1.2.3.6; SBN 34-5) 
 
From these brief comments there are a few immediate points of note: 
Firstly, one must take a stance on what exactly is being asserted in premise ii. 
when Hume tells us that perceiving visible bodies and then “considering the 
distance betwixt these bodies” is sufficient to “acquire the idea of extension.” 
This statement is echoed two paragraphs later when Hume states that “[t]he 
table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of 
extension.” Here Hume uses the definite article (though the italics are mine). 
However, the idea of extension appears to be a functionally-general idea, 
that is, an idea of the “manner of appearance” of other perceptions. In the 
story he tells he emphasises the requirement that we experience different 
particular instances and, only by coming to see a resemblance between those 
cases, do we come to form an idea of extension rather than, say, an idea of 
this or that particular extension. Is it problematic that he states we can form 
the idea of extension without this, merely by opening our eyes and 
considering the ideas of visible bodies that arise?  
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It is a slightly frustrating piece of language but I think, on the whole, we 
need not be too troubled by it. Since he immediately proceeds to tell a story 
of the development of the general idea from these particular instances, I 
suggest we do not put too much weight on this piece of language – 
something more complex seems clearly to be involved in the formation of 
the idea of extension in general as is the case for him with all general ideas.115 
Instead I will take it for now that the visual experience of the table affords 
us only an idea of extension, namely, an idea of this particular coloured 
extension that we take to represent a table. In order to form the idea of 
extension from this it is still necessary to develop the idea from the 
particular to the general through the resemblance-association that Hume 
goes on to discuss.  
 
Taking this view, the form of Hume’s argument is as follows: premise i. 
gives us a tool by which to guide our investigations. Premise ii. details an 
experience of a visual extension from which we can derive an idea of 
extension. Premise iii. states that this idea must come either from 
impressions of sensation or reflexion, and premise iv. rules out the 
possibility that it is derived from the latter.116 Premise v. focuses on our 
impressions of sensation and isolates the impressional content seemingly 
responsible for the idea as being the arrangement of coloured points. 
Premises vi. and vii. detail the process (as first set out in his discussion of 
abstract ideas in T 1.1.7.) by which these particular ideas become general in 
their representation through patterns of association; by these means 
particular ideas become functionally-abstract. To finish, Hume extends his 
discussion to the idea of time and, though noting that the idea can seemingly 
be derived from a greater variety of source experiences, the nature of the 
process by which we form it is presented as being analogous: we experience 
successions of perceptions of all different kinds and, by noting their 
                                                 
115 An alternative response is to note the use of “considering” here. Hume tells us that 
“upon shutting them again, and considering the distance betwixt these bodies, I acquire the 
idea of extension.” Frasca-Spada has suggested that the use of “considering” here might be 
telling and may indeed, in itself, be Hume’s recognition that mental work must be done to 
form the idea of extension. For further discussion of this point see Frasca-Spada (1998), p. 
70. In the next chapter I will discuss what extra work is involved. For now, though, I will set 
this issue aside.  
116 For an interesting discussion of whether Hume was too quick to dismiss this case see 
Falkenstein (1997), pp. 185-7.   
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resemblance to each other, we form a functionally-abstract idea of the 
structural similarity that temporal experiences bear to each other; in essence, 
that they are successive.  
 
The ideas of time and space emerge as different but analogous ideas of the 
“manner of appearance” of other perceptions. Exploring their generality 
more fully is the work of chapters 6 and 7. However, for now, note that the 
formation of ideas of particular extensions and durations is a crucial step in 
the process of idea-formation for Hume. If we did not have such particular 
ideas we could not feel a resemblance between these particulars and so could 
not form the more developed general ideas. In order to explain the general 
idea, then, it must be possible from within the Humean framework to form 
ideas of particular times and spaces. And here, as I noted above, an apparent 
asymmetry between our experience of time and our experience of space 
threatens to make forming ideas of particular times problematic.     
 
 
4.3. The Problem of Asymmetry 
So Hume tells us that the processes by which we form ideas of particular 
times and particular spaces are analogous even if the content from which we 
form ideas of particular times is notably broader. However, the respective 
nature of our experiences of time and space appears to be in one sense 
disanalogous and this opens the door to an additional difficulty. Hume tells 
us that: “’Tis a property inseparable from time, and which in a manner 
constitutes its essence, that each of its parts succeeds another, and that none 
of them, however contiguous, can ever be co-existent.”117 Later in the 
Treatise he puts the point specifically in terms of what is available to us in 
experience:    
 
Without having recourse to metaphysics, any one may easily observe, that 
space or extension consists of a number of co-existent parts dispos’d in a 
certain order, and capable of being at once present to the sight or feeling. On 
the contrary, time or succession, tho’ it consists likewise of parts, never 
presents to us more than one at once; nor is it possible for any two of them 
                                                 
117 T 1.2.2.4; SBN 31. 
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ever to be coexistent…Every part must appear single and alone, nor can 
regularly have entrance into the fancy without banishing what is suppos’d to 
have been immediately precedent.118 
 
In these lines Hume highlights what he seemingly takes to be a key 
difference between the nature of extension and the nature of duration: The 
parts of any extension can coexist; indeed, perhaps in order to form an 
extension, they must for spatial ordering relies on “a number of co-existent 
parts dispos’d in a certain order.” However, the moments of any duration 
cannot coexist, instead “[e]very part must appear single and alone.” This 
property of time “in a manner constitutes its essence.” In this way our 
experiences of time and space are disanalogous too. In spatial experience, 
the parts of an extension appear to be all available to experience at once; that 
is, the visual array itself is an instance of an extended, two-dimensional 
ordering of impressions. Intuitively, spatial complexity is immediately 
available in a way that temporal complexity is not.119  
 
Although I will suggest some challenges to the apparent ease of the spatial 
case in the next chapter, that Hume takes the immediacy and availability of 
spatial complexity to be straightforward has been suggested by many: 
Falkenstein and Welton highlight the quotation above in support of this. 
Jacquette states that “there is no doubt that Hume regards extension as an 
immediate rather than mediated complex idea”; in support of this he 
references the example of the experience of the table as discussed above as a 
prime example of an idea of extension unmediated by memory, imagination, 
                                                 
118 T 2.3.7.5; SBN 429.  
119 It is worth noting that this asymmetry concerning the availability of temporal complexity 
at a time trades on a possibly illegitimate request. As briefly noted above it seems that there 
would be just as much of a problem in experiencing spatial complexity at a single spatial 
point, which appears to be a parallel demand to experiencing temporal complexity at a 
single time. To this extent, asking why we cannot experience time at a time it is a question 
that is conceptually bound to cause trouble. However, it does seem to be a contingent fact 
of our experience that spatial complexity is available in a way that temporal complexity is 
not. The nature of our experience of time seems to limit us to experiencing only simple 
moments in each perceptual act. However, we are not prevented from experiencing more 
than one spatial point in an act. As such it seems that, for all the conceptual naughtiness of 
the question, experience appears at least to place a practical barrier in the case of time that 
does not seem present in the case of space. In the next chapter I will argue we can dissolve 
this barrier, but for now it is worth noting that these issues muddy the water. Thanks to 
Jasper Reid for pressing this point.    
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or reason.120 With the caveat already mentioned above regarding the table 
example (that what we receive is an idea of some particular extension, rather 
than the fully-blown idea of extension in general), there does seem to be 
support for the claim that Hume presents this process in this way. In one 
visual act we seem capable of taking in an extended, complex array. And 
when we are concerned with the formation of complex ideas this availability 
seems to be of use in that we might think that simples which come unified 
are easier to process as unified. That this unification in presentation has an 
effect of this sort seems to be implied in Hume’s comment that: “The parts 
of extension being susceptible of an union to the senses, acquire an union in 
the fancy.”121  
 
However, in the case of time, the nature of our experience appears to 
present an additional challenge. The moments of an experienced duration 
progress in a succession, where each new moment, through its 
incompatibility with the one before, “banishes” the previous moment from 
existence. The parts of time must be conceived of as different to what came 
before and what will come after, with each new moment excluding its rivals 
from existence. This pattern of each new moment replacing the last and 
being replaced in turn is of the very “essence” of succession, and so, time. It 
seems in the fundamental nature of time that one does not experience its 
composing moments simultaneously. No duration is ever wholly present; 
instead only simple moments are wholly present. What exists at any moment 
of experience is temporally simple.  
 
This asymmetry in the nature of our experience of time when compared to 
our experience of space threatens a challenge which is not easily resolved: if 
experience only ever presents us with temporal simples, how do we form an 
idea of temporal complexity? This question will cut deep to the core 
mechanics of the Copy Principle. In particular, it will become necessary to 
ask what features of experience we are capable of “copying” into ideas. 
Content only, or structured content?  
                                                 
120 Jacquette (1996) p.70.  




In the next chapter I will consider the view that we are capable of copying 
into ideas not only the content of experience (the moments) but also 
structured content (successions of moments); that is, moments and their 
own unique “manner of appearance.” However, many are reluctant to 
attribute such a view to Hume. The historical orthodoxy has Hume as an 
atomist and the reproduction of a structured whole rather than just simple 
“atoms” sits uneasily with some. The asymmetry explored here seems to 
imply there might be a kind of practical barrier in the case of time that does 
not hold in the case of space. In what remains of this chapter I will consider 
a range of approaches that reject the possibility of our copying structured 
content. These routes stay within the bounds of the Copy Principle and 
instead trace temporally complex ideas to temporally simple ones. I argue 
these routes are ultimately problematic. By showing that such views are 
neither consistently supported by the text, nor successful in explaining our 
ideas of particular times, I aim to motivate the need to consider alternative 
approaches, specifically, ones that would have us reinterpret the nature and 
bounds of the Copy Principle.   
 
 
4.4. Representing Temporal Complexity Through 
Temporally Simple Ideas 
Perhaps the most natural response to the problem above, given the means 
apparently available, is to suppose that, although we may only ever 
experience temporally simple moments, we can use these to form ideas that 
represent the temporally complex. There are a few different ways this might 
work. Firstly, I will consider the simplest form of approach. This is to form 
an idea of temporal complexity by some mental act of combination. Just as 
we might form an idea of a golden mountain by combining an idea of gold 
and an idea of a mountain, perhaps we form an idea of temporal complexity 
by combining temporally simple ideas.   
 
Secondly, we might appeal to the presence, alongside present experiences, of 
memories of the past or expectations of the future. Perhaps it is the constant 
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accompaniment of these kinds of ideas which grants us an idea of temporal 
complexity. In following this line of thought it is interesting to consider the 
approach to the idea of time taken by St. Augustine in the Confessions.122 As a 
comparison the case is apt in that Hume’s view appears very similar to 
Augustine’s particularly on relevant details regarding the structure of time 
and our experience of it. In particular, Augustine accepts the temporal 
simplicity of the present moment and the same commitment Hume has 
regarding the essential successiveness of time. As such, due to the change 
and conflict between moments, each of Augustine’s moments must appear, 
to use Hume’s words, “single and alone” just as they must for Hume. 
Augustine then sought to explain how it is we can get an idea of duration 
from an experience which will only ever be simple by appeal to ideas of past 
and future times. Since Hume does not offer us greater detail in his own 
exploration, considering an approach grounded in similar principles offers 
one way of thinking about how Hume could have proceeded. Considering 
the applicability and success of an approach like Augustine’s to Hume’s 
theory of time will open up some interesting problems and some possible 
further avenues. 
 
Thirdly and finally, I will consider the possibility that some intrinsic features 
of moments can give us markers of temporal complexity. This idea is 
motivated in part by C. D. Broad’s notion of “presentedness” and again, 
there are elements in Hume’s theory that might allow for a route of this sort. 
However, in spite of some initial viability given other features of Hume’s 
account, such an approach is neither well supported by the text nor is it, 
ultimately, able to allow Hume to account for the ideas we have of particular 
times.123  
 
Hume does not give us greater depth on this issue aside of telling us that we 
do form ideas of particular successions. As such, the best we can do in 
deepening an understanding of how this might work is appeal to hints in the 
                                                 
122 The similarities between Hume’s commitments to time and Augustine’s are presented 
and discussed interestingly in Bardon (2007) and also noted in Baxter (2008) pp. 20-1. For a 
look at Augustine’s influence in this area more broadly see Mundle (1966).  
123 For Broad’s discussion of the notion of “presentedness” see Broad (1938) p. 282; for 
comments on this see Bardon (2007) p. 5.  
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text and to the tools which Hume has available. In this chapter, much of 
what I introduce here by way of possible approaches will be ideas developed 
by other authors who share some core commitments. These approaches are 
consistent with the tools Hume had available to him and in places suggested 
by textual evidence. However, I do not introduce these routes as 
interpretations of what Hume had in mind. Instead my aim here is primarily 
to explore the shortcomings of this broad style of response, that is, tracing 
the complex idea to simple ones. Doing this is interpretively helpful (by 
showing that the textual support for these approaches is not consistently 
present) and critically interesting, for it serves to motivate the depth of the 
challenge Hume is facing here.  
 
Ultimately, I will suggest these avenues are not successful. On any approach 
wherein the resulting idea of succession is synchronic we are forced to 
interpret temporally simple content as temporally complex. Since the aim is 
to explain our first, most basic, ideas of particular successions it seems likely 
we are in no position to do this. As such, these routes engender circularity 
and the presupposition of ideas we do not yet have. The failure of 
synchronic-idea approaches does, however, give us good reason to 
reconsider the nature of the Copy Principle and its relationship to the idea of 
time.124   
 
 
4.4.1. The Simplest Form of Mental Combination 
To begin, let’s consider the simplest way that we might form an idea of time 
from simples. Seeing the shortcomings here will go a way towards 
highlighting what a solution to this problem might require. So, though we 
only ever experience temporally simple moments we have no trouble in 
forming temporally simple ideas from them. Why should we not just say that 
we combine some number of temporally simple ideas to form a temporally 
complex idea in the same way that we might mentally combine the idea of 
                                                 
124 For some particularly pertinent discussions of the problems with these kinds of routes in 
relation to the challenge faced by Hume (amongst others) see Bardon (2007), Falkenstein 
(1997), Johnson (1989), Mabbott (1951), and Mundle (1966). 
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gold and the idea of a mountain to form an idea of a golden mountain? 
Considering the case of extension makes the problem with this perspicuous.  
 
I take then my idea of a spatially simple blue point, and a second idea of a 
spatially simple red point. (Though we rarely experience such simples, let’s 
say that I have been engaging in one of Hume’s experiments to find visual 
minima: perhaps I have been viewing ink spots at a distance, or merely 
dividing my ideas until I find I have arrived at an idea I cannot conceive any 
division in). Could I not simply mentally position these two ideas alongside 
one another to form an extension? It seems I can: however, doing so 
involves appeal to a prior notion of spatiality. To position ideas alongside 
one another involves manipulating points in a spatial array; seemingly the 
capacity to place points alongside one another involves some notion of 
things’ being alongside one another. However, these are inherently spatial 
notions. The idea of extension is, for Hume, the idea of a certain manner of 
appearance. Although points arranged in conformity with this manner of 
appearance will constitute a visual extension, it is key that my success in 
creating this idea involves employing a prior notion of “alongside” that I 
would not have unless I already had some experience of extended spatial 
arrays and some idea of what the spatial “manner of appearance” was. 
Performing the required act of mental combination then, involves 
presupposing a familiarity with the relevant idea of extension. Thus 
circularity ensues. 
 
Analogously, in the case of time, it would not be enough for me to create an 
idea of succession by merely conceiving of many simple moments. I would 
have to also conceive of them as occurring successively. But here we are 
trying to explain how we form our most basic and rudimentary ideas of 
succession that are required in order to form a general idea of a successive 
manner of appearance. As such, we can hardly include a notion of their 
occurring successively without presupposing the very idea we are seeking to 
explain. Once again, we arrive at circularity. The failure of this most basic 
attempt at explaining the origin of our ideas of particular successions does 
not spell failure for all attempts of its kind. However, we will find that 
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circularity problems arise again and again, even with more developed 
accounts.  
 
4.4.2. St. Augustine and Time in the Confessions 
St. Augustine’s approach is one such more developed account. As noted 
above, this account offers to be illuminating for us in that Hume appears to 
share many of Augustine’s basic commitments regarding the ontology and 
experience of time. Durations consist of more than one moment of time and 
time consists of a succession of moments, where change between moments 
marks their succession. For Augustine, as for Hume, this change is what 
entails that moments cannot coexist, thus: “a long time is long only because 
constituted of many successive movements which cannot be simultaneously 
extended.”125 Our world (as contrasted with the eternal realm in which 
“nothing is transient, but the whole is present”126) is temporal insofar as it 
manifests change through this succession of states which replace each other 
in existence. Hume’s use of the idea of “banishment” echoes this theme in 
Augustine where “all past time is driven backwards by the future, and all 
future time is the consequent of the past, and all past and future are created 
and set on their course by that which is always present.”127 For Augustine 
the contrast case to our changing, temporal natures is the nature of the 
immutable deity:     
 
Your ‘years’ neither go nor come. Ours come and go so that all may go in 
succession. All your ‘years’ exist in simultaneity, because they do not change; 
those going away are not thrust out by those coming in. But the years which 
are ours will not all be until all years have ceased to be.128  
 
This idea of succession as replacement motivates, for Augustine, the same 
commitment as Hume’s notion of “banishment”: that of a single, temporally 
simple present moment. For, if duration requires succession, which in turn 
requires replacement, no single moment can have duration. Instead longer 
                                                 
125 Confessions, Book XI, section 13, p.228.  
126 Confessions, Book XI, section 13, p.228.  
127 Confessions, Book XI. section 13, pp. 228-9.  
128 Confessions, Book XI. section 16, p. 230.  
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and shorter times all rely on the passing of simple moments. The present 
moment itself, Augustine assures us, has no duration:  
 
If we can think of some bit of time which cannot be divided into even the 
smallest instantaneous moments, that alone is what we call ‘present’. And this 
time flies so quickly from future into past that it is an interval with no 
duration. If it has duration, it is divisible into past and future. But the present 
occupies no space.129  
 
The present moment cannot be “long”: it is simple, not successive, and so 
has no duration. It endures only until a change introduces the next moment. 
If only the present moment exists, Augustine questions how it is that we 
measure time. His solution is that we supplement what exists now with 
memories of the past and expectations of the future and, by these means, 
bring into existence representations of that which does not exist to hold 
alongside that which does. In this way we employ the mind to supplement 
the temporally simple present:   
 
What is by now evident and clear is that neither future nor past exists, and it 
is inexact language to speak of three times – past, present, and future. 
Perhaps it would be exact to say: there are three times, a present of things 
past, a present of things present, a present of things to come. In the soul 
there are these three aspects of time, and I do not see them anywhere else. 
The present considering the past is memory, the present considering the 
present is immediate awareness, the present considering the future is 
expectation.130 
 
The present is all that exists: however, some of what exists refers to what 
has been or what will be. Getting a sense of duration for Augustine seems to 
involve a kind of supplementation by the mind of ideas of other times. In 
this sense, time is ideal, and reliant on the mind: “My confession to you is 
surely truthful when my soul declares that times are measured by me.”131  
 
This developed, and yet intuitive, response offers one way of aiming to meet 
the challenge posed earlier to Hume, and from a theoretical position not 
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unlike Hume’s own.132 Two questions emerge from this: firstly, though he 
clearly did not explicitly recognise this route, does Hume have the resources 
available to adopt such an approach to forming the idea of time? Secondly, if 
he does, would adopting such a route allow Hume to meet the challenge 
posed above? I suggest the answers to these questions are yes and no, 
respectively.  
 
Firstly then, the answer to the first question seems to be yes: Hume’s 
account does possess the resources necessary to make moves of this sort 
and he does at times talk in a way that supports such a reading. To Hume, all 
experience amounts to experience of perceptions, be they impressions or 
ideas, and the work the principles of association do mean that we find what 
we take to be experiences of “now” constantly accompanied by associated 
memories of the past and expectations for the future. In accordance with the 
principles of association (resemblance, contiguity in time or space, and 
causation), our experiences are at every moment accompanied by fleeting 
associated ideas. Perhaps, just as an experience that resembles a past “cause” 
from a cause-effect pair can provoke a vivid expectation of some certain 
“effect,” so an experience deemed to be of the present now is accompanied 
with present memories of past times, and present expectations of the future. 
Could this phenomenon give us the means to form a basic idea of 
succession?  
 
To begin, let’s consider a toy example (“toy” to the extent that experience 
presents us with a far more complex phenomenal array that this at seemingly 
all times; and equally in that each “moment” here is probably temporally 
complex. However, I leave these points aside for now for the sake of 
simplicity). I experience a succession: at t-1, I see the second hand of the 
clock at 12 o’clock precisely; at t, I see the second hand at 12.01; at t+1, I 
                                                 
132 Baxter, in his discussion of this, argues that Hume’s ontology differs to Augustine’s in 
that Augustine is committed to the existence only of the present moment, whereas Hume is 
committed to the slightly different thesis that, as Baxter puts it, “[s]uccessive parts of time 
exist, just not all presently.” (Baxter 2008, p.20) For the problem at hand, though, this does 
not seem to me to help. Given only the present exists presently, we still face the problem 
that anything not present must be represented as such. So the requirement that we explain 
how we are able to interpret some content as non-present in a way that would give us an 
idea of temporal complexity remains.  
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see the second hand at 12.02. How to characterise this? (In an attempt to 
illustrate this example a little more clearly, I will be use bold type for 
impressions and regular type for ideas.) Focusing in on my experience at t, 
the present moment, it seems that it likely contains the sorts of elements 
Augustine discusses. I am undergoing some present impression P of the 
second hand at 12.01; at the same time I have an accompanying idea of 
memory M of the second hand at 12.00. Given my extensive past experience 
of staring blankly at clocks, I also have an expectation E (again an idea), of 
seeing the second hand at 12.02. The totality of my experience at t seems to 
be a temporally simple one: namely, “MPE.” Such experiences seem likely to 
be common on Hume’s account. Turn now to the second question of 
whether an experience of this sort could allow Hume to meet the challenge 
faced. That is, could the present experience “MPE” afford us an idea of 
temporal complexity?  
 
I do not see how it could. The moment in which I have this experience is 
itself simple. As such, even though elements in this experience purport to 
represent other times, the compound experience itself is still temporally 
simple: it is a synchronic experience consisting of two ideas and an 
impression. Even if we specified that M is not a false memory (though we 
would have no access to the means to do this) and so really does refer to a 
previous time, the experience I am having is still, in itself, temporally simple. 
If I copy this experience into an idea, the idea I form is also temporally 
simple. Although in our example, the parts of this experience would 
correspond to at least two different times (and hint at a third), the idea itself, 
being entirely synchronic, appears to be an experience of simultaneity not 
succession. Without an understanding of what the elements represent, an 
idea copied from this experience would seem to be just as temporally simple 
as the experience it copies. And yet, given we are trying to explain the 
formation of our very first ideas of time, there seems no way we could 




This simultaneity concern is highlighted by Bardon in his discussion of this 
problem.133 If what is before my mind in experience right now is a mixture of 
impressions and ideas, though it is true that they are different, and may even 
contain parts which correspond to different times, the idea itself is 
synchronic. Since both the current impression and the remembered idea or 
ideas are all together before the mind, they do not form an experience of a 
succession but an experience of a simultaneity. In short, an experience of M 
and P is not an experience of M then P.  
 
 
4.4.3. Intrinsic Markers of Temporal Complexity 
So the conscious combination of temporally simple ideas appears to be 
problematic, as does the copying of experiences which represent temporal 
complexity but are themselves temporally simple. One line of response that 
might be tempting at this point is to point to intrinsic qualities of the ideas 
and appeal to those as in some way indicating temporality. If we can employ 
intrinsic features to indicate or suggest a temporal interpretation of a 
synchronic idea we might find we can avoid the need to impose a temporal 
interpretation that we are not, at this point, in any position to give. If this 
could be achieved we might find a route to avoiding the reoccurring 
circularity.   
 
C. D. Broad considers such a route though he was ultimately not entirely 
optimistic as to its success. He suggested that there is an aspect of certain 
mental contents one might call “presentedness.” In the case imagined above, 
it is what marks P as different to M. The element of the experience we take 
to constitute the present impression is forceful and vivacious; the memory 
part is fainter and weaker. Broad considered the idea that the quality of 
presentedness came in degrees and that the decline in strength correlated 
with the “age” of the perception. Such a route does seem available to Hume 
and, though not strongly suggested by the text, it does cohere to some 
extent with his account of memory as, in looking to distinguish genuine 
memories from those ideas of the fancy that we might conjure up in our 
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heads, Hume does seem to point to the intrinsic force and vivacity as part of 
what the difference amounts to:   
 
Since therefore the memory is known, neither by the order of its complex 
ideas, nor the nature of its simple ones; it follows, that the difference betwixt 
it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity. A man may 
indulge his fancy in feigning any past scene of adventures; nor wou’d there be 
any possibility of distinguishing this from a remembrance of a like kind, were 
not the ideas of the imagination fainter and more obscure.134   
 
If the ideas of memory are marked by their being more vivid, though not as 
vivid as impressions, we might think that there is room for Hume to make a 
similar move to Broad’s. That is to say that impressions of how the world is 
now are most vivid; memories of how it was a moment ago are less vivid, 
but still more vivid than mere inventions of the imagination.  
 
One might object at this point that the phenomenology does not support 
this. In particular, it seems very implausible to suggest that there is a 
consistent gradual fade across all memories. Some memories long past are 
far more vivid that the memory of what I had for breakfast yesterday. 
However, it is importantly to note that, given we are only trying to form a 
very basic idea of succession at this point, it may not matter that this marker 
does not consistently extend. Perhaps it could be enough that it extend over 
a very short sequence, such as in the clock example given above. Limiting 
things even just to the intrinsic difference between M and P as a pair, 
perhaps this can be employed in order to explain how the synchronic idea 
MP gives us an idea of succession? Unfortunately, this approach also seems 
to encounter a number of difficulties that limit its success.     
 
Firstly, it seems it would face all the difficulties that Hume’s impression/idea 
distinction already faces. Hume has no grounds available on which to 
maintain that ideas and impressions are different in kind since his 
introspective method of analysis offers us no way to use origin as a principle 
of individuation. Impressions and ideas are all on a par as being perceptions 
and can be picked apart only by generally, though not invariably, possessing 
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characteristic degrees of force and vivacity. In certain cases that Hume 
discusses, for example “in sleep, in a fever, in madness” we seem to have 
ideas which approach the force and vivacity of impressions.135 It is already 
problematic on what grounds Hume can maintain that such cases are not 
simply cases of impressions that come from the mind: after all, they are 
comparable in their intrinsic qualities and feel to impressions and, with no 
appeal to point of origin, there do not seem to be immediate grounds on 
which to exclude them. These are complex questions and by no means does 
Hume have no tools by which to address them, but any account which 
attempted to adopt an approach involving something echoing the notion of 
presentedness would seem to be under an obligation to say something about 
how we should.  
 
Secondly, thinking in this way does not make clear what we should say about 
future expectations of how things will be, and yet these play an integral role 
in Hume’s account of causal reasoning and so permeate rather a lot of his 
theory of our experience of the world. St. Augustine made room for future 
expectations in his account, but if we adopt this notion of vivacity as 
presentness we might think Hume’s acceptance of expectation creates 
problems. For Hume, such expectations arise through powerful mental 
connections between ideas such that the expected effect of an experienced 
thing can strike one forcefully (“if we think of a wound, we can scarcely 
forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it”136). This feature of being 
forceful and striking seems to characterise many of our causal expectations 
and marks them as believed, on a par with memories in the sense of being 
conceived with a certain kind of force and steadiness. However, if being 
vivid (though less vivid than impressions) is a marker of both the past and 
the future, how can force and vivacity indicate temporal ordering? As Hume 
highlighted in his comments on memory above, we do not have access to 
the original impressions to compare our ideas with what has happened: so if 
we really are left with force and vivacity alone as an indicator it seems too 
impoverished a notion to do the job in hand.  
 
                                                 
135 T 1.1.1.1; SBN 2.  
136 EHU 3.3; SBN 23.     
111 
 
Furthermore, we would have to make sense of other parts of the text that 
seem to count against this position. For example, where Hume attempts to 
account for the phenomenon that he finds in himself that distance in time 
weakens the conception of an object, and distance in past time has a greater 
effect than distance in the future. He remarks that, because we’re used to 
experience progressing from one moment to later ones as opposed to 
receding into the past, we find that our imagination runs smoother forwards 
in time than backwards: “fancy flows along the stream of time, and arrives at 
the object by an order, which seems most natural, passing always from one 
point of time to that which is immediately posterior to it.” And this 
smoothness appears to impact on our strength of conception so that “[a] 
small degree of distance in the past has, therefore, a greater effect, in 
interrupting and weakening the conception, than a much greater in the 
future. From this effect of it on the imagination is deriv’d its influence on 
the will and passions.”137 It does not seem that even Hume thinks that 
vivacity fades uniformly, again telling against a reading of this sort. 
 
Thirdly and finally (and perhaps most damningly), even if the intrinsic force 
and vivacity of perceptions did reliably and consistently track temporal 
ordering, it is not clear how exactly this comes to be interpreted as temporal 
by us prior to our possessing some idea of temporal complexity (and, as 
before, this is the very idea we are attempting to form). Let’s say that I have 
before my mind the complex simultaneous idea/impression MP, and that M 
and P do have different intrinsic qualities. One can still ask why, before I 
have any notion of temporal complexity at all, these intrinsic differences of 
quality could or would be interpreted as marking a difference in temporal 
ordering. It seems there is nothing intrinsic to force and vivacity that implies 
presentness, not faintness that implies pastness or futurity. The idea MP is 
still synchronic and what is before the mind is still a simultaneous set of 
ideas and impressions. It is simply a simultaneity with parts which possess 
different degrees of force and vivacity. In order to interpret this as indicating 
something temporally complex it seems we need to have already some idea 
of temporal complexity. Once again then, the charge of circularity ensues. 
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Without a notion of temporal ordering being applied to this experience, it 
just is not clear why force and vivacity would be taken as a marker of 
presentness. 
 
One might be tempted to respond that, although force and vivacity do not 
intrinsically mark something out as present, the constant conjunction of 
these qualities with impressions, that is, sensations which we are having right 
now, means we come to associate force and vivacity with presentness. This 
feels a Humean sort of response and yet again it is inadequate. For we are 
also having right now a number of fainter ideas. Why then would we not also 
associate faintness with presentness? It does seem that Hume takes our 
understanding that ideas are copies of impressions to be fairly immediate 
and intuitive. However, it is still not something we simply see when we 
introspect. Instead we arrive at the idea that ideas are copies by 
introspectively noting both intrinsic features and that, of the pairs of 
perceptions, one sort seems to always precede the other.138 Again then, this 
interpretation seems to involve the application of some notion of temporal 
ordering, and again, we cannot presuppose that we possess this idea since it 




If we must rely only upon copying temporally simple ideas, I suggest we find 
ourselves in no position to form an idea of temporal complexity. The above 
routes all require a kind of interpretive spin of temporal complexity onto 
temporally simple content and we are in no position to perform this prior to 
our forming the most basic ideas of times. If Hume’s account is limited to 
accounting for the idea in this way, we might concede the critical charge that 
his approach is doomed to circularity for, if we are required to presuppose 
the possession of the very idea we are seeking to form, it surely is. We 
cannot apply an idea of temporal complexity, of a successive manner of 
appearance, before we have formed these most basic ideas of particular 
successions, let alone formed the idea of a successive manner of appearance 
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in general. Without already possessing an idea of temporally complexity, and 
thereby interpreting simple content as temporally complex, it seems we 
cannot perform the mental acts required by the approaches I have 
considered so far.  
 
Given the essentially successive nature of time, if we privilege the Copy 
Principle as a rule which dictates that we can only form ideas of temporal 
simples then it seems we face a serious challenge in forming ideas of 
particular times. In the next chapter I am going to consider two lines of 
response to this. The first, forwarded by Frasca-Spada, involves accepting 
that the ideas of time and space constitute a violation of the Copy Principle. 
The second approach I will consider receives its fullest expression in 
Falkenstein, though can be found in other places too. He argues that the 
ideas of time and space do not constitute a violation of the Copy Principle 
but an extension to it. This chapter, I propose, shows us that something in 
this principle must either bend or break, and that we might do well to allow 
Hume’s commitment to our possessing the ideas of time and space to tell us 



















In answering the challenge of how we might be able to form an idea of 
temporal complexity in spite of the fact that experience only ever presents us 
with temporal simples, how we interpret the Copy Principle becomes 
extremely important. In this chapter I will look at two very different 
approaches to understanding the nature and bounds of the Copy Principle in 
light of Hume’s commitment to our having ideas of time and space and at 
their implications for how we understand the ideas that emerge.  
 
Firstly I will look at the approach forwarded by Frasca-Spada, who stresses 
the sense in which these ideas constitute a violation of the Copy Principle. 
She argues that its role is more in guidance, it is an investigative maxim that 
grants us a better understanding of ideas by showing exactly what is and 
what is not accounted for by sense experience. In the case of the ideas of 
time and space, it shows us what is left unaccounted for, namely, the 
ordering or manner of appearance of the simple components. On account of 
this, she argues that the ideas of time and space are not simply given in 
impressional content, instead they mark “an original contribution of the 
mind to sense experience.”139 We cannot simply extract these ideas from 
experience, instead the mind must be at work from the off in order that they 
become available.    
 
The defence of this is interesting and drawn with sensitivity from the text. 
However, one might feel a degree of reluctance in allowing such a 
contribution by the mind. Even if the Copy Principle keeps a central role, to 
allow that Hume recognised certain ideas to be not derived straightforwardly 
from experience has made some uncomfortable and so others have sought 
instead to extend the Copy Principle such that it is not violated by the ideas 
of time and space. The second line of approach I will consider strives for 
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this. Specifically, the move is to argue that these ideas demonstrate that we 
are capable of copying not just simples but arranged simples, that is, simples 
along with their manner of appearance.  
 
This second approach has some initial pay-off. In the previous chapter I 
considered ways of trying to account for the idea of time in spite of our 
being limited by the unavailability in direct experience of the temporally 
complex. Being limited to copying only simple moments, the ideas we 
formed were correspondingly simple. This led to the requirement that we 
interpret temporally simple content as temporally complex, a requirement 
that I argued consistently led to circularity. If we posit this extension to the 
Copy Principle, however, and suppose that we can copy not just simples but 
arranged simples, it may be possible to avoid this circularity. Because the 
resulting idea is already temporally complex there is no requirement to 
impose an interpretive spin on it that we cannot yet impose. By these means 
circularity is avoided, though we must accept a somewhat unusual view of 
representation. Examples of approaches of this sort can be found in Costa, 
Falkenstein, and Garrett.140   
 
However, when we press this second avenue it becomes impossible to 
maintain it without accepting a greater role for the mind even if it is possible 
to account for ideas of particular times without encountering the circularity 
that arose time after time in the previous chapter. My ultimate aim here is to 
show that, whether or not one wants to, it is impossible to exclude the mind 
from playing a significant role in the formation of ideas of particular times. 
The picture that emerges is not unHumean: recognising the influence our 
own cognition has upon the ideas we form is undoubtedly one of Hume’s 
aims. However, whether we interpret the Copy Principle as bending or 
breaking, these ideas sit strangely alongside it and contain integral elements 
which are better traced to the mind’s activity than to impressional content.  
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5.2. The Ideas of Time and Space as an “original 
contribution of the mind” 
Firstly then, we might take the lesson of the previous chapter to be that 
there is a significant problem in accounting for ideas of particular times 
within the bounds of the Copy Principle. The ideas of time and space are 
ideas of the manner of appearance or ordering of other things. They are not 
given in any separate and separable impression and, whether or not one 
thinks that we can copy spatial complexes in one act (of which more later), 
this option does not seem to be immediately available for the case of time 
because of the contingent but problematic asymmetry in our experience. The 
idea of time, then, appears to sit uneasily alongside the Copy Principle in its 
current formulation. One might very well conclude that something must 
bend or break. To begin I am going to consider Frasca-Spada’s 
interpretation on which the ideas of time and space violate the Copy 
Principle. However, as she notes, this does not mean this principle is 
without value, or indeed, an important role in Hume’s work. Instead its role 
is negative: it shows us what experience cannot account for, which we must 
instead infer to be the additional work of the mind.   
 
She argues that, when we apply the Copy Principle to our ideas of time and 
space, we find that the crucial manner of appearance is left unaccounted for. 
Considering an experience of extension Hume notes that “my senses convey 
to me only the impressions of colour’d points, dispos’d in a certain 
manner.”141 If this is so, it seems the Copy Principle allows us a means to 
trace the simple elements, these simple impressions can be copied to form 
simple ideas. However, what we do not find a way to account for is the 
disposition or manner in which these simples are arranged. As Hume puts it 
in discussing the temporal case of hearing five notes played in succession, we 
can perfectly well account for the notes we hear but their successive manner 
of appearance is not some “sixth impression.”142 The manner of appearance 
is not, Hume makes clear, some separate or distinct impression which we 
receive along with the simple perceptions. Instead the manner is something 
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instantiated by complexes of these simples. When we apply the Copy 
Principle to these complex impressions, we are left with an important 
element left unaccounted for: the arrangement. And yet, the arrangement is 
the exact thing we are ultimately seeking to explain. Her conclusion is that 
the manner of appearance is not derived by the senses; instead it should be 
thought of as an “original contribution of the mind to sense-perception.”143  
 
As additional support for this reading, Frasca-Spada points to a number of 
other places in the Treatise where we find a gap between experience and 
ideas, and notes these gaps are marked fairly consistently by Hume’s use of 
loose but evocative language. His discussion of abstract ideas, belief, and, 
perhaps most notably, the self all instance this. When Hume discusses not 
only ideas and their content but the way that ideas are had or felt by the 
conceiver his language bears these marks. This, Frasca-Spada takes to be “a 
form of acknowledgement, on his part, of the trace, in experience, of the 
mind’s operations.”144 More explicitly,    
 
[the linguistic markings] never fail to be there when circumstances require 
them: that is, when the subject is something at once very familiar and difficult 
to express – something at once intimate and ineffable, something which has 
to do not with ideas, but with, for instance, the differences between how 
different ideas are felt. I suggest that, in the Treatise, the language becomes 
loose when mental contents are being described not as such, but in terms of 
qualities and acts of the mind. The action of the mind is described as: That 
certain je-ne-sais-quoi, of which it is impossible to give any definition or 
description, but which everyone sufficiently understands. (T/106).145  
 
In each of these cases the ideas are “somehow more directly and specifically 
related to the self.”146 The resulting ideas bear indications of the mind’s 
activity though we can only infer this activity indirectly by noting what 
experience cannot account for. To Frasca-Spada then, the ideas of time and 
space indicate that the mind has played a role in their formation. Indeed, one 
might think it must have played a key role given that the ordering or 
arrangement is exactly the core thing in these ideas. She concludes that “The 
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self arranges perceptions in certain orders or dispositions, and organises 
itself as a set of beliefs. And this is all metaphysics can say.”147 We are 
prevented from going further by the inaccessibility of the operations of the 
mind: however, by appeal to the Copy Principle we can still put our finger 
on what is left over and so what is required. Since the ordering itself is not 
traceable to experience, we can infer that it is contributed by us.  
 
Frasca-Spada does not tell us more about exactly how the mind makes this 
contribution, but this is a principled decision, for Hume notes the 
impossibility of turning the mind in on itself to reflect upon its operations. 
In many places he highlights that a kind of indirect knowledge seems to be 
the best that we can do, that is, our knowledge of the mind’s work is limited 
to an appreciation of its apparent effects:  
 
[T]he essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external 
bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and 
qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the 
observation of those particular effects, which result from its different 
circumstances and situations. And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our 
principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the 
utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still 
certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to 
discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be 
rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.148 
 
We can know something of the effects of the mind’s activities, so long as 
our experiments are careful and exact, but we cannot get to the ultimate 
causes. Ultimately, in Hume’s words, “we can give no reason for our most 
general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their reality.”149  
 
On Frasca-Spada’s account the ideas of space and time violate the Copy 
Principle if it is conceived of as a strict law, which is fine because the role 
she assigns it is different. Instead it acts as a guide and an indicator, and 
remains in conformity with Hume’s “endeavour to render all our principles 
as universal as possible” which, one might think, allows for exceptions in 
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certain unusual or special cases.150 And the ideas of time and space are 
indeed unusual in this respect. By applying the principle to them we find that 
core elements of them cannot be accounted for by experience and we can 
infer instead that they arise as a result of the activity of the mind. On this 
view, even in forming our first ideas of particular times and spaces, the mind 
is at work and provides the ordering or arrangement that is characteristic of 
them.    
 
In spite of a persuasive re-characterisation of this principle though, not 
everyone is happy to give up what seems such a core element of Hume’s 
empiricism. In his assessment of this approach Allison, for example, is 
unwilling to allow that Hume accepted this kind of mental contribution 
(though he does maintain that this is what Hume should have said). Instead 
he emphasises the links Hume appears to make between the Copy Principle 
and the denial of innate ideas:   
 
The present question concerning the precedency of our impressions or ideas, 
is the same with what has made so much noise in other terms, when it has 
been disputed whether there be any innate ideas, or whether all ideas be 
derived from sensation and reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove 
the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing 
but shew, that they are conveyed by our senses.151  
 
From this, Allison suggests that allowing that these ideas violate the Copy 
Principle is tantamount to accepting that they are innate.152 But is it possible 
to explain this ordering without appeal to the mind? Next I will look at an 
alternative avenue of response which aims to do just this. By suggesting that 
the ideas of time and space constitute not an exception but an extension to 
the Copy Principle, some argue that it is possible to derive not just content 
but arranged content from experience itself. If this is so the requirement that 
the mind be so significantly involved can be avoided. I will argue that, even 
granting an extension to the Copy Principle, we cannot so easily set aside a 
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significant role for the mind, however, in order to show this let’s first 
consider the suggested alternative.     
 
  
5.3. Complex Ideas from Complex Impressions 
The alternative approach I will consider has it that the Copy Principle is not 
violated by our ideas of space and time. However, they do constitute 
evidence of an interesting and underappreciated extension: that we are 
capable of copying complex impressions to form complex ideas. If this is 
correct, it is argued, there is no bar to our copying not only the simple 
elements of experience (spatial points and moments) but also their manner 
of appearance in that, to copy the complex impression, in this case, just is to 
copy an arrangement of simples. I will first present the interpretation along 
with the view of representation integral to it. Then I will forward a problem 
seemingly posed by the asymmetry of time and space, in essence, it is the 
asymmetry objection aimed at a new target. I will argue for an amendment 
and then suggest that, even with this amendment, this approach requires the 
mind to be much more active in the creation of these ideas than its 
proponents have so far accepted.     
 
So, one way of viewing the shortcomings of the views considered in the 
previous chapter was to note that the idea that resulted, being copied from 
something temporally simple, was itself temporally simple. Reacting against 
this, we might think that what is required is a temporally complex idea. It is 
argued that we can form such an idea by copying not only the individual 
moments of experience, but also their “manner of appearance.” On this 
view we copy not just the moments but also the way those moments occur 
in experience. The idea we form from this is thereby temporally complex. 
Falkenstein, one proponent of such an interpretation of Hume, illustrates 
this thought with the analogy of a photocopier:  
 
That this manner or disposition of parts should be copied over into the idea 
is ultimately no more mysterious…than that a photocopier should reproduce 
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not only the letters on a printed page, but the exact order in which they are 
printed.153 
 
Falkenstein argues in this way that our ideas of space and time do not violate 
the copy principle: however, they do imply an interesting extension to it in 
that they show that, in at least these cases of copying complex impressions 
to form complex ideas, we copy not only the simple impressions but also 
their manner of appearance. As I noted briefly above, Hume’s restatement 
of the copy principle at the commencement of his discussion of the ideas of 
time and space did not specify the tracing must be to simple impressions, as 
it did in T 1.1.1. Instead Hume tells us that “every idea, with which the 
imagination is furnish’d, first makes its appearance in a correspondent 
impression.”154 Hume appears to think that our spatially complex idea of the 
table has its first appearance in the spatially complex impression of a visual 
array of coloured points. If we are capable of forming complex ideas copied 
from complex impressions this might provide us with an interesting 
alternative strategy.   
 
Before more fully exploring the case of time I want to quickly address one 
possible concern that may arise at this point. Namely that, as even the 
immediately above quotation illustrates, Hume does use what appears to be 
singular terms at times. For example, he asks what “impression” gives us the 
idea of extension, and concludes it is the “impression” of “colour’d points 
disposed in a certain manner.”155 In the case of time he also appears to use 
the singular, stating that five notes played on the flute give us “the 
impression and idea of time.”156 One might think this rules out seeking a 
complex impression and yet the examples he uses are explicitly complex in 
Hume’s sense of the term. The “impression” of coloured points could not 
help but be spatially complex since it consists of an arrangement of more 
than one simple point. Similarly, if it is a succession of notes that gives us 
the “impression” of time, that impression can be broken down into the 
notes that compose it. He may use singular language, then, but it is clear 
                                                 
153 Falkenstein (1997) p. 194.   
154 T 1.2.3.1; SBN 33. 
155 T 1.2.3.4; SBN 34 
156 T 1.2.3.10; SBN 36 
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from Hume’s examples that these impressions are, by his own lights, 
complex. I do not think this approach is at odds with the text in this way 
then and it does suggest an initially plausible way of accounting for what it 
could be to form an idea of a successive event. This may also explain why 
Hume does not labour his point in explaining how we form ideas of 
particular times and spaces: if he thought the case with space 
straightforward, and the case with time as analogous to the case of space, 
perhaps he did not think it required further explanation.  
 
As further support for this view we can also consider certain comments 
Hume makes regarding the nature of memory, specifically, that memories 
preserve not only the content but also the order of experiences. For 
example, Hume states “the imagination is not restrain’d to the same order 
and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner 
ty’d down in that respect, without any power of variation.”157 And, perhaps 
even more explicitly:  
 
’Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects 
were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any 
thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty…The 
chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their 
order and position.158 
 
These comments do seem to lend support to the idea that in forming certain 
ideas, namely memories, we copy not only the impressional content but 
ordered content. By these means we have a faculty that preserves the 
ordering of experience not only the experiences themselves. Perhaps the 
Copy Principle is open to this broader specification then and admits that we 
not only copy simple content but the ordering in which that content occurs. 
By rejecting the idea that the Copy Principle is limited to the copying of 
simple content, but instead is open to copying content in the order in which 
it is experienced, these approaches meet the challenge expressed above head 
on. They do not deny that there is this asymmetry between time and space, 
                                                 
157 T 1.1.3.2; SBN 9.  
158 T 1.1.3.3; SBN 9. 
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however, with the Copy Principle interpreted in this broader sense, they 
argue that the asymmetry ceases to be problematic. 
 
If we adopt this line of interpretation then there is none of the problematic 
supplementation that was required for synchronic ideas in the previous 
chapter. The complex impressions we experience are themselves spatial and 
temporal and the ideas that result from experiencing them are equally spatial 
and temporal. They argue that, just as we can copy the spatially extended 
impression of the apple on the table, so too can we copy the temporally 
extended impression of the apple rolling off the table. As Falkenstein puts it:  
  
[Hume] held that while our ideas of space and time are drawn from 
something directly and immediately given in sensory experience, and so are 
not subsequently constructed, this thing is not any one simple impression. It 
is instead an experience of the manner in which a number of simple 
impressions are ordered in a compound.159 
 
This line of interpretation also has interesting implications for the resulting 
ideas of particular times. On this view, we find that the resulting ideas 
represent temporal complexity by literally possessing temporal complexity. 
Which is to say that, by mirroring the parts of a temporally complex 
sequence, the idea produced literally takes time to have. As Allison put it 
whilst characterising Falkenstein, ideas “represent their objects by mirroring 
rather than by intending them.”160 They represent in virtue of being literally 
similar to what they represent so “[a]n idea of space represents space by 
being itself extended in space, not by being ‘of’ space; an idea of time 
represents time by enduring over time.”161  
 
This view of representation may initially seem strange but it has some merits. 
In particular, there are places where Hume appears to talk of ideas as 
“agreeing with” impressions in that they literally possess certain qualities had 
by the impressions they are copied from, extension among them. Consider:   
 
                                                 
159 Falkenstein (1997) p.190.  
160 Allison (2008) p.52.  
161 Falkenstein (1997) p.193.  
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The most vulgar philosophy informs us, that no external object can make 
itself known to the mind immediately, and without the interposition of an 
image or perception. The table, which just now appears to me, is only a 
perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception. Now the most 
obvious of all its qualities is extension. The perception consists of parts. These 
parts are so situated, as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity; of 
length, breadth, and thickness. The termination of these three dimensions is 
what we call figure. This figure is moveable, separable, and divisible. Mobility, 
and separability are the distinguishing properties of extended objects. And to 
cut short all disputes, the very idea of extension is copy’d from nothing but 
an impression, and consequently must perfectly agree to it. To say the idea of 
extension agrees to any thing, is to say that it is extended.162 [My italics] 
 
To the extent that the idea of extension is applicable to impressions, it 
appears to be equally applicable to ideas. Given Hume argues that extension 
consists in a certain sort of arrangement, one which is exhibited as much by 
ideas as by impressions, this is perhaps unsurprising. A very plausible 
reading of the way that my complex idea of the table represents the complex 
impression of the table is by consisting of copies of both the points and 
their positioning, or, on the view we are considering, a copy of the 
positioned points. But then, if we say that the impression is extended in 
virtue of consisting of points arrayed spatially it seems there is nothing that 
should stop us attributing the same quality of extension to the idea.  
 
As noted by several commentators, the resemblance that ideas bear to 
impressions need not be construed as literal mirroring. Resemblance in 
Hume is a varied phenomenon and there are cases which do not seem 
captured by mirroring at all. I will discuss varieties of resemblance in depth 
in chapter 7, however as a quick case to consider, Hume tells us that “[b]lue 
and green are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue and 
scarlet.”163 Mirroring seems insufficient in this case to capture the 
resemblance of their colour (though it might of their simple structure). I will 
argue mirroring also fails to capture core elements in several other examples 
                                                 
162 T 1.4.5.14; SBN 239-40 
163 T 1.2.3.8n1;” SBN 637. 
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of resemblance that Hume gives.164 However, we need not think every case 
of resemblance is a case of mirroring in order to accept this view of 
representation. In this case, if not in others, it seems a very plausible reading 
of the ideas that are formed by copying extended impressional arrays, that 
they represent by mirroring the structured content and, in virtue of this, 
exhibit some of the features of the impressional array including being 
extended or possessing duration.  
 
I suggest we can find further support for this way of understanding 
representation from Hume’s account of ideas of relations. Hume tells us that 
“complex ideas may be divided into Relations, Modes, and Substances.”165 Ideas 
of relations, it appears, are complex ideas and we might wonder why. I take a 
satisfying answer to be given if we note again that Hume rejects abstraction 
by separation. As discussed in chapter 1 (and throughout), all ideas are 
particular for Hume, meaning they are all determinate in their quantities and 
qualities. Consider some relation, say, “to the left of.” The idea of this 
relation cannot be an idea of “to the left of”-ness devoid of all particular 
content, for no ideas are like that for Hume. However, it is also a general 
idea of a relation that is instantiated by many different particulars and so it 
cannot also be merely some one particular idea. If we remember Hume’s 
account of functionally-abstract general ideas as given in T 1.1.7. an answer 
suggests itself: the idea of this relation is an idea of some instance of the 
relation connected to other instances of the relation by association in virtue 
of perceived resemblance. We form this general idea by experiencing and 
thereby gaining ideas of various particular things standing in the “to the left 
of” relation to other things. Upon feeling a resemblance between these 
various cases, they become connected in thought so that thinking of one 
instance brings to mind others. By these means Hume forms general ideas 
without ever leaving the realm of particulars.     
 
                                                 
164 For a thorough discussion of some varieties of Humean resemblance see Gamboa 
(2007), for some criticisms of the adequacy of an account of resemblance as mirroring (in 
relation to impressions and ideas) see Frasca-Spada (1998) p. 18.  
165 T 1.1.4.7; SBN 13.  
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My idea of any given relation will be an idea of some instance of that relation 
related to other instances of that relation by links of association. On any 
given occasion of thought it will be an idea of some instance of that relation. 
Given this reading, we can now see why such ideas would be complex for 
Hume, for they would consist of (at least two) related things. What is more, 
they would also be ideas that seem to represent in an analogous way to the 
proposal above. Just as the copied idea of a spatial array would be an idea of 
extension in virtue of being extended, so too an idea of a relation would be 
an idea of that relation in virtue of contains parts so-related.166  
 
If our ideas of extension are themselves literally extended (and they seem to 
be insofar as they too consist of spatially arranged coloured or felt parts), 
perhaps our complex ideas of duration equally have duration. If this is so 
then the approaches of the previous chapter are ruled out in virtue of not 
being instances of the relations they aim to represent. Instead, in order to 
represent temporal complexity an idea must be an instance of temporally 
complexity. To represent succession, an idea must itself be successive. 
Hume’s theory of relations seems to lend support to this alternative 
conception on which the idea of duration itself possesses duration. For it 
just is an idea of two or more successively occurring moments. One unusual 
consequence of this view would be that, as Costa puts it, “[i]t literally takes 
time to have an idea of time.”167 Just as some of our ideas of extended 
impressions are themselves extended, so too, some of our ideas of 
successions are themselves successive.  
 
On this view then, the idea of time is itself temporally complex in virtue of 
being successive. Although perhaps a little strange to the ears, I have argued 
this view can be supported by a plausible view of Humean relations given his 
rejection of abstraction by separation. Equally, it seems to fit with what it is 
to have extension and duration for Hume. Nothing bars impressions from 
                                                 
166 If this view of relations is right, it seems to make the case of our idea of the causal 
relation rather unusual. For in that case we move beyond ideas of related pairs to an idea of 
the impression of reflexion these related pairs eventually trigger in us. There is not space 
here for a detailed exploration of this view of relations, however, for discussion of the 
spatial and temporal case as well as others see Costa (1998) and, for an opposing view, 
Hausman (1975).   
167 Costa (1990) p. 3.  
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forming the kind of spatial and temporal arrays that instantiate extension 
and duration. It seems, then, that there is no problem with these qualities 
being had by perceptions. But if they are had by impressional content in 
virtue of that content being coloured, say, and so-arranged, there seems no 
reason to say ideas do not also exhibit this and, to the extent that they 
exhibit this, it seems possible for ideas too to be extended and enduring.  
 
 
5.4. Two Further Challenges  
An approach such as this has some merits: the temporal complexity of the 
idea itself provides a means by which to avoid the circularity I discussed in 
chapter 4. It also seems reasonably well motivated and comes with a 
corresponding view of representation that, though perhaps a little unusual, 
seems defensible as a reading of Hume. However, the case is not yet settled. 
In what follows I will argue this approach faces two challenges: firstly, it 
seems the threatening asymmetry in our experience of time in the world has 
an equally threatening parallel when applied to a temporally complex idea. 
Specifically, if the idea itself has duration, then it must be successive. As 
such, at any moment of my having such a temporally complex idea, the 
content experienced is temporally simple. How then are these simple 
perceptions bound such that my idea is truly an idea of temporal 
complexity? If what is before my mind at every moment of having this idea 
is simple, what makes this an idea of succession rather than of temporal 
simplicity? The proponents of accounts of the sort under evaluation can, as 
some recognise, meet this first challenge by appeal to the principles of 
association. However, this means that even an account such as this which 
aims to limit the role of the mind must still posit certain levels of activity in 
forming ideas of particular times.  
 
The second challenge arises from the apparent need of an account of this 
sort to take the impressional content of experience to be given as an 
ordering of parts or, in the case of time, an ordering of moments. In order 
for that to be the case it seems we need the impressional content to consist 
of many things, that is, it needs to be a complex of things. Though the kind 
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of impressional content Hume countenances does seem to be complex in his 
meaning of the term, it is not obviously given as a complex. Hume defines the 
complex in opposition to the simple: “Simple perceptions or impressions 
and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex 
are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts.”168 To say 
something may be distinguished into parts is not to say that it already 
consists of these parts, I contend that distinguishing these parts in order to 
turn out something which is actually a complex of parts requires additional 
mental activity. This again provides evidence that it is not such a 
straightforward task to limit the role of mental activity in the creation of 
these ideas.    
 
 
5.4.1. Asymmetry, Circularity, and Associative Binding   
Firstly then, the asymmetry between time and space rears its head again and, 
in so doing, threatens the return of circularity. What I will argue is that 
accounts of the second sort considered above, which aim for a minimal role 
for the mind, can only face this new challenge if they accept a much more 
active role for the mind, pressing us much closer to the first view considered 
on which the mind contributed core elements of these ideas. Whichever way 
we go then the mind’s role is significant. The way the asymmetry returns is 
perhaps already clear: when I represent any particular succession in an idea, 
the idea I have is itself temporally complex in that it is literally a succession 
of temporally simple ideas. Such an idea takes time to occur and, at any 
moment in my thinking it the momentary perception before the mind is 
itself temporally simple even if it is part of a temporally complex succession. 
Given this, we might wonder what makes it so that the moment I am 
experiencing now is an idea of a moment of a succession, rather than just an 
idea of some simple moment. How is it that this idea is an idea of part of a 
more complex whole, as opposed to just a simple idea?  
 
As in the previous asymmetry, the concern is that we will be forced to say 
that some interpretive spin is required in order to explain why this simple 
                                                 
168 T 1.1.1.2; SBN 2.  
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idea is an idea of part of a succession. And yet, if that were the case then we 
would again be in a position of having to presuppose the application of an 
idea of temporal complexity to simple content in order to form an idea that 
itself is meant to be the origin of our idea of temporal complexity. As 
before, it seems we could not interpret a temporally simple thing in terms of 
the temporally complex prior to forming these first ideas of temporal 
complexity. Once again, circularity threatens. The problem here can be 
viewed as one of binding. In particular, how it is that that we experience the 
moments of the idea as bound into temporally complex sequences? Allison 
puts the challenge this way:  
 
We have already seen that we cannot regard these notes as given in a single, 
compound impression, which is then ‘copied’ by an idea, because, as 
successive, they do not exist at the same time, though they succeed each other 
in the same time. Thus, in order to form the compound idea of the five 
successive notes, it is necessary to bind them together in the imagination.169   
 
When I have an idea of a succession of five notes, I only ever represent 
temporally simple things. However, I must somehow represent them as 
bound into a complex whole if they are to collectively represent the complex 
whole rather than only their simple selves. Representing a temporally simple 
perception as being part of a whole succession as opposed to as a complete 
idea in itself seems to require something more. Yet this something more had 
better not require that we apply concepts we are not yet in possession of.  
 
Though certainly a challenge that needs addressing, proponents of the above 
account do seem capable of accounting for this binding without 
presupposing the idea involved, thus avoiding the related circularity. 
However, doing so involves recognising a core role for the mind in the 
formation of these ideas. In the above Allison suggested that “in order to 
form the compound idea of the five successive notes, it is necessary to bind 
them together in the imagination.” This may be correct, and yet we need not 
imagine that this binding is the result of the application of a presupposed 
concept. If the Humean framework allows for binding without 
presupposition we might think it well capable of avoiding this second charge 
                                                 
169 Allison (2008) p.55. For further discussion see also Bardon (2007).  
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of circularity. And Hume seems to have tools at his disposal that can play 
this role: the principles of association.   
 
The principles of association create binding between ideas in a way that 
occurs instinctively and pre-reflectively simply in virtue of the kind of 
creatures that we are and our natural disposition to respond to certain kinds 
of stimuli in certain kinds of ways. The human mind, according to Hume, is 
powerfully inclined to form connections between ideas in certain conditions, 
our very nature “in a manner pointing out to every one those simple ideas, 
which are most proper to be united into a complex one.”170 This influence 
on thought is instinctive and mechanistic. It is presented as “a gentle force, 
which commonly prevails.”171 However, its pervasive power is also clear: this 
common influence on thought is said to be the cause, for example, of why 
“languages so nearly correspond to each other.”172 The qualities that provoke 
this associative tendency and guide our thinking afterwards are said to be 
resemblance, continuity in time or space, and cause and effect.  
 
Within the bounds of the challenge above, the focus naturally falls on the 
role of association in virtue of perceived contiguity.173 In introducing this 
Hume’s discussion and examples are brief. Regarding contiguity he notes 
that:  
 
’Tis likewise evident, that as the senses, in changing their objects, are 
necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to 
each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of 
thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its 
objects.174  
                                                 
170 T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10.  
171 T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10.  
172 T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10. See also EHU 3.1; SBN 23: “Among different languages, even where 
we cannot suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, 
expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: a certain 
proof that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by 
some universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind.” 
173 “Perceived” in that, like all the natural relations introduced by association, Hume does 
not require any objective support for their presence: that we feel some things to be 
contiguous, resembling, or causally related is sufficient for our connecting them in thought 
regardless of whether these relations truly pertain between the things so-connected. This 
point will receive further discussion in section 7.2.1., where I examine Hume’s distinction 
between  natural relations and philosophical ones.   




And in the Enquiry that “the mention of one apartment in a building 
naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others.”175 
Equally, “[t]he thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is 
contiguous.”176 Though his comments are brief, we see many examples of 
this association in use. Pertinent here would be that the principles of 
association are tied explicitly to the memory and its role in connecting and 
preserving the order of experienced objects: resemblance, contiguity in time 
or place, and cause and effect are “the principles of union or cohesion 
among our simple ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that 
inseparable connexion, by which they are united in our memory.”177 And in 
the Enquiry: “It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the 
different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the 
memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of 
method and regularity.”178 
 
We are inclined to respond to contiguous impressions by associating them, 
thereby connecting simples in thought. This creates connections between 
the component parts of complex ideas formed from them. As contiguity has 
its influence as much in time as it does is space, it seems very plausible to 
read this as suggesting that our memories of events are likely to be 
temporally complex and yet bound into successive sequences. The very fact 
that we have experienced perceptions as occurring contiguously in time, 
given our associative tendencies, is enough to incline us somewhat towards 
thinking of them later as ordered successions of perceptions. The other 
principles of association often play a role in uniting successions as well. In 
spite of the difference between moments required for the complex to be a 
succession, there will often be a strong degree of resemblance between 
contiguous moments. Equally, to the extent that successive ideas resemble 
prior successions judged to be causal, association in virtue of perceived 
causality can become involved. If all three relations hold to some degree the 
                                                 
175 EHU 3.3; SNB 24.  
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moments of a succession might be quite tightly bound. However, the 
binding that results is not unbreakable. Nor is it indicative of any genuine 
connection in things beyond our perceptions, should there be any such 
things. Binding is simply the way that cognisers like us react to certain kinds 
of stimuli. The mind is at work then, but this binding does not require that 
we reflectively apply an idea of temporal complexity. It is simply a result of 
the way we naturally process certain kinds of information.  
 
Hume notes that one result of the principles of association is that they 
connect our ideas in such a way that the mind “runs easily” from any idea to 
a connected one, and strong connection in thought results in a “smooth 
transition” from one perception to another: “The relation causes a smooth 
passage from the impression to the idea, and even gives a propensity to that 
passage.”179 Consider here his discussion of association in virtue of perceived 
resemblance: “’Tis plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the 
constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea 
to any other that resembles it.”180 This easy transition is a core feature of 
associative relations for Hume and absolutely essential to their role in his 
theorising. That they induce a smooth slide between what they connect is 
highlighted again and again in discussion of many topics and it seems a 
plausible reason here why we might feel these ideas to be related or bound in 
the required way; that is, as parts of a succession of ideas, not merely as 
distinct, unconnected, elements.181 
 
As this binding occurs without the need for the application of an idea of 
time the circularity appears to be avoided. The role of the mind also 
becomes much more pronounced, though not in a way that is in conflict 
with the Copy Principle: the mind may provide the binding, but the ordering 
is given. If the unadulterated impressional content is an ordering of simples 
then these simples stand in contiguity relations to each other and we are the 
kinds of creatures who are inclined to associate in these conditions. 
                                                 
179 T 1.4.2.20; SBN 208.  
180 T 1.1.3.2; SBN 11 
181 For evidence that the transition is part of the very essence of a relation see T 1.3.8.3; 
SBN 99: “In considering the nature of relation, and that facility of transition, which is 
essential to it.” For further discussion of this phenomenon see section 7.3.    
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However, next I will propose a further problem, that it is not clear that the 




5.4.2. Contiguity and Complexity 
To meet the first challenge I argued that we must posit more mental work. 
However, a second challenge arises at this point: in order to associate in line 
with perceived contiguity the impressional array needs to exhibit perceived 
contiguity. This seems to require that it contain elements perceived as 
contiguous to each other and this requires that it be presented as a complex 
of things. Simply put: in order to copy an ordering of objects and feel them 
to be ordered we require the impressional content to appear as a complex of 
ordered things. However, it is not clear that impressional content is of this 
sort. If impressional content is not given as a complex of things then it 
seems once again the mind is required to explain how we view it as such. If 
the mind is responsible for this it seems we cannot simply say, as Falkenstein 
in the above would like to, that we simply copy complexes. Instead, once 
again, the mind must be at work in order that we can forms these ideas.  
 
It is an interesting question whether Hume did indeed think that the 
impressional array is given as a complex. Certainly many have taken him to 
be of this opinion. Falkenstein is one example:  
 
According to Hume’s account, spatiotemporal structure is given. Impressions 
consist of parts that occur after and alongside one another (T 1.2.3.2–11; 
SBN 33–7). These spatial and temporal relations are not invented or even 
first discovered by the imagination (T 1.2.3.4 and 10; SBN 34 and 36–7). On 
the contrary, they are one of the factors that influence the imagination and 
determine the way it operates on subsequent occasions (T 1.3.8.5, 1.3.9.5, 
1.3.13.1–2, 2.3.7–8; SBN 100, 109, 143–4, 427–38).182 
 
Here Falkenstein recognises that the imagination is influenced by the 
relations that impressions exhibit (presumably we should think in terms of 
contiguity-association), but it is an interesting question whether Hume 
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consistently supports a view on which impressional content is just given as 
complex, and one worth considering.  
 
Considering the case of visual extension, Hume does make comments like 
this: “my senses convey to me only the impressions of colour’d points, 
dispos’d in a certain manner.”183 Here then, the senses apparently just give us 
a complex of arranged points and, it seems, there is no intermediary work 
happening here in order to see the world in terms of this complex. It is just 
presented to us. However, he also says in introducing the idea of extension 
that “[u]pon opening my eyes, and turning them to the surrounding objects, 
I perceive many visible bodies; and upon shutting them again, and 
considering the distance betwixt these bodies, I acquire the idea of 
extension.”184 If by “visible bodies” he means coloured points then this 
conveys the same thought as the above, however, if by bodies he means the 
everyday objects we take to be bodies: tables, chairs, people, etc., then it is 
far from obvious these are just presented to us. In fact, Hume goes to 
lengths to explain that thinking in terms of these kinds of bodies is the result 
of imaginative work. Seeing the world in terms of every day bodies is the 
result of experience and custom, of taking coloured patches to represent 
things in the world with different persistence conditions and which are 
variously related to each other and to ourselves. This is an act of judgement 
resulting from both experience and instinct and all the less recognisable for 
its familiarity. It is not something just presented in impressional content. 
Consider his comments regarding three-dimensional distance:  
 
’Tis commonly allow’d by philosophers, that all bodies, which discover 
themselves to the eye, appear as if painted on a plain surface, and that their 
different degrees of remoteness from ourselves are discover’d more by reason 
than by the senses. When I hold up my hand before me, and spread my 
fingers, they are separated as perfectly by the blue colour of the firmament, as 
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’Tis universally allow’d by the writers on optics, that the eye at all times sees 
an equal number of physical points, and that a man on the top of a mountain 
has no larger an image presented to his senses, that when he is cooped up in 
the narrowest court or chamber. ’Tis only by experience that he infers the 
greatness of the object from some peculiar qualities of the image; and this 
inference of the judgment he confounds with sensation, as is common on 
other occasions.186  
 
Here, the mind is at work. It is just that the “judgments” it provides are so 
naturally to us by the time we reflect on them that we take them to instead 
be sensation. When Hume tells us we just open our eyes and see bodies it 
seems (if we read “bodies” in this more developed sense) that he is not 
being entirely truthful to the picture he goes on to endorse. He may be 
intending to start the discussion of extension from a more intuitive position, 
perhaps to emphasise that our reaching this conclusion requires work. 
Custom and association are so well entrenched in our way of experiencing 
the world that it takes effort and concentration to think about the raw 
material. We confuse judgement with sensation and take ourselves to be 
merely sensing things which we, in fact, would not had we not already 
brought imaginative work to the table. Hume tells us that visual experience 
presents us with a flat screen of coloured patches. Equally, though this 
screen may, in fact, be composed of innumerable coloured points, our 
experience does not seem to just give us these either. Isolating the points in 
visual experience, if we can do it at all, takes effort. What impressional 
content offers is a visual screen that exhibits difference, it does not seem to 
give us a complex of things.  
 
Here I suggest we focus on the difference between a thing’s being complex, 
and a thing’s being a complex. As noted above, Hume’s definition of 
complexity does not entail that complex things are presented to us as 
complexes of things. To remind: “Simple perceptions or impressions and 
ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are 
the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts.”187 The 
impressional content we receive does seem to be complex, for it is certainly 
such that we find ourselves capable, indeed naturally inclined, to distinguish 
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parts within it. However, to say that a thing is complex is not to say that it is 
presented to us as a complex of many things, it is only to say that, with 
experience and through additional work activity, we can come to see it as 
many things. To distinguish something into parts takes experience and 
imaginative work.188 When looking for what kind of work we might look 
again to the so-called Separability Principle:  
 
[W]hatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that whatever objects 
are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination. And we may 
here add, that these propositions are equally true in the inverse, and that 
whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable, and that whatever 
objects are distinguishable are also different. For how is it possible we can 
separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different?189 
  
A complex impressional array contains the difference required that we come 
to view it as a complex. However, to say that something is separable “by the 
thought and imagination” is again to posit additional work on the part of the 
perceiver.  
 
In order to perceive the impressional array in the way required for it to 
exhibit contiguity we require it to be presented as a complex of things, rather 
than merely as a complex thing. But if we look at how Hume in his more 
careful moments describes the impressional array it appears to be a complex 
thing, but not necessarily a complex of things. Coming to see a complex 
array as a complex of things again requires mental work. Once again, it 
seems that the mind must be significantly involved in the formation of these 





                                                 
188 As a point of note, what I say here is not at odds with the Malezieu argument Hume 
offers in T 1.2.2. which I discussed in chapter 3. On its strongest reading the Malezieu 
argument tells us that anything complex is really many things. However, even if this is so, 
this does not entail that we perceive it as many things without additional mental work. As 
mentioned above, it may be that the visual field is composed of innumerable coloured 
points, this does not entail that we can isolate these points without effort.  
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5.5. Conclusion  
I have argued that accounting for how we form ideas of particular times 
requires significant work on the part of the mind, regardless of which route 
we adopt. If we interpret the Copy Principle in the way that Frasca-Spada 
does then this mental work is contributed early in the game: being capable 
only of tracing the simple elements, we must conclude that the ordering 
these simples occur in is, in some way, a product of the mind.  
 
Some have sought to avoid this kind of consequence by extending the Copy 
Principle to the copying of complexes. Interpreting the principle in this 
broader way, Falkenstein and others argue that the ordering is simply copied: 
experience presents us with complexes and we form complex ideas from 
them. I have offered two challenges to this position: Firstly, in order to 
address the reoccurring asymmetry concern, it is necessary for proponents 
of this route to appeal to a degree of mental activity in order that these 
complex ideas be formed as complex ideas. Copying the complex is not 
enough if you do not also contribute the work required to bind it into a 
complex. Even if the ordering is given in impressional content then, one 
must do work to create ideas of particular times and spaces from it. 
Secondly, I challenged the idea that ordering was given in impressional 
content. If impressions are not in fact presented as ordered, but rather the 
work needed in order to explain how they come to be seen as such is 
contributed by us, then again the mind must come into play and, indeed, in 
quite a marked manner.  
 
It seems we can account for the formation of ideas of particular times and 
we can do this whilst avoiding the charges of circularity that arose time after 
time in chapter 4. We can form ideas of particular times without 
presupposing a prior idea of time, however, we cannot explain their 
formation without elevating the influence of the mind: there is no avoiding a 
significant role for the mind in the creation of these ideas then. Equally, 
whether the Copy Principle must bend or break, it seems these ideas sit in an 
unusual position. The adaptions that seem required to shore up the second 
line of approach do not involve appealing to anything which is not already 
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available on the Humean system; an active mind compelled by associative 
tendencies seems to have the capacity to form these ideas from the 
impressional content given. Nevertheless, these ideas of time are hardly 
copied in any straightforward manner and contain absolutely integral 
elements which can be traced to the mind’s role, rather than to experience. 
In the next two chapters I will consider the next step of the process of 
forming the idea of time, which takes us from ideas of particular times to an 
idea of time in general. Once again we will see that the role of the mind and 

























In the previous chapter I argued that is it possible to account for the 
formation of ideas of particular times within Hume’s account without 
circularity. However, it is not possible to account for these without 
countenancing a marked role for the mind. For even these first ideas of 
particular times the mind’s influence is great. The idea of time in its fullest 
form though is not merely a particular, temporally complex idea. Instead it is 
an idea of the “manner of appearance” that temporally complex ideas share: 
their successiveness. This successive structure is manifest in not one, but 
many particular ideas; it is an idea of successiveness in general.  
 
As has already been noted, Hume rejects abstraction by separation when it 
comes to accounting for general ideas. Instead, he characterises general ideas 
in a way that is broadly in line with Berkeley’s treatment. On any occasion of 
thought, a general idea is instantiated by thinking of a fully particular idea. 
However, because of the associative connections between this and other 
particular ideas, one idea is capable of standing for many and calling other 
resembling ideas to mind when required. The availability of the selection of 
particulars allows the thinker the same flexibility with the ideas as an abstract 
idea aims to, but with none of the indeterminacy of content. By these means 
Hume forges functionally-abstract general ideas using particular ideas and 
the connecting principles of association. Through these patterns of 
associated particulars we find ourselves able to think about an aspect of our 
ideas that cannot be conceived alone: their successiveness. The idea of time 
in its fullest form, then, is not copied from any particular idea. Instead its 
origin is in the resemblances that different sets of temporally complex ideas 
bear to each other.   
 
For Hume then, forming an idea of time relies on our capacity to associate 
as resembling in their successiveness a number of otherwise diverse 
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particular ideas. As discussed in the previous chapter, Hume tells us we can 
derive the idea of time from perceptions of all kinds, that is, both 
impressions and ideas, from the succession of impressions of all sense 
modalities and indeed of reflexion, and from ideas of any and all sorts.190 So, 
the sound of five notes played on a flute, but also the feel of running my 
fingers across tree bark, the succession of emerging flavours in a sip of wine, 
the thoughts running through one’s head, etc.: for Hume, all of these 
experiences are temporally complex, and our ideas of them all resemble each 
other in that respect. In many ways then, the particular ideas that forge this 
general idea are extremely different. From this fact a fundamental challenge 
arises as to how it is we come to see as similar in this one respect 
experiences which are, in other respects, so different. In the final part of this 
work I will explore the difficulties raised by this need to find a resemblance 
among such disparate things. I will argue that two core problems emerge: 
 
Firstly, it is problematic that the resemblances between the different realising 
ideas are highly elusive. In the case of time it is a very broad structural 
resemblance that underlies the association, but this is potentially obscured by 
all the prima facie differences between these experiences. In light of this 
apparent elusiveness, the charge is made that, only if I already knew 
something of what it was to be successive, could I possibly come to see such 
different ideas as resembling each other. However, to know what 
successiveness is and how it can be realised, is to know the key feature of the 
idea of time and to know that, it seems, just is to have an idea of time.191  
 
To this first challenge I will suggest a further element of difficulty arises: that 
(with the possible exception of the idea of existence) seems particular to the 
case of time.192 The concern is that noting resemblances is made easier when 
                                                 
190 T 1.2.3.6; SBN 34-5.  
191 Discussion of this challenge for general ideas occurs in many places: see Broughton 
(2000) and Wilson (1998) for two good examples. For this problem being directly applied to 
the ideas of time and space see Allison (2008) chapter 2.   
192 The idea of existence seems another instance of an idea which has no contrast class. 
Hume tells us that to conceive of any thing is to conceive of it as existing: “[t]here is no 
impression nor idea of any kind, of which we have any consciousness or memory, that is 
not conceiv’d as existent” (T 1.2.6.2; SBN 66), and “[t]he idea of existence, then, is the very 
same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on any thing simply, and 
to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other.” (T 1.2.6.4; SBN 66-7). 
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we have at hand a contrast class, that is, a class of things which are not-F 
and so can stand apart from the resemblance class of things which are F. It 
is plausible to think that experiencing things which do not possess the 
relevant feature might enable one to more easily note the resemblance that 
exists between the ideas that possess the relevant positive features, not least 
because Hume notes that properties which become common to too many 
particulars lose their capacity to provoke resemblance-association.193  
 
In the case of the idea of space, for example, a contrast class is available: 
Hume tells us that our visual and tactile perceptions resemble one another in 
that they appear arrayed in space. Contrasted with this are the perceptions of 
other senses and of our internal sense which are not spatial and do not give 
us the idea of space (though we sometimes come to think of them as being 
spatially located in virtue of their constant conjunction with things which we 
understand to be. For example, when I come to think of the taste of the 
apple as located in the apple). However, in the case of time, all our 
perceptions make their appearance to us in succession and experience at 
every moment is changing. Strictly speaking, it looks like the contrast class 
that could help us form an idea of time is absent.  
 
The second problem is that Hume’s idea of time is an idea of a cross-modal 
resemblance which holds between ideas of different sense modalities. Hume 
tells us that the resemblances we find between different particular ideas can 
be carried beyond the ideas of one sense to others. In the case of space, the 
resemblance holds between the spatial and the visual. In the case of time, the 
resemblance extends over ideas of all sense-modalities and ideas of reflexion 
too. If we think of resemblance as requiring anything like qualitative 
similarity in terms of content it becomes extremely difficult to say how there 
could possibly be a resemblance that embraces all these cases. In suggesting 
                                                                                                                        
Distinctions of reason won’t help us either: “Our foregoing reasoning [T.1.1.7.] concerning 
the distinction of ideas without any real difference will not here serve us in any stead. That kind 
of distinction is founded on the different resemblances, which the same simple idea may 
have to several different ideas. But no object can be presented resembling some object with 
respect to its existence, and different from others in the same particular; since every object, 
that is presented, must necessarily be existent.” (T 1.2.6.6; SBN 67)    
193 “When a quality becomes very general, and is common to a great many individuals, it 
leads not the mind directly to any one of them; but by presenting at once too great a choice, 
does thereby prevent the imagination from fixing on any single object.” T 1.1.5.3; SBN 14 
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that the resemblance of the spatial extends over both visual and tangible 
ideas, Hume departs from Berkeley and presents himself a substantial 
challenge in accounting for this.194 Being that much more variously 
instantiated, we might think the case of time is at least as bad as that of 
space, if not worse.    
  
In this chapter I will first set out these challenges in more depth. They are 
both interpretive and critical: they ask us deep questions about how Hume’s 
account functions and what it relies on, but also provide challenges that cut 
to the heart of the its adequacy. Although it has certainly been challenged in 
many ways, there are further difficulties that emerge here: I suggest the 
problem of the absent contrast class is one. However, this is not to say that 
positive things cannot be said in relation to these problems. In this chapter I 
will focus on the issue of a contrast class and suggest it is possible to address 
this particular difficulty and thereby remove one of the barriers to forming 
this idea. In the next chapter, I will look much deeper into Humean 
resemblance and what kinds of resemblances seem capable of provoking 
association in creatures like us. The examples Hume offers of resemblance 
are varied and yet, for all the roles resemblance plays, somewhat under-
explored: he provides hints and clues and examples but it is up to us to draw 
out the details. In both this chapter and the next we will see that, by focusing 
on the idea of time and the particular challenges it presents, we are again 
offered the opportunity to look deeper into the workings of Humean 
cognition more generally and to shed light on the principles of association, 
and the status of general ideas. What emerges is, just as in the previous two 




6.2. Forming the General Idea: Abstraction, Separability, 
and Distinctions of Reason 
From particular ideas we come to form a general idea grounded in the 
resemblances these particular ideas bear to each other. In this case the 
                                                 
194 For discussion see Allison (2008) chapter 2 and Waxman (1996).  
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resemblance is in virtue of their perceived successiveness. Before I lay the 
problems more fully on the table it is worth looking in more depth at how 
Hume presents the process of forming general ideas.   
 
Broadly, Hume follows Berkeley in rejecting abstract ideas construed as 
ideas which are indeterminate between the particular features of the things 
they represent. These ideas, he thinks, are literally inconceivable for, when 
we strip away all the particularities of an idea, we lose the idea itself. Instead 
all ideas are particular and fully determinate. However, particular, 
determinate ideas can, through patterns of association which in this case are 
wrought by resemblance, come to represent a number of other relevantly 
similar particular ideas. This is how we arrive at the functional equivalents of 
abstract ideas from within a system that excludes genuinely abstract ideas. 
Notably the process becomes smoothed out by language and by habit:  
 
When we have found a resemblance among several objects, that often occur 
to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences we may 
observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever other 
differences may appear among them. After we have acquired a custom of this 
kind, the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of these objects, and 
makes the imagination conceive it with all its particular circumstances and 
proportions. But as the same word is suppos’d to have been frequently 
applied to other individuals, that are different in many respects from that 
idea, which is immediately present to the mind; the word not being able to 
revive the idea of all these individuals, only touches the soul, if I may be 
allow’d so to speak, and revives that custom, which we have acquir’d by 
surveying them.195 
 
First we come to feel a resemblance between several things and so they 
become connected in thought. Then we tag the collection of associated 
items with a word which allows for easier and more systematic recall. Once 
the practice of using the word linked to its connected ideas becomes habitual 
we no longer explicitly recall the related ideas, instead, the custom of word-
use itself allows us to think and speak well enough even without fully 
considering all associated ideas:  
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I believe every one, who examines the situation of his mind in reasoning, will 
agree with me, that we do not annex distinct and compleat ideas to every 
term we make use of, and that in talking of government, church, negotiation, 
conquest, we seldom spread out in our minds all the simple ideas, of which 
these complex ones are compos’d. ’Tis however observable, that 
notwithstanding this imperfection we may avoid talking nonsense on these 
subjects, and may perceive any repugnance among the ideas, as well as if we 
had a full comprehension of them.196 
 
Our idea of time is essentially formed in this way. As outlined in chapter 4, 
Hume’s presentation focuses on forming the idea of extension, then 
develops the parallel for the case of time. To remind the reader, this second 
step of the argument proceeds as follows:  
 
i. [F]inding a resemblance in the disposition of colour’d points, of which 
they are compos’d, we omit the peculiarities of colour, as far as possible, and 
found an abstract idea merely on that disposition of points, or manner of 
appearance, in which they agree. (T 1.2.3.5; SBN 34) 
 
And this resemblance we find appears to extend beyond the objects of sight 
to include also the objects of touch:  
 
ii. Nay even when the resemblance is carry’d beyond the objects of one 
sense, and the impressions of touch are found to be similar to those of sight 
in the disposition of their parts; this does not hinder the abstract idea from 
representing both, upon account of their resemblance. (T 1.2.3.5; SBN 34) 
 
iii. [Thus] [a]ll abstract ideas are really nothing but particular ones, 
consider’d in a certain light; but being annexed to general terms, they are able 
to represent a vast variety, and to comprehend objects, which, as they are 
alike in some particulars, are in others vastly wide of each other. (T 1.2.3.5; 
SBN 34) 
 
To finish, we are given the story for the case of the idea of time. In spite of 
being a more “abstract” idea, since it is derived from, and instantiated by, a 
greater variety of sources, the formation process for it is presented as 
analogous to that of the idea of space:   
 
iv. The idea of time, being deriv’d from the succession of our perceptions 
of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reflection as 
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well as of sensation, will afford us an instance of an abstract idea, which 
comprehends a still greater variety than that of space, and yet is represented 
in the fancy by some particular individual idea of a determinate quantity and 
quality. (T 1.2.3.6; SBN 34-5) 
 
Association in virtue of perceived resemblance is the trigger factor for 
forming this idea, and seeing the resemblance these different particular 
instances bear to each other is what allows us to focus not on the respects in 
which they differ, but on the respect in which they resemble each other. 
Notably, this resemblance carries across ideas of different sense modalities. 
Just as Hume says we find a resemblance between the extensions of sight 
and of touch, so too do we find a resemblance between successive 
experiences of all sense modalities. In encompassing these even more 
disparate experiences, the idea of time relies on a resemblance that cuts 
across a great deal of very different ideas. In any act of thought it will be 
represented by some particular idea: however, by relations of association in 
virtue of perceived resemblance, it will be capable of representing a huge 
variety of otherwise different ideas.  
 
Before I turn to the challenges a theory of this sort presents, I briefly want 
to consider one concern that might be had at this point. This is the worry 
that the idea of time that emerges is at odds with Hume’s commitments 
regarding distinction and separability. Showing how this concern is 
misplaced will be helpful in clarifying Hume’s position here.  
 
Consider again Hume’s Separability Principle: “Every thing, that is different, 
is distinguishable; and every thing, that is distinguishable, may be 
separated.”197 Hume employs this principle on several occasions and it does 
plenty of theoretical work for him. However, immediately after this 
statement of it he goes on to say that: “The idea of time is not deriv’d from a 
particular impression mix’d up with others, and plainly distinguishable from 
them; but arises altogether from the manner, in which impressions appear to 
the mind, without making one of the number.”198 The idea of time (as 
                                                 
197 T 1.2.3.10; SBN 36. For more discussion of the Separability Principle see Garrett (1997) 
chapter 3.   
198 T 1.2.3.10; SBN 36.   
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opposed to the idea of this or that time) is not the same as the succession of 
perceptions which on any occasion instantiate it, nor is it the same as any 
succession of perceptions: it is a different idea from all successions of 
perceptions in that it is the idea of their very successiveness.  
 
In spite of being a different idea, then, it is inseparable from successions of 
perceptions for it cannot be realised without them. In spite of being 
different then, it is not separable. Instead, Hume tells us that the idea of time 
is not only derived from successions of perceptions: it is inconceivable 
without conceiving a succession of perceptions:  
 
The ideas of some objects it certainly must have, nor is it possible for it 
without these ideas ever to arrive at any conception of time; which since it 
appears not as any primary distinct impression, can plainly be nothing but 
different ideas, or impressions, or objects dispos’d in a certain manner, that 
is, succeeding each other.199  
 
Hume addresses this difficulty by appealing to a “distinction of reason,” 
wherein we draw a distinction in thought between things which cannot in 
fact be conceived separately. Hume places his discussion of distinctions of 
reason immediately after his account of abstract ideas and immediately 
before his account of the ideas of time and space. The location of this 
discussion is telling for it illuminates both passages. The example used as 
illustration is the seemingly problematic distinction we are capable of 
drawing between “figure and the body figur’d; motion and the body 
mov’d.”200 In both cases (and as with the idea of time), we appear to have 
distinct ideas of elements that nevertheless cannot be conceived separately. 
Some have taken his acceptance of distinctions of reason to be problematic 
and fundamentally at odds with the Separability Principle he stated mere 
paragraphs before. Kemp-Smith, for example, comments that Hume is 
“quite evidently allowing, under a new title [distinctions of reason], what he 
has seemed to deny in the earlier parts of the section.”201 
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However, there is no need to see distinctions of reason as in conflict with 
the Separability Principle and what resolves the tension is association by 
resemblance. On this score, I side with Garrett in suggesting that these 
distinctions can be accommodated happily into Hume’s account so long as 
we take care. To show why Hume does not in fact contradict himself here, 
we need to return to his discussion of abstract ideas and resemblance and it 
is to this Hume refers us when he attempts to explain away the face-value 
unacceptability of distinctions of reason:  
 
’Tis certain that the mind wou’d never have dream’d of distinguishing a figure 
from the body figur’d, as being in reality neither distinguishable, nor different, 
nor separable; did it not observe, that even in this simplicity there might be 
contain’d many different resemblances and relations.202 
 
He explains himself through an example: consider a first experience of a 
coloured globe. In this case one of white marble. What we experience is a 
white shape, and at this point the colour and the shape are one for us. 
However, say I then experience a white cube and later a black globe. I notice 
that the cube resembles the globe in respect of its colour and yet it also 
resembles the black globe in respect of its shape. In noting these 
resemblances, I come to form ideas of “globe” and “white.” In forming 
these ideas I become capable of forming a distinction of reason between the 
globe’s shape and its colour. This does not, however, involve forming 
separate ideas of the shape apart from its colour or the colour apart from the 
shape. Instead, “we consider the figure and colour together, since they are in 
effect the same and undistinguishable; but still view them in different 
aspects, according to the resemblances, of which they are susceptible.”203 
When I consider the shape of the white globe it makes me think of the black 
globe; when I consider the colour of the white globe it makes me think of 
the white cube. Through these associations and resemblances, I am able to 
think of one thing under different aspects without thereby implying a real 
distinction among these elements, or the possibility of their separate 
existence.  
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Applied to the case of time, I am able, by noting the similarities between the 
five successive notes and the succession of flavours in a sip of wine, to think 
about succession in general as something which is different from any 
particular set of successive perceptions even though it is impossible for me 
to conceive any idea of succession without thereby conceiving some set of 
successive perceptions. As Garrett highlights in his dismissal of this seeming 
objection, it is not a question of separation, but of conceiving different 
aspects by noting different resemblances:  
 
The distinctions of reason that appear to be exceptions to the Separability 
Principle thus prove to involve aspects of resemblance…to speak of 
distinguishing such “aspects” or “resemblances” is merely a way of referring 
to the genuine distinction we find between the many different – but also 
distinguishable and separable – classes of perceptions that resemble the 
perceptions under discussion. Hume is thus able to maintain his Separability 
Principle without exception for all objects, including all perceptions, and it is 
for this reason that he regards his account of distinctions of reasons as 
vindicating rather than undermining, that principle.204 
 
In sum then, the idea of time is the idea of a successive manner of 
appearance. Since this idea cannot be conceived without forming a 
determinate idea of some particular set of successive perceptions, any 
instance of our thinking about time will be a thought of a particular 
succession. However, because we perceive different particular successions to 
resemble, we associate them in thought, thus forming a general idea which, 
though always entirely particular in its features, has the capacity to represent 
a number of different particular successions through its associative ties. This 
is how time provides an instance of a distinction of reason: we draw a 
distinction between the various parts of a complex experience and the order 
of arrangement of those parts. Through these patterns of associated 
particulars we find ourselves able to think about a quality that cannot be 
conceived alone. The idea of time, then, is derived from our perceptions. 
However, it is not traceable to any particular simple perception, nor any 
particular complex perception. Instead its origin is in the resemblances that 
hold between sets of complex perceptions.  
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6.3. The Challenges: Elusive Resemblances and Cross-
Modal Association 
From Hume’s account of this process we can see that association in virtue 
of perceived resemblance plays a pivotal role. According to Hume, we are 
susceptible to finding resemblances between complex particulars of the same 
sense modality, and even between those of different sense modalities. We 
are capable of doing this in spite of the fact that the resemblances are 
structural, and obscured by their many other differences.  
 
As outlined above, there are two key challenges I will forward here: First, the 
resemblances between particulars are highly elusive, and this makes it 
unclear how we come to note the positive inclusion criteria for the idea of 
time. That is to say, how do we come to see two different temporally 
complex particular ideas as resembling one another in respect of their 
successiveness? As I will discuss, this problem has certainly been noted in 
the literature. To this challenge I add a further level of difficulty: strictly 
speaking, we seem to lack a contrast class in the case of successive 
perceptions.  
 
The second challenge arises from the fact that the resemblance is presented 
as holding across different sense modalities, this further complicates the 
picture. Specifically, it seems to imply that Hume employs a much broader 
sense of resemblance than we might have thought. I will leave fuller 
explication and analysis of this problem to the next chapter, where the 
phenomenon of resemblance will get a deeper look. Collectively, the 
challenges Hume faces here have inclined some commentators to conclude 
that the process of forming this general idea of time is simply unachievable 
from within his framework. It is suggested that, unless we already had some 
idea of what the key features of temporally complex ideas were, we would 
not be able to see the requisite resemblances involved in forming the idea of 
time. However, if we already had an idea of the features we are looking, it 
seems, we already have an idea of succession. If this were the case, we would 
be required to presuppose the very idea we are seeking. Once again, 




A final point before I begin: there is an artificiality to these cases which 
needs to be addressed in order that the depth of the difficulty they present 
be appreciable. Although Hume explains general ideas through resemblance-
association, it is not inconsistent with this that we in fact learn most of our 
ideas through being taught them. We have examples pointed out to us by 
people who already possess the ideas, and are practiced in picking out the 
relevant features of the things under consideration. Then, by trial and error, 
we learn to correctly pick out the cases for ourselves. Perhaps then, for any 
given person, the idea of time is not likely to have actually been developed in 
the way Hume suggests. However, this does not resolve the difficulties 
Hume faces. He aims to account for the origin of these ideas within the 
framework of their broad derivation from experience. This does not require 
that we actually do derive each general idea in this particular way, but Hume 
requires that it be possible for us to do so. And in order to explain how it is 
possible for us to do so, his account needs to be explanatorily adequate in 
providing a plausible story of how this may be done in the face of these 
challenges. Even if, in any particular case, we do not in fact do all the work 
ourselves, so to speak, if these ideas are grounded empirically, it needs to be 
possible that they could be derived empirically. Some of the examples used 
to illustrate the cases I will discuss, then, are toy examples. In spite of this 
though, the problems they pose to the adequacy of Hume’s epistemology are 
very real.  
 
 
6.3.1. The Problem of Positive Inclusion  
To illustrate problem of how we notice positive inclusion criteria before we 
have an idea of the respect in which two particulars resemble each other, 
consider Wilson’s example (given in her critique of Hume’s theory of general 
ideas) of forming the general idea of “dog.”205 According to Hume, in order 
to form this general idea, I need to encounter particular dogs and come to 
see a resemblance between them. This resemblance results in my associating 
these particular ideas and, in so doing, forming an idea of dog that is 
                                                 
205 Wilson (1998) pp.136-7.   
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indifferent to variation in a number of other features including colour, 
shape, size, location, disposition, eating habits, smell, and the rest. The 
problem is this: why think that I would, if I didn’t already know that the idea 
of a dog includes such variation, see the similarities between, say, a German 
shepherd and a Chihuahua in order to form an idea of doghood that 
represented them both? One might think I wouldn’t.  
 
Wilson makes the charge that only if I already knew that dogs were the sorts 
of things that allowed for these particular kinds of variation (though not 
others) could I recognise the relevant similarities and associate them 
together, thereby forming an idea that took each dog as representative. So 
only by knowing in advance that some characteristics were more important 
than others could I know what to rule out and what to attend to. However, 
knowing which characteristics are at the core of the idea of a dog seems to 
involve already having a somewhat developed understanding of the sorts of 
things that dogs are. Indeed, one might think that knowing the key features 
of dogs in such a way that you can sort cases into dogs and non-dogs 
amounts to already possessing the idea of “dog”. So one might worry that 
Hume’s account presupposes the very idea it is seeking to explain. This 
circularity is taken by many to indicate a fundamental shortcoming in his 
approach. Here, Allison and Broughton make essentially this charge:   
 
Not only does Hume assume that the mind can recognize resemblances 
among its distinct impressions (even though there is no such thing as an 
impression of resemblance), but also that it can pick out those that are 
relevant and disregard irrelevant differences, without already having the 
concept or general idea in question.206  
 
On a very natural understanding of Hume’s aim, this account of general 
terms will be defective, for it will appeal to the very ability it is supposed to 
explain. In order for my imagination to be readied to call up ideas of various 
tables, I need first to have noticed the respect in which the various tables 
resemble one another (and for that matter the respect in which the various 
utterances of “table” resemble one another). It is only when I have noticed 
these resemblances that my experience can work upon my imagination and 
prod it into forming the custom or habit that links one particular idea to the 
many particular ideas in the “collection, which [the mind] intends to express 
by the general term” (T 22). But then it seems that Hume’s explanation must 
                                                 
206 Allison (2008) p. 33. 
152 
 
be circular: how can someone notice that one thing resembles another in 
respect of tablehood unless he already has the general idea of table?207  
 
Broughton’s point which highlights the role of language is key. Although 
words definitely seem to play an important role in allowing us to think with 
general ideas (by working as tags for the various resemblance classes and 
thereby aiding smooth, efficient recall), they cannot be what allows us to 
form these classes. Assigning a word to a class of ideas could allow us to 
think certain ideas more easily. However, it is important to note that the 
application of a term here cannot help us address this particular problem 
because, in order to help us think of a quality, a term must be attached to an 
idea or group of ideas. The grouping must already have occurred, only then 
can the term allow us easier access to, and manipulation of, these ideas. 
Ultimately, words seem to come in too late to aid us in addressing this 
difficulty.   
 
6.3.2. The Problem of the Absent Contrast Class 
To compound this problem we can, I suggest, find an additional challenge in 
the case of time. Consider: although different dogs can be very different, 
they mostly resemble each other in more ways than say, they resemble tables. 
Though dogs might be quite dissimilar, I also have access to a range of 
things which do not resemble dogs. These encounters with the non-
resembling provide a contrast class. Such a contrast class also exists for the 
idea of space, for Hume tells us that only some of our experiences are 
spatial. Specifically, visual and tactile experiences are spatial, whereas 
impressions of reflexion, tastes, smells, sounds, and ideas of these, are not. 
In the case of space then, though our ideas of visual and tactile extensions 
may not be obviously alike in many ways, but, at least in theory, they 
resemble each other in this respect more than they resemble the ideas of 
other sense-modalities. These other experiences provide a kind of contrast 
class in virtue of this. However, for Hume, all successive perceptions of all 
sorts occur in time and the idea of time is “deriv’d from the succession of 
our perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, and impressions 
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153 
 
of reflection as well as of sensation.”208 If this is the case for all perceptions, 
what kinds of experience could provide a contrast class? Two sorts of 
experience offer themselves up: (i) experiences of the temporally simple, that 
is, experiences of moments. (ii) Experiences which remain unchanging 
through time. At first blush, both look inappropriate, though for different 
reasons.  
 
So to the first possible source of a contrast class: that of the experience of 
moments. In chapters 2 and 3 I argued the moments of time were 
temporally simple, and so not successive. However, these moments were 
always, it seems, far briefer than our perception allowed for, this was one of 
the ways in which the world simply outran our capacities to perceive it. In 
this sense, I suggested that the moments of the world, should there be such, 
came apart from the moments of our experience. In seeking an experience 
of the temporally simple we might wonder whether the moments of 
experience could provide this, even if the ultimate parts or moments of time 
itself are epistemically inaccessible.  
 
Just as Hume seems committed to a single present moment of time, it seems 
he would be correspondingly committed to a single present moment of 
experience. In his discussion of moments, Hume makes two things clear 
about them: they cannot coexist, and they are temporally simple. 
Conceptually, they stand in opposition to successions and the temporally 
complex. If the moments of experience equally earn the name moments, we 
might think these qualities must carry over to them as well (though I will, in 
the next section, discuss a view on which the first criterion is denied). If we 
think that a moment of experience in a way analogous to the moments of 
time I argued for in chapters 2 and 3, we might think of them as collections 
of coexisting things. In the case of time, they were collections of things in 
the world, in the case of experience, we might think of them as collections 
of coexisting perceptions: that is, all the perceptions had by some perceiver 
at a time. If we think of them in this way, however, a contingent, yet 
problematic difficulty emerges regarding the availability in experience of 
                                                 
208 T 1.2.3.6; SBN 34-5. 
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these moments: The constant movement and change in our perceptions 
seems to make experience near constantly successive in a way that makes 
simple experiential moments a troublingly inaccessible contrast class.   
 
First, let’s consider this is a little more depth. I will begin by taking our 
experience to be, in Hume’s words, “the universe of the imagination,” that 
is, all impressions and all ideas that we have.209 If we understand experience 
in this way, it seems any moment of my experience will be the sum total of 
all perceptions, both impressions and ideas, that I am having at that time. 
From what Hume tells us, we have reason to suppose that experience 
conceived in this way is in a near constant state of flux.  This is true even if it 
is composed of innumerable temporally simple (so not successive) moments. 
Keeping in mind that any change in any perceptions, be they impression or 
ideas, introduces succession into my experience, consider the following:   
 
For we may observe, that there is a continual succession of perceptions in our 
mind.210 
 
One thought chaces another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expell’d 
in its turn. In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any 
thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are 
united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise 
to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes 
of its parts.211 
 
But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of 
the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of 
different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable 
rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in 
their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more 
variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to 
                                                 
209 “Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are 
deriv’d from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that ’tis impossible for 
us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and 
impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chace our 
imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance 
a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, 
which have appear’d in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor 
have we any idea but what is there produc’d.” T 1.2.6.8; SBN 67-8.   
210 T 1.2.5.29; SBN 65.  
211 T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261.   
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this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains 
unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment.212   
 
“Continual succession”, “incessant changes”, a “perpetual flux” moving with 
“inconceivable rapidity”. As our experience includes the constantly flowing 
thoughts in our mind and the rapidly changing impressions from our 
internal and external senses, we have every reason to suppose that each 
moment will be so minute a section of this experience that it is, in effect, 
unnoticeable. Our experience is rarely, if indeed ever, unchanging. And, if 
every change introduces a new moment in the experiential succession, it 
seems they will pass by extremely rapidly. From this, although unchanging 
moments provide the bedrock of this experience, from our perspective, the 
whole is a changing, flowing succession of perceptions. On this reading of 
experience, the contrast class that moments offer to provide is contingently 
(but no less problematically for that), unavailable.  
 
In the next section I will consider an alternative view of moments that offers 
to avoid this problem, first though, there is an interesting line of objection to 
this that it is worth considering at this point. That is to argue that, though 
moments are themselves not noticeable in our experience, they are inferable 
from the very nature of the succession; the two concepts are just two sides 
of one coin. Thinking of an experience as constantly successive seems to 
require we think of it as a succession, and thinking of it as a succession, for 
Hume, requires that we think of it as a succession of moments. 
Conceptually, it seems that conceiving of a succession requires thinking in 
terms of simple moments: could this not ensure that the non-successive is 
cognitively available even if it is not an overt feature of our experience? All 
successive experiences involve a succession of moments, and so we always 
have a contrast class available if we just think about what being successive 
means for Hume. We need only contrast the whole with its parts.  
 
However, although the simple is inextricably linked to the complex for 
Hume, I do not think this can help us with the problem at hand. For a 
contrast class to be of use to us, it needs to be a feature of our experience 
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we can notice. For these simple moments to help then, they need to be 
experientially available. Yet, at this rudimentary first stage of idea-formation, 
conceptually hefty links between ideas do not seem to be something we are 
in a position to appreciate. Ontologically, and perhaps even conceptually, 
moments stand in contrast to successions. However, in the act of forming 
the very idea of time, these facts do not seem to be available to us, and so 
they offer no help with the problem at hand. We need a contrast class which 
is notable. Something which can be felt as obviously in opposition to 
succession and encourage us to form this first idea of what it is to be 
successive. Conceptual truths and underlying ontology seem of no use in 
this.  
 
So to the viability of the second candidate experience: an experience which 
is unchanging through time. We might think that, just as we form ideas of 
particular successions we can form ideas of particular unchanging things. 
This seems a straightforward solution, and yet explaining how we might 
have ideas of such things is challenging from within Hume’s discussion. 
However, it is a consideration worth dwelling upon because it is a topic 
Hume devotes some discussion to, and which raises some interesting 
questions. On the one hand, we might think that an idea of an unchanging 
object which persists through time could be ruled out in a straightforward 
manner: to be temporally complex is to be successive, and so the idea of 
time without change has a kind of conceptual incoherence for Hume. The 
idea of time is an idea of succession, of change; so to think of a thing 
unchanging through time is to think of something changing and not 
changing. Hume tells us this idea of an unchanging duration is indeed a 
fiction.213 On these grounds there seems to be no contrast class to be found 
here.  
 
In fact though, Hume’s discussion of this kind of case is rather more subtle 
and interesting. He appears to countenance something of this sort in his 
discussion of so-called “stedfast objects,” that is, objects which remain 
unchanged through time, though what to conclude from his discussion is 
                                                 
213 For more on the idea of an unchanging duration as a fiction see Baxter (2008) chapter 2 
(which will receive much discussion below), McRae (1980) p. 120, and Traiger (1987).  
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somewhat contentious. Since they offer the possibility of a contrast class, 
they are well worth investigating here.  
 
6.4. Steadfast Objects  
Hume discusses “stedfast objects” in three places in the Treatise: T 1.2.3.11; 
SBN 37, T 1.2.5.29; SBN 65, and T 1.4.2.29 SBN 200-1. According to 
Hume, a steadfast object is an object which is “stedfast and unchangeable,” 
and which stands in contrast to being “a succession of changeable 
objects.”214 Steadfast objects are unchanging and yet are presented as 
coexisting with successions. Being unchangeable, and so not successive, 
steadfast objects, considered alone, have no duration. However, they coexist 
with successions, which would seemingly bestow duration upon them; 
wherein lies their strangeness. One problem in making sense of these is that 
it is not entirely clear exactly what Hume means by “object” or whether in 
each of these places he is using the term in the same way. After the 
discussion at T 200-1, he states: 
 
I shall at first suppose; that there is only a single existence, which I shall call 
indifferently object or perception, according as it shall seem best to suit my 
purpose, understanding by both of them what any common man means by a 
hat, or shoe, or stone, or any other impression, convey’d to him by his 
senses.215 
 
 However, this occurs after the part I am considering and, given he notes his 
use of language, we might think he was not speaking in this way before. 
Certainly, the way he discusses these objects can seem sometimes to align 
better with thinking of them as external objects, a view that would be shored 
up by this interjection since this would then be him highlighting a new use 
for the term. On the whole though, it is hard to put too much on this. First 
then, let’s consider the passages and what they might require.     
 
As an example of these things, consider Hume’s first discussion of steadfast 
objects, in this he is concerned to stress that we have no idea of time 
                                                 
214 T 1.2.3.11; SBN 37.  
215 T 1.4.2.31; SBN 202 
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without changing, existing things, although “we can easily point out those 
appearances, which make us fancy we have that idea”: 
 
For we may observe, that there is a continual succession of perceptions in our 
mind; so that the idea of time being for ever present with us; when we 
consider a stedfast object at five-aclock, and regard the same at six; we are apt 
to apply to it that idea in the same manner as if every moment were 
distinguish’d by a different position, or an alteration of the object. The first 
and second appearances of the object, being compar’d with the succession of 
our perceptions, seem equally remov’d as if the object had really chang’d. To 
which we may add, what experience shews us, that the object was susceptible 
of such a number of changes betwixt these appearances; as also that the 
unchangeable or rather fictitious duration has the same effect upon every 
quality, by encreasing or diminishing it, as that succession, which is obvious 
to the senses. From these three relations we are apt to confound our ideas, 
and imagine we can form the idea of a time and duration, without any change 
or succession.216 
 
The object itself does not appeared changed, but we think of it as in time 
because, firstly, our perceptions change in between our views of it (“The 
first and second appearances of the object, being compar’d with the 
succession of our perceptions, seem equally remov’d as if the object had 
really chang’d.”217), and secondly,  we think of it as an experience that could 
have changed even if it did not, that is, it is similar to situations in which 
change has occurred, even if it did not in this case (“experience shews us, 
that the object was susceptible of such a number of changes betwixt these 
appearances.”218). So, just as we imagine ourselves capable of forming an 
idea of extension without an arrangement of visible or tactile perceptions, 
we imagine ourselves capable of forming an idea of time without change, 
even though both ideas are equally contradictory. 
 
The idea of time without change is a fictitious idea for Hume. In this case it 
is fictitious because we are applying an idea of duration to something 
                                                 
216 T 1.2.5.28; SBN 65.  
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. The counterfactual here is interesting for other reasons in that it clearly implies the 
possibility of change which can seem at odds with some of the language Hume uses to 
describe steadfast objects. In T 1.2.3. and T 1.4.2. these objects are steadfast and 
“unchangeable,” and in T 1.2.5. the fiction is of an “unchangeable” duration. Equally, the 
only other time the term “stedfast” occurs in the Treatise it is paired with “immutable.” The 
modal implication of his language here seems entirely at odds with the proposed 
counterfactual above which implies it could have changed.    
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unchanging which, strictly speaking, is always improper. (The idea of time 
can “never in any propriety or exactness be apply’d to [the unchanging], nor 
can any thing unchangeable be ever said to have duration.”219) However, 
fictitious though this idea may be, it may also be of use in our finding a 
contrast class to the successive. If steadfast objects are unchanging then they 
are temporally simple and yet, unlike the moments I characterised above, 
they appear to be a notable part of our experience. If they can indeed coexist 
with longer successions, they seem to be experientially accessible in a 
potentially helpful way. Perhaps these objects can provide us with the 
contrast class we require. Here, I consider two ways of thinking about these 
cases and how they might help us address the problem of the absent 
contrast class.  
 
The first is the view forwarded by Baxter: he denies that we should think of 
time, or our experience of it, as a single timeline wherein all perceptions 
come ordered. In the above, I motivated the problem using such a 
framework. It was the constantly changing parts that introduced constant 
change into the whole and made moments experientially inaccessible. We 
might then wonder whether rejecting this view is the key to addressing the 
problem at hand. Although he is not addressing the problem I set out here, 
Baxter does explore the alternative in an interesting way. He argues that 
time, for Hume, is best understood in terms of different, separate 
successions which coexist and change at different rates to each other. To 
distinguish this kind of coexistence from the kind that cannot occur within a 
single timeline, he calls the coexistence of different successions “co-
duration.” For him, steadfast objects retain full and genuine temporal 
simplicity in spite of their coexistence with successions because they exist on 
different lines of succession. On this kind of reading, steadfast objects do 
provide a contrast class, and so offer a way to address the problem I set out 
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6.4.1. Baxter on Steadfast Objects 
For Baxter, the discussion of steadfast objects shows us something 
interesting and unusual about the way that Hume conceived of time: 
essentially that time is not best thought of as a single successive line, or 
ordering of objects. Instead, he takes Hume to accept a view upon which 
time is an abstraction from many different, separate time lines, which change 
at different rates to each other, and coexist without necessarily sharing any 
members (moments) in common. This, he argues, is how we can make sense 
of Hume’s otherwise seemingly paradoxical commitment to the idea that 
steadfast objects, which are temporally simple, can nevertheless coexist with 
successions that, being changing, have duration. If we think that time is a 
linear ordering, it seems unclear in what sense something could coexist with 
a succession of things without thereby inheriting their temporal complexity. 
In setting out the problem of the absent contrast class in the above, I 
accounted for Hume’s claims that our perceptions were in perpetual flux by 
appeal to the fact that, considered as a whole, our experience is constantly 
changing. Baxter, in effect, rejects this whole, instead thinking in terms of a 
number of separate intervals. In his discussion he employs a helpful 
illustration of the problem as he sees it:  
 
Perhaps the movie camera analogy is the problem. The analogy makes it 
plausible to assume that there is only a single succession of perceptions in the 
imagination, just as there is only one reel of film in the camera. But why 
should we assume this. Let’s rather assume something less like a movie 
camera and more like a mind…220  
 
If we think that experience unfolds in the way the movie camera analogy 
encourages us to think then each moment is comprised of some set of 
perceptions and no moment lasts longer than any other, for every moment is 
simple (though comprised of all our coexisting perceptions). Baxter suggests 
that we reject this way of thinking. Instead, he suggests we think in terms of 
a number of different successions unified in terms of their features which 
each occur separate to each other, a characterisation which, as he notes, 
more resembles a brick wall:221        
                                                 
220 Baxter (2008) p.35.  
221 This diagram is a close approximation of the one offered by Baxter (2008) p.37.  
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The arrow indicates later-than, from left to right. The blocks represent 
moments, the lines indicate change between moments. Coexistence is 
represented by the fact that two blocks could be cut by the same vertical 
line. Here, then, the middle moment at place 2 coexists with a succession of 
moments at place 1 and place 2 but, in theory, does not thereby inherit 
duration from this fact because, in itself, it is not successive. Importantly to 
note, although Baxter also illustrates his own version of this diagram using 
place as an indicator, he notes that the theory is more complex than this. 
Some successions will be unified by sameness of place but many successions 
will not, strictly speaking, occur in any place at all. The unifying role will be 
played in those cases by the principles of association: temporal contiguity 
will be crucial in all, that is, our tendency to feel a connection between that 
which is contiguous in time. For spatial perceptions, their perceived spatial 
contiguity will contribute. Successions which do not occur in any place can 
still be unified by appeal to resemblance or causation:   
 
[I]f Hume enjoys the succession of tastes in a sip of a complex claret, their 
resemblance as tastes and their having a common cause helps unify the 
succession. If Hume simultaneously listens to a birdsong and feels a change 
of mood, each of these two successions of perceptions likewise are unified 
without appeal to sameness of place.222  
 
These unifying features provide the impetus for another interesting feature 
of these successions: they may, in some cases, share members in common. 
Baxter gives the example of the left-hand and the right-hand parts of a piano 
piece coming together for a bar before splitting off into two separate 
melodies again. The diagram as it stands does not leave room for this, but 
                                                 
222 Baxter (2008) p.38.  
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Baxter’s main aim is in highlighting the nature of the possibility of 
coexistence, so he takes it as sufficient to those ends.  
 
If we adopt Baxter’s interpretation we seem in a position to find a contrast 
class to the successive. For, in our experience, we find moments which are 
simple and yet noticeable. These moments are not over so quickly we cannot 
pick them out because they remain steadfast and unchanging whilst other 
separate successions of things change around them. If we think about time 
for Hume in the way that Baxter suggests, then a contrast class becomes 
available: we simply compare some moments (unchanging ones) with the 
successions they coexist with. When contrasted with the unchanging, we 
might think that the successiveness of temporally complex experiences could 
become apparent to us.  
 
 
6.4.2. Some Reservations and an Alternative Proposal 
If we adopt Baxter’s view, then it seems we can find a solution to the 
problem of the absent contrast class. However, adopting Baxter’s view does 
carry with it some costs. Here I will explore some reservations I have with 
this approach. The prime concern I will explore here is that Baxter’s 
characterisation of moments seems problematically at odds with Hume’s 
commitment to the impossibility of coexisting moments. Baxter himself 
notes that, at face value at least, his interpretation is at odds with textual 
evidence. I will look at how he explains this away, and give some reasons for 
remaining sceptical. However, for all that I am not convinced by his 
characterisation of time itself, I think he presents a plausible interpretation 
of our experience of time and the way experiencing time comes to feel to us 
given the kind of cognisers we are. The way that the principles of association 
come in to bind successions also provides a way by which we can 
understand how experience is felt to contain unchanging things which 
contrast with changing things. This, I suggest, is enough as it still enables a 
contrast class to be found, albeit a relative rather than absolute one. For 
those happy with Baxter’s stronger formation, the problem of finding a 
contrast class is already solved. For those looking for a more moderate 
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interpretation, there is one available. Either way, the problem of the absent 
contrast class can, I suggest, be adequately addressed.   
 
To begin then, I will explain my reservations with the way Baxter proceeds. 
In particular, one might object to his characterisation of moments. For him, 
moments are abstractions from members of successions (“the idea of a 
moment is the idea of a member of a succession qua member”223). He states 
further that “moments of time are abstractions from single things in time. 
Each moment is an abstraction from the temporally simple object occupying 
it.”224 In rejecting the single timeline movie camera view, Baxter’s view of 
moments is to be different to the view I set out above where each 
experiential moment contains all the perceptions a perceiver has at that time. 
Since he allows for different successions to coexist, his moments are 
members of particular successions, rather than moments which comprise all 
experiences at a time. To take an example, a moment for Baxter could be an 
abstraction from a single musical note, whereas, on the conception of 
moments I set out above, any moment containing the note would, in all 
normal cases of experience anyway, also contain innumerable other 
perceptions had by the experiencer at the same time (the feel of the chair, 
the emotions the music evokes, the smell of the room, etc.).  
 
Since Baxter is committed to different successions coexisting with each 
other (this is the essence of the idea of co-duration explored above), he takes 
it that different moments can coexist. As already considered in chapters 2 
and 3, this is at odds with Hume’s explicit statements on the matter. To 
remind, Hume tells us that “’Tis a property inseparable from time, and 
which in a manner constitutes its essence, that each of its parts succeeds 
another, and that none of them, however contiguous, can ever be co-
existent.”225 Hume ends the paragraph this is taken from by stating that 
supposing coexistent moments amounts to an “arrant contradiction.” 
Elsewhere, he states that “’Tis also evident, that these parts [the moments of 
time] are not co-existent: For that quality of the co-existence of parts 
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224 Baxter (2001) p. 130.  
225 T 1.2.2.4; SBN 31. 
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belongs to extension, and is what distinguishes it from duration.”226 Equally, 
that “time or succession, tho’ it consists likewise of parts, never presents to 
us more than one at once; nor is it possible for any two of them ever to be 
co-existent.”227 The contradiction inherent in the coexistence of moments 
seems deeply rooted in Hume’s theory of what time, in essence, is. As I 
argued in chapters 2 and 3, this may be because of deep conceptual features 
relating to time and moments.  
 
To his credit, Baxter notes this textual evidence, but he nonetheless takes 
Hume’s discussion of steadfast objects to overrule it, opting to reinterpret 
these comments in light of the commitment to coexistence he takes steadfast 
objects to demonstrate. His proposal for squaring the difficulty rests on two 
forks: firstly, he notes that Hume tends to use “time” and “succession” 
interchangeably. In light of this, he reinterprets the comments immediately 
above as making claims about successiveness rather than time. It is then part 
of the concept of successiveness that the moments of a succession do not 
coexist. However, Baxter suggests, time need not exhibit this restriction 
(because of his commitment to multiple timelines). Secondly, Baxter 
suggests that the consequences of the commitment to steadfast objects may 
have simply escaped Hume. By drawing a distinction between the parts of 
each succession (which cannot coexist), and the parts of different 
successions (which can coexist with parts of other successions), Baxter has made 
room for coexisting moments. He suggests that Hume does not note this 
particular extension to his theory because “recognizing co-duration requires 
unnatural care and attention. What is natural is to attribute duration to 
steadfast objects [this is the natural fiction Hume takes us to be inclined 
towards] and so be unable to see the need for, or even the possibility of, 
coexisting moments.”228 
 
I am unconvinced by the first point. Although Hume does seem to use 
“time,” “succession,” and indeed “duration” interchangeably at time, Baxter 
has not persuaded me that the quotations above are cases of this. The first 
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quotation is taken from Hume’s third argument against the infinite 
divisibility of time, and from the section explicitly titled “On the infinite 
divisibility of time and space.” Here I do not see any motivation for taking 
him to be talking about the qualities of successiveness rather than of time. 
The arguments I made in chapters 2 and 3 perhaps make my position on 
these clear already: given the way Hume’s approach is restrained by his 
epistemology and the concept of time as requiring change, I think we have a 
way to explain exactly why it is a contradiction to suppose either two 
moments of time or two moments of experience to coexist. Time requires 
change, and so coexisting moments require coexisting contrary states of 
affairs. It is true that I take these comments to be about the moments of 
time itself, rather than the moments of experience. However, for the reasons 
mentioned above, it is not clear to me why the moments of experience 
would be different in a way that means they could be successive (though 
they might feel different – of which more in a moment). Even given this 
though, these comments certainly seem to be about time, rather than 
successiveness.    
 
I also see no reason to take Hume to be discussing successiveness rather 
than time in the second quotation. Regarding the third, although Hume 
introduces the comment as being about “time or succession” thereby 
indicating at the least that he is not going to distinguish the two, the 
comments are given in the context of a discussion of the “different 
properties of space or time.” He may not be distinguishing between the two 
terms, here but it seems more like “succession” is being used for “time”, 
rather than “time” for “successiveness.” Although Baxter is right to point 
out that Hume does sometimes use the language in the way he describes, he 
does not offer us additional reasons for thinking these cases constitute that 
kind of looseness and, even in the last quotation which seems to employ 
“time” and “succession” interchangeably, this does not seem to support the 
idea that Hume is discussing successiveness. As such, Baxter has not done 




So to Baxter’s second point: that Hume simply did not notice that his view 
of time entailed coexisting moments because recognising co-duration 
requires a much higher level of care and attention. Certainly it is not 
inconceivable that Hume’s theory requires something that he did not 
recognise. However, if we can explain what he says from within a more 
moderate view, that is less in conflict with the text, that surely is preferable. 
One way we might go about this is to note that Baxter draws a distinction 
between time and our experience of it, but then appears to posit coexisting 
moments in both cases:  
 
What makes moments members of the same succession of moments? Answering 
the question requires distinguishing time as it is from time as we experience it. Time 
as it is consists simply of moments later than some, coexistent with others, and earlier than still 
others. It is not objectively divided up into successions with additional principles of 
unity. However, time as we experience it is different. We experience time by 
experiencing various coexistent successions of objects. It is the ideas of these that 
we use to form the abstract idea of time. The experienced unity of successions of 
objects is a result of the principles of association of ideas [my italics].229  
 
If Baxter were only to ascribe coexistence to the moments of experience, we 
could allow that, at least in the sense he is using moments, there might be 
less to object to here than it initially sounds. The moments that Baxter picks 
out are abstractions from members of successions. The successions Baxter 
picks out appear to be, in some sense, mentally constructed. Which is just to 
say that they are united by the principles of association. One might think we 
experience a mess of perceptions and we interpret it in terms of different, 
coexisting successions. If we think of successions in this way, and we allow 
Baxter his particular way of characterising moments as members of 
successions, the coexistence of these moments does not seem to result in 
contradiction. Given the separate successions, the moments can coexist 
because they do not express the same part of some one thing as being one 
way and another way at the same time. A spatial parallel makes this point 
clearer: to say that some single spatial point is entirely red and entirely blue is 
a contradiction, but there is no contradiction in having a blue point in one 
                                                 
229 Baxter (2001) p.135-6.  
167 
 
place and a red point elsewhere. To the extent that Baxter’s successions are 
separate to each other, the objection I levelled at coexisting moments in 
chapter 2 does not seem to arise for his view of moments: the moments of 
two different successions do not express contradictory states of any one 
thing, they merely express one part of the experiential whole as being one 
way and another part of it as being another. So, if we can allow Baxter his 
separate successions and his view of moments, perhaps the problem of 
coexistence does not occur. My core concern though, is that separate 
successions seem to be the result of the principles of association having 
been at work. Separate successions do not seem to be part of the raw matter 
of experience, and still less do they seem to be the way that time itself exists. 
But if that is the case, in what sense do we have coexisting moments of 
time? One might even think that, if the principles of association mainly are 
at work in shaping the ideas we form from experience, this is not even 
sufficient support for positing coexisting moments of experience.  
 
In sum, I feel Baxter oversteps the bounds of what we have good reasons 
for thinking Hume thought. However, his appeal to the principles of 
association in encouraging us to think of time in terms of separate 
successions seems absolutely right and, I suggest, sufficient to address the 
problem of the absent contrast class. I suggest a more moderate route is 
available: we allow that the principles of association process the content of 
experience in certain ways, and so encourage us to form ideas of particular 
successions which we can then think of parts of the whole which change or 
do not change relative to other things.  
 
As a claim about the ideas we form from experience, it seems that the 
principles of association do indeed have the effect of hiving off parts from 
the experiential whole that we can then see as bearing different properties to 
each other. This is a fair characterisation of how, on Hume’s view, we come 
to form ideas of objects, and also explains why we take these objects to 
persist through time. Under the influence of the principles of association, we 
come to think in terms of hats and shoes, rather than blocks of colour. We 
pick out the table and the apple from the visual array, and feel their 
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component parts to be bound in a way that the whole is not. We bind other 
qualities into these objects, connecting, say, the green shape of the apple and 
the co-occurring smooth feel. Equally, qualities like tastes or smells, which 
Hume tells us are not located in extension, come to be seen as, in some 
loose sense, in the object to which they are constantly conjoined, eventually 
feeling as much a part of it as its colour or shape.230 Objects, at least as we 
know them, are bundles of ideas, so “a particular colour, taste, and smell are 
qualities all united together in this apple.”231 The idea of the apple is a 
complex formed of these distinct but unified elements, joined by their felt 
connectedness and apparent conjunction. This binding does not stop with 
sensory qualities: We go on to associate feelings that arise in us with the 
objects that provoke these feelings until even the feelings of internal 
reflection come to be to some degree merged with the objects of sense.   
  
These examples already show us something interesting about the effect of 
this feature of human nature on the capacity to perceive and ascribe 
properties. Specifically, they show us that we can come to see parts of our 
experiences as exhibiting properties different to the properties exhibited by 
the experiential whole: the apple is green, the weather is miserable, the ball is 
moving. Considered in terms of visual experience, the experiential whole is 
of innumerable shades. However, this does not mean I cannot ascribe a 
particular colour to the apple. Equally, these cases demonstrate that Hume 
does not see this partitioning as confined to the synchronic nature of 
objects. Instead, we experience the world as containing objects that persist 
through time; moving, growing, shrinking, changing their properties along 
multiple avenues at once. Hume’s example of the fire in his study illustrates 
this: When Hume returns to his study after an hour and forms a belief that 
the fire has died down he forms this belief because the bundle of 
perceptions thought of as representing a fire, though different to the bundle 
of perceptions previously thought of as representing a fire, is still displaying 
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roughly similar properties (though diminished), in roughly the same place 
and at a close, though different, time. In the past, objects resembling the fire 
have conducted themselves similarly and so he comes to think that the fire 
has died down, as opposed that the first fire has been replaced by a second, 
smaller fire.232 
 
These tendencies come to impact on how we view experience itself and 
what we take it to present. In chapter 5 I discussed the idea that we come to 
imagine that spatial depth is just given in sensation, here perhaps something 
similar occurs. We are inclined to think in terms of objects which persist and 
change relative to each other and we may come to feel that the world is of 
this sort too. However, we can explain how we come to do this without 
posting coexisting moments of time, or even coexisting moments of 
experience. The principles of association are a powerful enough tool to do 
this work on their own.  
 
By these means then, I suggest we can find a contrast class of ideas even if 
the content of experience may be constantly changing, and so constantly 
successive in the way I set out above. For, in spite of this, the ideas we form 
from experience can (and do) exhibit contrasting temporal properties to 
each other. In terms of our ideas then, it seems we might have a contrast 
class that could do the job because some ideas are successive, some are not.  
 
In terms of experience the question is harder to address but it strikes me as 
plausible that we could have a relative contrast class here too. Just as our 
ideas of objects encourage us to split the visual field into things, it seems 
likely that our feeling parts of the world to be different objects to other parts 
will encourage us to feel experience to present us with different successions 
that we feel to be more apart than they perhaps really are. Consider Hume’s 
discussion of an unchanging perception:  
 
When we fix our thought on any object, and suppose it to continue the same 
for some time; ’tis evident we suppose the change to lie only in the time, and 
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never exert ourselves to produce any new image or idea of the object... The 
passage from one moment to another is scarce felt, and distinguishes not 
itself by a different perception or idea, which may require a different direction 
of the spirits, in order to its conception.233 
  
Thinking only of the perception of the object, it stays the same. Other 
perceptions may change around it though, it is just that the passing of 
moments is scarce felt. We can selectively attend to parts of our experience 
over others. This seems to make a relative contrast class a possibility even 
within experience. To the extent that we come to feel the music is different 
to the painting, we might feel one to be successive and the other not, even as 
we experience them.   
 
In short, I see no reason to reject the movie camera as a view of the content 
of experience for we can explain both the ideas that result, and the ways we 
feel the world to be, if we only appeal to the principles of association. If we 
do this we do not have to say that the moments of time, or of experience, 
coexist, so we do not have to explain away significant textual evidence, or 
suggest that Hume failed to see the implications of his account. If we do this 
I have suggested we can also maintain that there exists a contrast class to the 
successive, or at least, a relative contrast class. Since we are trying to explain 
our thinking and ideas, a relative contrast class seems sufficient. In the next 
chapter I will examine how this contrast class might enable us to form the 
requisite resemblance classes to develop the general idea of time, in spite of 
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In the previous chapter I highlighted two challenges: the problem of the 
seemingly elusive resemblance we are required to see in the case of time 
(worsened by the apparent unavailability of a contrast class) and the problem 
of cross-modal resemblance-association. Having addressed the problem of 
the contrast class, we are still left with the question of whether, even in this 
situation, we can account for our noting the requisite resemblances. From 
these challenges I set out two aims: firstly, the interpretive aim of seeing 
what accounting for Hume’s theory of the idea of time could tell us about 
how he conceives of other topics, including the relation of resemblance. 
Secondly, the critical aim of evaluating whether the formation of the idea of 
time results in unacceptable circularity from within a Humean framework. It 
is worth clarifying these aims a little before I forward a response.   
  
Firstly then, I am motivated by an interpretive question: given that Hume 
tells us we can form the idea of time, what does that imply about how he 
understands resemblance? Thinking about what this idea presses us towards 
a deeper analysis of the phenomenon of resemblance and how it provokes 
association in cognisers like us. Forming a greater understanding of 
resemblance in Hume’s work is all the more valuable because of the many 
and varied roles resemblance-association plays and how it shapes our 
experience of the world. Understanding this concept better is not just of 
benefit to those interested in his work on time then, it has far broader 
application. Hume tells us that we perceive resemblance in extremely 
disparate cases and, unlike Berkeley, across sense-modalities; what does this 
tell us about how he conceived of association, of general ideas, and of 
resemblance?    
 
Secondly, looking deeper here is of interest in critically assessing Hume’s 
account of time. He stands accused of forwarding an account that results in 
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circularity in that we are required to presuppose an understanding of the 
very idea we are trying to form. If his account really does require this, it is 
inadequate. Many of Hume’s critics take this second step in forming the idea 
of time (that is, the move from ideas of particular times to a general idea of 
time) to be a serious barrier and if he is unable to explain it then the idea of 
time remains problematic, even if we can account for the formation of ideas 
of particular times. If forming the idea of time is so inexplicable that the 
only route available involves presupposing the very idea we are seeking to 
explain then that tells us something interesting (and seemingly troubling) 
about Hume’s theory and, potentially, about empiricist approaches more 
broadly. If, however, there is an interpretation available on which Hume’s 
account is not circular, this would also tell us something interesting about his 
approach and, potentially, about the viability of empiricist treatments of the 
idea of time too.   
 
In his discussion of the idea of time, Baxter considers and immediately 
dismisses the objection of circularity considered above. He states that, “[a] 
certain point of resemblance might intrude upon our attention if we are 
naturally susceptible to the intrusion.”234 This natural susceptibility need not 
be explained in terms of our already having the idea of time, instead: “[a]s 
long as successiveness naturally intrudes on our attention and we naturally 
find it convenient to coin a word for it to remind us of things that resemble 
with respect to successiveness, Hume’s account is noncircular.”235 Perhaps 
this is so and, if it is, all the better for Hume. However, looking at how and 
why this might be so offers us a way of going deeper into so many issues, 
and so a more thoroughgoing analysis feels worthwhile. Equally, to those 
unconvinced by Hume’s capacity to account for these ideas, and I cited 
several such people in section 6.3.1., merely stating that we are susceptible to 
forming these resemblance-associations does not seem like a satisfying 
response. To reply to the charge of circularity more needs to be said.  
 
Pressing for something deeper seems potentially rewarding then. However, 
in doing so, we must be mindful to tread a careful path. A full and complete 
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understanding of the mind’s operations (and so of the hidden mechanisms 
that drive resemblance-association) is epistemically inaccessible to us, and 
would seem to overstep bounds Hume himself is keen to comply with. 
Instead, as discussed in chapter 5, we at best know the principles of 
association by their effects. In seeking a fuller explanation, then, it would be 
insensitive to Hume’s stance if we did not also keep in mind the sorts of 
explanatory limitations he insisted upon. Asking for the deep causes of 
association and what makes it so that we are the kind of associating creatures 
that we seem to be, would seem to be beyond this. However, to presume the 
very idea in question is unsatisfying. I will argue that there is an interesting 
path to be walked in between these extremes. On the question of circularity, 
we can perfectly well ask whether we can account for the idea of time from 
within the framework which Hume has laid out and by appeal to tools he 
recognises. Equally, it seems we can use what we find to further illuminate 
related issues in Hume. These are the tasks of this chapter.    
 
With these aims and cautions in mind, I proceed by first considering the 
interpretive question of what the idea of time might tell us about 
resemblance. I contend that the idea of time requires quite a particular kind 
of resemblance. In order to support this claim it is necessary to take a look 
at the forms of resemblance recognised in Hume’s work more broadly. 
Having shown that resemblance comes in a variety of forms I will draw out 
a kind that does not seem to rely on sameness or even similarity in the 
content of the related ideas, this is the kind that has the most promise in 
explaining the resemblance which different temporally complex ideas bear to 
each other. Having established the presence of this kind of resemblance in 
Hume’s work, I will finish with a detailed examination of exactly how this 
kind of resemblance might help us understand the formation of the idea of 
time. To finish, I will return to the critical questions. I conclude that, if we 
think in terms of this particular variety of resemblance, we can respond to 
the challenges set out above. We can explain how otherwise elusive, cross-
modal resemblances could nonetheless be formed, and we can do this in a 




7.2. The Nature of Resemblance 
In Hume’s work, the phenomenon of resemblance has many forms and 
appears in many places. Our natural inclination to associate ideas in line with 
perceived resemblances plays a role in the formation of many of the most 
important themes discussed in Hume, including the idea of the self, of 
causation, even our belief in an independent, continuous external world. 
Resemblance is also responsible in no small way for many fictitious ideas we 
take ourselves to have. It is, according to Hume, “the most fertile source of 
error; indeed there are few mistakes in reasoning, which do not borrow 
largely from that origin.”236 For better or worse, perceived resemblance is 
presented as having a powerful influence upon human cognition. The 
important and pervasive role of resemblance in human thought runs deep 
even if it can lead us astray.  
 
To better understand the resemblance involved in the idea of time, I will 
consider a variety of examples Hume gives. Resemblance is a relation 
though, and it will be helpful for the later discussion to say a little something 
about Hume’s view of relations more generally. Hume draws a distinction 
between so-called “natural” and “philosophical” relations.237 Resemblance, 
occurs as both a natural and a philosophical relation, and so admits of this 
duality. To begin, I will briefly discuss the two kinds and argue that the 
philosophical relation is too ubiquitous to be responsible for the formation 
of the general idea of time. When thinking about the resemblance involved 
in forming the idea of time, we must look to the natural relations. This, in 
turn, means that we must also think about association.  
 
 
7.2.1. Resemblance as both a “Natural” and a 
“Philosophical” Relation 
Firstly then, Hume tells us that resemblance (like causation and contiguity) is 
both a natural and a philosophical relation. These two senses of relation 
correspond to two very different ways that we use the word “relation”:  
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The word Relation is commonly used in two senses considerably different 
from each other. Either for that quality, by which two ideas are connected 
together in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other, after 
the manner above-explained; or for that particular circumstance, in which, 
even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper 
to compare them.238 
 
Considering the two senses in turn, the first and most familiar is the sense of 
relation which describes a connection or association in the imagination. The 
natural relations correspond to Hume’s principles of association. They are 
relations we perceive as holding between perceptions in light of qualities that 
produce associations in thought and, as a result of this, guide the 
imagination through its ideas: “these qualities produce an association among 
ideas, and upon the appearance of one idea naturally introduce another.”239 
When I conceive of one idea then, I will tend to be led to think of other 
ideas connected to it by apparently manifesting those qualities. This is the 
first sense in which resemblance enters the picture:  
 
’Tis plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of 
our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that 
resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and 
association.240  
 
In his discussion, Hume identifies three key triggering qualities for this 
association: we are disposed to associate (and so move easily from one 
thought to the other between) things which are perceived to i. resemble each 
other, ii. be contiguous in time or space, or iii. be causally related to each 
other. Hume does, in the Enquiry, leave open the possibility of further 
triggers for this association but these three are at least ones we consistently 
find throughout.241 
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This sense of relation then simply means related in thought, that is, related 
by a thinker. As mentioned in section 5.4.1., Hume is not always consistent 
in describing the force and reach of these connections: they are described 
sometimes as “permanent, irresistible, and universal”, without them “human 
nature must immediately perish and go to ruin.”242 They fall short of logical 
implication certainly but are clearly powerful and, Hume tells us, “the cause 
why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; 
nature pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper 
to be united into a complex one.”243 A thought that is echoed in the Enquiry:  
 
Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least 
connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, expressive of ideas, 
the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: a certain 
proof that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were 
bound together by some universal principle, which had an equal influence on 
all mankind.244 
 
At other times they are a “gentle force that commonly prevails.”245 Little 
nudges that smooth the passage between ideas and so serve to sway the 
mind by degrees, encouraging it along certain pathways:  
 
[H]owever changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule 
and method in their changes. The rule, by which they proceed, is to pass 
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from one object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produc’d by it. 
When one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these 
relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility by means of that 
introduction.246 
 
Arguably we make best sense of this duality in force by noting that many 
small influences can, over time, create a great force. Hume sometimes toys 
with a physical explanation of this, though his adherence to this is not 
consistent:247  
 
When I receiv’d the relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation, as 
principles of union among ideas, without examining into their causes, ’twas 
more in prosecution of my first maxim, that we must in the end rest 
contented with experience, than for want of something specious and 
plausible, which I might have display’d on that subject. ’Twou’d have been 
easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shewn, why 
upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the 
contiguous traces, and rouze up the other ideas, that are related to it.248 
 
As Kail describes the process in discussing the notable similarities between 
Hume’s natural relations and Malebrache’s “liason naturelle,” it brings to mind 
the way in which a steady flow of water can, over time, gouge rock:  
 
Ideas become linked in the imagination, and inferential dispositions become 
acquired, in virtue of repeated experience affecting the structure of the brain, 
leaving channels through which animal spirits flow. Like water, the contents 
of the imagination seek the easiest path, which means the deepest and widest 
traces in the brain.249  
 
For my purposes here, the most crucial thing to note with natural relations is 
that, being connections between thoughts in the mind of a thinker, these 
relations are subject-dependent in an important way. As such, the fact that a 
thinker feels a relation is no guarantee that there exists any such connection 
in the world. Causality is perhaps the prime example of this: repeated 
experiences of their constant conjunction may lead me to form a connection 
in thought between seeing the barometer fall and the event of a storm which 
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I might take to be evidence of a casual relation. However, that this 
connection exists in my thought says nothing of whether such a relation 
exists in your mind, and still less about whether there is such a causal 
connection in the world.   
 
These are the natural relations then. Contrasting with these is the second 
sense of relation which Hume terms “philosophical relations.” Philosophical 
relations are more numerous and varied and do not entail a connection in 
thought. Instead philosophical relations tell us something of the different 
ways in which it is possible to compare ideas. In T 1.1.5. Hume tells us there 
are seven philosophical relations: resemblance, identity, relations of time and 
place, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety, 
and causation. He divides them into two classes. Firstly, there are those 
which depend solely on the related ideas for whether they hold or not. These 
are resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity 
or number. Secondly, there are relations that can change whether they hold 
or not without a change in the ideas they relate. These are contiguity, 
distance, and causation.  
 
As a philosophical relation of the first sort, whether two ideas fall into a 
philosophical relation of resemblance depends solely on the content of the 
two ideas. As a philosophical relation, resemblance is ubiquitous: Hume tells 
us that, in order to compare any two ideas, there must be some resemblance 
between them which, it seems, forms the grounds of the chosen 
comparison. As such, our ability to compare ideas in accordance with any of 
the philosophical relations first requires that some relation of resemblance 
along some line holds between them: 
 
[Of the philosophical relations] [t]he first is resemblance: And this is a 
relation, without which no philosophical relation can exist; since no objects 
will admit of comparison, but what have some degree of resemblance. But 
tho’ resemblance be necessary to all philosophical relation, it does not follow, 
that it always produces a connexion or association of ideas. 
 
To compare apples and oranges I can compare them by size, shape, colour, 
taste, aerodynamics, and in innumerable other ways. However, if I do not 
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view them as similar in some way (even if they are at the opposite ends of 
the spectrum for whichever feature I am comparing them in light of) I 
cannot compare them at all.  
 
Our ability to compare along any line then requires a grounds of comparison 
and there can be no grounds of comparison, Hume tells us, without a 
relation of resemblance. To support this he gives the example of the relation 
of contrariety, a relation which we might think excludes resemblance 
between its objects. Even in this case though, he argues there must be a 
degree of resemblance, specifically, if we do not think of two ideas as 
resembling in some way then we cannot point to the respect in which they’re 
contrary. Indeed,  
 
no two ideas are in themselves contrary, except those of existence and non-
existence, which are plainly resembling, as implying both of them an idea of 
the object; tho’ the latter excludes the object from all times and places, in 
which it is supposed not to exist.250  
 
As a philosophical relation, then, resemblance is everywhere. Seemingly as a 
result of this, philosophical resemblance does not provoke association in 
thought:  
 
When a quality becomes very general, and is common to a great many 
individuals, it leads not the mind directly to any one of them; but by 
presenting at once too great a choice, does thereby prevent the imagination 
from fixing on any single object.251  
 
The philosophical relation of resemblance may be ubiquitous, but, as a 
result, it does not produce association.  
 
Given this, I suggest we can exclude the philosophical relation of 
resemblance from our search for the kind of resemblance that matters in 
forming the idea of time. If it does not produce association, how can explain 
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the formation of the general idea which explicitly relies on our forming 
resemblance classes of related ideas? Although time and space are 
philosophical relations according to which we can compare objects, the kind 
of resemblance Hume points to in our forming the idea of time is first and 
foremost of a kind that produces association, for it must in order that the 
general idea be formed at all. Equally, the kind of resemblance that is 
involved in forming the idea of time is selective in the associations it 
produces. It picks out some ideas as resembling and not others.252 It seems 
we must be concerned with the natural relation of resemblance, then, and 
not the philosophical. Given the differences between the natural and the 
philosophical relations of resemblance we can conclude that the class of 
things any given thinker associates as resembling is going to be far smaller 
than the class of things that actually do admit of some degree of 
resemblance. Accounting for the difference between these classes of things 
involves a deeper look at the varieties of resemblance that Hume discusses 
and an examination of which conditions inclined us to associate two things 
together in virtue of a perceived resemblance.  
 
 
7.2.2. Varieties of Resemblance 
Association in virtue of perceived resemblance, just like other forms of 
association, is the result of at least two factors: i. our particular cognitive 
habits, and ii. our experience and its features (or, to use Hume’s phrasing, 
the “qualities” of experience). It relies both on our being the sorts of 
creatures who respond to certain kinds of stimuli with association and 
experience providing the relevant kinds of stimulation. In the case of causal 
association, for example, Hume points to triggering factors like constant 
conjunction and temporal priority of the “cause.” In this section I will 
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highlight some examples Hume offers regarding resemblance and assess 
their use in accounting for the idea of time.253  
 
As an intuitive first pass at what provokes a feeling of resemblance we might 
point to ideas which exhibit sameness of content. When I glance at my mug 
and form an idea of how it looks at 803 then glance again at 8:05, I form a 
second idea which appears to exhibit much of the same intrinsic content as 
the first. The same colours, shape, and patterns all seem to be exhibited in 
the two ideas. Hume tells us in cases like these that “the exact resemblance 
of our perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity.”254 Exact 
resemblance in this case encourages us to connect these two ideas and think 
of them as two instances of one enduring thing. For a further example of 
this we might look to Hume’s case in which a “picture naturally leads our 
thoughts to the original,” as given in the Enquiry.255 In these cases sameness 
of content seems to ground a feeling of resemblance.  
 
However, in the case of time this does not seem to be the kind of 
resemblance that provokes the feeling of sameness. As already noted, 
forming the idea of time relies on a resemblance that holds across very 
disparate cases and across different sense-modalities. A succession of felt 
sensations and a succession of heard sounds resemble in their being 
successive, but it does not seem that they share any content in the sense 
given above. This kind of intuitive resemblance does not seem like it could 
play the role of grounding the idea of time then. However, not all 
resemblance appeals to sameness of content: in fact, Hume denies that all 
resemblance requires the resembling perceptions have circumstances in 
common and seems to embrace far a broader understanding of the 
phenomenon. It is worth citing his comments in full:  
 
’Tis evident, that even different simple ideas may have a similarity or 
resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary, that the point or circumstance 
of resemblance shou’d be distinct or separable from that in which they differ. 
                                                 
253 I will only discuss a few cases of Humean resemblance, there may be more. For a 
thorough run through of some of the varieties of resemblance appealed to by Hume see 
Gamboa (2007).  
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Blue and green are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue 
and scarlet; tho’ their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation 
or distinction. ’Tis the same case with particular sounds, and tastes and 
smells. These admit of infinite resemblances upon the general appearance and 
comparison, without having any common circumstance the same. And of this 
we may be certain, even from the very abstract terms simple idea. They 
comprehend all simple ideas under them. These resemble each other in their 
simplicity. And yet from their very nature, which excludes all composition, 
this circumstance, in which they resemble, is not distinguishable nor separable 
from the rest. ’Tis the same case with all the degrees in any quality. They are 
all resembling, and yet the quality, in any individual, is not distinct from the 
degree.256  
 
There is much of importance in this passage. Firstly, Hume rejects the idea 
that all resemblance involves sameness of content. Instead, different 
“sounds, and tastes, and smells” can admit of resemblances without having 
any content in common. That he notes they admit of “infinite 
resemblances” upon “comparison” might lead us to believe he is thinking of 
the kind of philosophical resemblance I highlighted above, which is a 
possible source of concern if what we require in the case of time is a natural 
sense of resemblance. However, let’s first consider the alternative forms of 
resemblance that emerge in more depth and see whether they can be of use.  
 
Firstly then, Hume tells us that blue and green resemble more than blue and 
scarlet. Leaving aside their simplicity for now (I will address that next), what 
he seems to appeal to here is not same content but something more like 
closeness of content. Some ideas are more alike than other ideas even if they 
are not exactly alike. Gamboa terms this inexact closeness “likeness.”257 
Seemingly, this likeness exists in virtue of some feel of qualitative closeness. 
A second case of this close but inexact resemblance (and indeed of 
resemblance as coming in degrees) can be found in Hume’s discussion of 
causal cases:  
 
It seems evident that, if all the scenes of nature were continually shifted in 
such a manner that no two events bore any resemblance to each other, but 
every object was entirely new, without any similitude to whatever had been 
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seen before, we should never, in that case, have attained the least idea of 
necessity, or of a connexion among these objects.258  
 
Here new cases bear a “similitude” to what has occurred before and are felt 
to be causal partly because they resemble prior cases judged to be causal. 
Each new case is different, so the resemblance is not exact. However, they 
are sufficiently close for us to feel them to be causal. In this causal case there 
is also an echo of the notion that resemblance comes in degrees. Just as blue 
might be more similar to green than to red, we can judge new causal cases to 
be more or less similar to other cases. What is more, the degree to which 
they seem similar to previous cases affects the strength of the causal 
judgement we are willing to make about them:  
 
Tho’ the several resembling instances, which give rise to the idea of power, 
have no influence on each other, and can never produce any new quality in 
the object, which can be the model of that idea, yet the observation of this 
resemblance produces a new impression in the mind, which is its real model. 
For after we have observ’d the resemblance in a sufficient number of 
instances, we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from one 
object to its usual attendant, and to conceive it in a stronger light upon 
account of that relation. This determination is the only effect of the 
resemblance; and therefore must be the same with power or efficacy, whose 
idea is deriv’d from the resemblance.259 
 
This kind of resemblance does not require sameness of content, but it does 
seem to require closeness of content. Applied to the case of time we might 
worry that a similar difficulty emerges as did for the first intuitive 
characterisation of resemblance: in one sense, particular successive ideas are 
not even very like each other. The succession of flavours in a mouthful of 
food and the succession of sights as we watch a bird swoop past by do not 
just not share any content exactly, their content does not seem to be at all 
alike. In one sense they do seem to bear a likeness to each other, but this is 
not in respect of similar content, instead the likeness they bear to each other 
is structural, i.e. they are both successive. This brings me to the second kind 
of resemblance that Hume highlights in the passage from the Appendix: 
structural resemblance.  
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When Hume first introduces resemblance he speaks of qualities which are 
“common to a great many individuals.”260 Here resemblance appears to be 
grounded in shared properties. For any two things you care to choose, one 
reason we might feel the first to resemble the second is if there is some 
property P such that both perceptions have property P. So far, I have been 
focused on content and, because of the cross-modal resemblance required 
for time, have found difficulty in accounting for the resemblance successive 
cases bear to each other. However, for all their differences in content, it 
does seem that successive experiences do share a structural property: their 
successiveness. In the quotation above Hume highlights another case which 
seems of a similar sort: different simple perceptions resemble in respect of 
the structural property of being simple: they “resemble each other in their 
simplicity. And yet from their very nature, which excludes all composition, 
this circumstance, in which they resemble, is not distinguishable nor 
separable from the rest.” 
 
This structural resemblance seems to be a parallel of the kind of structural 
resemblance that successive perceptions bear to each other. If nothing else, 
this demonstrates that Hume was open to resemblance in virtue of structural 
properties and indeed counted it amongst the kinds of resemblances that we 
find in our experience. However, though this shows that Hume recognised 
such resemblances, this case does not yet seem to provide a route out of the 
challenges faced by the idea of time. Firstly, it is not obvious from the 
quotation whether Hume thinks this resemblance is something that we 
become aware of through deliberate consideration (as with the philosophical 
relations) or whether it is a kind of resemblance that we naturally come to 
and can reflectively associate in terms of. The case of simplicity seems to 
exhibit at least some of the elusiveness found in the case of successions and 
so if we do not have reason to think we would simply feel a resemblance in 
this case it does not seem it brings us any closer to imagining we would feel 
a resemblance in the case of successions. As in the case of successions then, 
Hume tells us that this resemblance is one we can form an idea of, and that 
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this idea grants us the abstract idea of simplicity, but he does not tell us any 
more about how this occurs.  
 
A second difficulty is that the case of simplicity given here is not explicitly 
cross-modal. Given Hume’s simple/complex distinction (which does not 
limit itself to any one sense-modality) and the apparent openness of the 
phrase “all simple ideas”, I am inclined to say that the abstract idea of 
simplicity is one that applies across sense-modalities. But it is not stated here 
and the example given immediately above is limited to the visual case of 
simple coloured perceptions. Even if the resemblance involved were of the 
natural sort then, we might feel a slight hesitation in carrying our findings 
over to the case of time.  
 
 
7.3. Resemblance and Experiential Feel 
From these cases we can see how varied Humean resemblance can be. 
Equally it is of interest that there is precedent for the kind of resemblance in 
virtue of structural properties that seems to hold in the case of successions. 
However, I am not yet convinced that the kinds of resemblance explored 
above help us face the challenges set out. The resemblance that different 
successive ideas bear to each other is still elusive and the structural 
resemblances considered do not obviously provoke the requisite 
resemblance-association. Equally, the fact that the resemblance we are 
interested in cuts across different sense-modalities means that the other 
kinds of resemblance discussed above (which we might think were more 
noticeable or striking and so perhaps more accessible in provoking 
association) are ruled out from coming into play. In what follows I will 
explore one further sense of resemblance that Hume discusses. It is a kind 
of resemblance felt between ideas which are conceived by a similar “act or 
operation of the mind” which, in turn, appears to be linked to a similarity in 
what we might call “experiential feel.” This kind of sameness of feel is to a 
greater degree than the other kinds of resemblance independent of whether 
the ideas related actually have similar content. This is the kind of 
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resemblance that I suggest is best suited to explaining the resemblances 
involved in the formation of the idea of time.  
 
The case of resemblance-association I am going to focus on is one that is 
very different to the cases given above. Previously, each of the resemblances 
were founded on the content of the ideas and their properties, and what 
mattered was the content of the ideas. The final type of resemblance I will 
consider differs to this. It is not founded on the content of the ideas directly, 
but instead on how it feels to have certain ideas. More specifically, this kind 
of resemblance is a resemblance that is grounded in the states the mind is in 
when conceiving certain ideas and the experiential feel of these states. Often 
it will be that the act of the mind and the feel of having two different ideas is 
similar because the ideas themselves resemble. However, this is not always 
the case.  
 
To make this notion clearer consider an intuitive example of experiential 
feel: if we are sighted then when we open our eyes in a sufficiently well-lit 
environment we receive visual impressions. Depending on what we are 
looking at these impressions will vary enormously. We experience 
innumerable different colours, differences in brightness, intensity, etc. In 
spite of these differences though it is natural to think that all our experiences 
of visual impressions nevertheless bear a kind of resemblance to each other. 
Part of this resemblance seems to be explained in terms of their content, for 
example, all visual experiences have some colour. However, part of the 
similarity also seems to lie in how it feels to experience visual impressions. 
This may be linked to the body in that all visual impressions at least seem 
connected to our using our eyes. There seems a further kind of intuitive 
resemblance between visual impressions though and this perhaps extends 
also to visual perceptions that include ideas of visual impressions (where we 
do not use our eyes), there is a sense of what it is like to visually experience 
something, of how it feels to have a visual experience. A similar kind of 
resemblance seems to be shared by experiences of impressions had by the 
other senses. Experiencing a smell feels different to experiencing a taste, 
hearing a sound feels different to feeling a touch. In spite of differences in 
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content, intuitively we can note a sense or awareness of what it is like to have 
certain experiences. The similarity in feel will often be grounded in certain 
features of the things experienced (though not, Hume seems to think, always 
– of which more in a moment). This idea of similarity in feel is the kind of 
resemblance that I suggest Hume is broadly invoking here.  
 
The reason I point to the fact that this resemblance in experiential feel does 
not need to be matched by a genuine sameness in the content of the ideas is 
that Hume’s discussion of this kind of resemblance is centred on this feature 
and, more specifically, a kind of mistake we are inclined to make when 
different ideas bear a resemblance in experiential feel to each other. 
Specifically, his discussion highlights that, in some cases, a sameness of 
experiential feel encourages us to associate as resembling, and so take to be 
similar, ideas which are actually quite different. To begin then I will explore a 
bit more fully what Hume says about this kind of resemblance and the cases 
he discusses it in relation to. These get their fullest exploration in his 
discussion of the ideas we form of enduring objects and of an enduring 
external world that exists beyond our interrupted perceptions.  
 
Firstly, Hume notes that our perceptions of the external world are partial 
and interrupted. Every time I blink the impression I receive of the scene 
before my eyes is numerically distinct from the impression I had a moment 
ago. However, even though I will form many distinct ideas from one 
apparently still scene, I am strongly inclined to view the multitude of ideas as 
one, not many. Resemblance is responsible for this, but it comes in to the 
picture in two ways. On the one hand, there is the kind of resemblance we 
are familiar with, for any two of these distinct ideas, they near-exactly 
resemble in their content so I associate them in thought. However, Hume 
tells us that resemblance also enters the picture in a second way because “it 
not only causes an association of ideas, but also of dispositions, and makes 
us conceive the one idea by an act or operation of the mind, similar to that 
by which we conceive the other.”261 Since “whatever ideas place the mind in 
the same disposition or in similar ones, are very apt to be confounded,” this 
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results in our coming to think of the multitude of distinct but resembling 
perceptions as being one, not many.262 How exactly this occurs is worth 
looking at in more depth.  
 
Hume tells us that in this case that the succession of related (in this case 
strongly resembling) perceptions becomes confused with a single idea of an 
unchanging object because both are conceived “by an act or operation of the 
mind, similar to that by which we conceive the other.” The act or operation 
involved in having the one idea resembles the act, operation or disposition 
of the mind in having the other, and this results in our feeling a sense of 
similarity between the two actually different cases and, in this case, to take 
certain qualities of one to apply to the other. As an example of the first idea, 
that is, a single idea of an unchanging object, Hume gives this case:  
 
When we fix our thought on any object, and suppose it to continue the same 
for some time; ’tis evident we suppose the change to lie only in the time, and 
never exert ourselves to produce any new image or idea of the object. The 
faculties of the mind repose themselves in a manner, and take no more 
exercise, than what is necessary to continue that idea, of which we were 
formerly possest, and which subsists without variation or interruption. The 
passage from one moment to another is scarce felt, and distinguishes not 
itself by a different perception or idea, which may require a different direction 
of the spirits, in order to its conception.263 
 
When we think of an unchanging object we allow our mind to “repose.” 
Other perceptions may change alongside our thought of that object but the 
perception of the object itself “subsists without variation or interruption.” 
Though the moments of experience continue to pass (because we still 
undergo other changes in our perceptual experience) this is “scarce felt” and, 
at least as regards our perception of the object we are focused on, we allow 
an apparently temporally simple yet enduring perception to persist and do 
the job of representing that object in thought.  
 
Now to the second example, an idea of a strongly related succession. This 
idea is a complex one, it is successive and is in fact many numerically distinct 
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ideas. However, these distinct ideas are united by association so as to be 
strongly connected in thought: 
 
Now what other objects, beside identical ones, are capable of placing the 
mind in the same disposition, when it considers them, and of causing the 
same uninterrupted passage of the imagination from one idea to another? 
[…] I immediately reply, that a succession of related objects places the mind 
in this disposition, and is consider’d with the same smooth and uninterrupted 
progress of the imagination, as attends the view of the same invariable object. 
The very nature and essence of relation is to connect our ideas with each 
other, and upon the appearance of one, to facilitate the transition to its 
correlative. The passage betwixt related ideas is, therefore, so smooth and 
easy, that it produces little alteration on the mind, and seems like the 
continuation of the same action; and as the continuation of the same action is 
an effect of the continu’d view of the same object, ’tis for this reason we 
attribute sameness to every succession of related objects. The thought slides 
along the succession with equal facility, as if it consider’d only one object; and 
therefore confounds the succession with the identity.264  
 
In this particular case, it is the resemblance between the numerically distinct 
ideas that bind them into a strongly connected succession and results in the 
easy transition between different ideas in thought. However, the other kind 
of resemblance is key: it is the feel of the easy transition between ideas that 
resembles the feeling of experiencing one single, unchanging idea. Although 
content resemblance is involved in the picture then, it is not what the 
confusion relies on. When we feel a similarity between our experience of one 
unchanging idea and our experience of many closely-connected ideas, how it 
feels to have them matters. What results in our confusing the two different 
ideas – and they are different, for one is single and temporally simple and the 
other is temporally complex and, in truth, a succession – is that the sameness 
of experiential feel. Because of contingent features of human cognition, 
these two different ideas strongly resemble in terms of how it feels to think 
them. And this resemblance results in our confusing the one for the other. 
In this case, we confuse the case of a succession of distinct views for the 
case of the constant and uninterrupted perception and come to think of our 
interrupted experience of the world as being more constant than it actually 
is. And this, Hume is clear, is a confusion grounded in the similarity of the 
disposition of the mind that the different states put us in:   
                                                 




An easy transition or passage of the imagination, along the ideas of these 
different and interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind 
with that in which we consider one constant and uninterrupted perception. 
’Tis therefore very natural for us to mistake the one for the other.265  
 
The disposition of the mind in this case seems to be related to the kind of 
effort or action that the mind is required to take in conceiving the different 
ideas. In the first case we experience a perception and, it being unchanging, 
the mind is not required to put in any extra effort in order to continue 
experiencing that perception, the result is that the mind does not “exert” 
itself any further. In the second case, though what is being conceived is in 
fact many distinct ideas, the mind is still not required to put in noticeable 
effort in order to think the succession. Instead, because the ideas are so 
strongly connected, the mind “like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries 
on its course without any new impulse.”266 In both cases the experiential feel 
of having the ideas is similar because the mind is not required to put in extra 
effort. However, the reason for this differs between the cases. For Hume 
what this shows is that two kinds of resemblance play an important role in 
the conflation of these two different cases, and they are quite different:  
 
[T]here are two relations, and both of them resemblances, which contribute 
to our mistaking the succession of our interrupted perceptions for an 
identical object. The first is, the resemblance of the perceptions: The second 
is the resemblance, which the act of the mind in surveying a succession of 
resembling objects bears to that in surveying an identical object. Now these 
resemblances we are apt to confound with each other.267 
 
We feel a resemblance not only when two ideas (simple or complex) exhibit 
sameness of content or properties. We are also naturally inclined to feel a 
resemblance between ideas which are conceived by similar enough feeling 
mental acts. This second kind of resemblance appears to contribute as much 
as the first to the association and conflation of the ideas as it too provokes 
us to feel the two ideas to be similar.  
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I suggest then, that Hume recognised a further kind of resemblance to the 
ones discussed above, and that this kind of resemblance can induce 
association between ideas. From here, I will argue that this kind of 
resemblance is the most plausible candidate in accounting for the 
resemblances that matter in our forming the general idea of time. Two 
preliminary points are worth noting though: firstly, there is a necessary sense 
of speculation to the investigation from here on in. Hume only tells us that 
resemblance induces the requisite associations in the case of time, he does 
not tell us how. My aim then is only to show that Hume has the resources 
available to explain this idea and, by so doing, to meet the critical challenge. 
Adopting this approach also offers some rewards both interpretively and 
critically (of which more later). What follows is speculative then; but, to 
those interested in assessing Hume’s account for circularity, such speculation 
can be fruitful.  
 
Secondly, what follows is aimed only at the general idea of time (though it 
might generalise well to the idea of space as well). Some of the unsatisfied 
commentators above argued Hume’s account of all general ideas resulted in 
circularity. If this approach and recognising this kind of resemblance bears 
upon the idea of time it is possible that it bears upon some other general 
ideas. However, though addressing this question would be an interesting 
challenge, it is beyond the bounds of this project.  
 
 
7.4. Resemblance and the Idea of Time 
In order to offer a more general characterisation of this kind of resemblance 
and the association it provokes, it is necessary to set aside for the moment 
the specifics of the case Hume gives and look to the general features which 
are responsible for the feel of resemblance. In this case it seems that the 
perceived resemblance is grounded in the fact that some ideas, though 
different, put the mind into similar states. When the act of the mind in 
surveying one idea is sufficiently close to the act of the mind in surveying 
another, we feel a resemblance between those ideas. In the excerpts above, 
Hume explained the “act” or “disposition” of the mind sometimes in terms 
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of what the mind was required to do: for example, the faculties of the mind 
“repose themselves in a manner, and take no more exercise, than what is 
necessary to continue that idea,” the mind does not further “exert” itself. 
What the mind does, though, is connected to what effect certain ideas have 
on the mind and so at other times the state of mind is talked about in a 
slightly more passive sense: a succession of strongly connected ideas 
produces “little alteration on the mind, and seems like the continuation of 
the same action.” One feature of the related ideas that matter for this kind of 
resemblance-association then are the features that determine what the mind 
is required to do in order to have the ideas, for example, whether or not it is 
required to put in certain kinds of effort, say whether it is required to change 
objects or produce new perceptions.   
 
From this we can also get a sense of the sorts of features of us as cognisers 
that encourage this feel of resemblance. It matters that ideas which require 
similar acts of the mind and effort to conceive feel similar to us. What the 
mind does in having certain thoughts and, as a result, how it feels to have 
certain ideas matters when it comes to this kind of resemblance. And note 
that, in the case above, the similarity we feel between ideas is not that we feel 
them to be the same idea in terms of content, but that we feel them to be 
the same kind of idea in terms of structure. We feel that a number of ideas 
are like a single idea. Take the single idea that results from my staring at my 
desk and the multitude of ideas that result from a number of distinct views 
of the plant on the windowsill as I occasionally glance outside: the 
resemblance between the distinct impressions of the plant results in a 
number of distinct but strongly resembling ideas. The strong resemblance 
between these ideas binds them together in my thought. When I experience 
the single idea of the desk and the numerous but tightly associated ideas of 
the plant, I feel the two experiences to be the same in some sense. This does 
not mean I confuse the content, taking the plant for the desk, it means that I 
feel their different structures to be the same. One is a complex of many 
ideas, the other is a single idea. However, in this case, I take the number of 




Here I will argue that we can appeal to this resemblance of mental act or 
operation and its corresponding experiential feel in explaining the formation 
of the idea of time. It should be said, Waxman briefly discusses a role for 
this kind of resemblance in the ideas of time and space in his defence of 
Hume’s arguments against infinite divisibility.268 However, although 
highlighting some advantages this approach offers (which I will discuss in 
turn), Waxman’s treatment is somewhat cursory (which is understandable 
given the much broader aim of his discussion); he does not draw out the 
details of such an approach, nor does he give it a full defence. In what 
follows I offer a fuller treatment and expansion of what this idea involves 
and argue that it has the capacity to resolve the challenges set out in the 
previous chapter.  
 
The claim will be that ideas of particular times, in spite of great qualitative 
variation, require a resembling act or operation of the mind in order to be 
thought and, as a result, exhibit a similar experiential feel. Here the fact that 
it is possible to isolate a contrast class of ideas which stand in opposition to 
successive, temporally complex ideas becomes crucial. Firstly then, we might 
ask what does the mind have to do in order to think a temporally complex 
idea? In the above Hume noted that in the case of having a single, 
unchanging idea, or in the case of having a number of ideas which were 
tightly bound by association, the mind did not have to do very much at all. 
In both cases there is a kind of initial effort in producing the initial 
perception and from there it did not need to further exert itself. In the first 
case this is because there were no further perceptions required to be 
produced, the mind merely needed to continue the perception it was having. 
In the second case, this was because, although the mind is actually having 
many distinct perceptions, the work of producing new ones was being done 
imperceptibly by the connectedness of the perceptions with each 
introducing the next and no more mental effort being required.   
 
                                                 
268 Waxman (1996), see pp. 135-6 and, for a discussion of some advantages of this, pp.138-
9. He also notes this kind of resemblance in his 1994 work, though not in relation to the 
ideas of time and space. There it is discussed as a phenomena (see pp. 49-50) and in relation 
to personal and bodily identity (see pp. 209-10, pp. 233-5, and p. 254 especially).  
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Turning now to the case of the act or operation in the mind whilst having a 
temporally complex idea, say, an idea of some particular succession, I 
suggest the mind is in a sort of halfway state between having unconnected 
ideas and having powerfully connected ones. In any temporally complex idea 
there must be change or succession. This is the manner of appearance that is 
at the heart of the idea of time for Hume: “the idea of duration is always 
deriv’d from a succession of changeable objects, and can never be convey’d 
to the mind by any thing stedfast and unchangeable.”269 So any temporally 
complex idea requires change and, for this reason, requires minimally that 
the mind experience altering perceptions. This need not require much by 
way of mental activity though: think about a temporally complex idea of 
some cause-effect pair. The mind might be compelled from the first idea to 
the second whether the thinker wants to think the second idea or not, hence 
“if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain 
which follows it”270 We may not want to reflect on this pain, but we are 
unable to resist it. Such a change may not require much mental effort, 
however, it will require a perceivable change in perceptions. Whether active 
or passive, any idea of temporal complexity will be an idea of perceptible 
change and any idea like this will stand in contrast to ideas of single, 
unchanging perceptions (and, as the case above shows, complex ideas of 
very closely resembling perceptions).  
 
Temporally complex ideas must exhibit change then; however, their 
moments are not entirely disconnected. As argued in chapter 5 and 
discussed again in chapter 6, temporally complex ideas seem to involve and 
require a degree of associative binding in order that they be ideas of the 
temporally complex rather than unconnected simples. To remind, the worry 
was that any temporally complex idea I have seems to instantiate itself as a 
succession of temporally simple moments. In order that these moments 
appear as part of a succession and so as part of something temporally 
complex they need to be bound together by the principles of association. 
Each case will differ but this binding will typically involve several of these 
principles. Temporal contiguity will play a role in all, and spatial contiguity, 
                                                 
269 T 1.2.3.11; SBN 37.   
270 EHU 3.3; SBN 23.     
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causation, and resemblance come in to different successive ideas to a greater 
or lesser degree. However, though resemblance can connect the moments of 
a succession it cannot be the kind of indistinguishably close resemblance 
that occurred in the case above, for any temporally complex idea will be 
perceivably changing. Temporally complex ideas will not consist of unbound 
elements then, but equally they will not be capable of passing in an 
imperceptible sequence, as in the case Hume considers above. This is ruled 
out by the requirement that they exhibit change. In this they will again stand 
in contrast to both simple ideas and collections of exactly resembling ideas.  
 
Temporally complex ideas then do seem to have a distinct kind of act or 
operation that they require of the mind for they have a distinct manner of 
appearance. The mind may be more or less passive in the changes that 
occur, but there must be perceptible change. If the mind feels a sense of 
similarity in the experiential feel of unchanging ideas (as Hume states above 
it, at least sometimes, does), it seems equally plausible to think it feels a 
sense of similarity in the experiential feel of changing ideas. If it is plausible 
in the one case, and Hume seems committed to this, is seems just as 
plausible in the other case. This similarity in feel is, I suggest, the 
resemblance that grounds the formation of the general idea of time. 
Temporally complex ideas have their own distinct manner of appearance 
and their particular nature dictates something of the disposition of the mind 
in having them. This particular manner of appearance has a kind of 
experiential feel and it is noting the similarity in how it feels to conceive 
these ideas that allows for the formation of the idea of time.  
 
 
7.5. Some Merits of this Approach  
Although Hume’s discussion of the resemblance that holds in the case of the 
ideas of space and time is not elaborated on enough for this offering to be 
much more than speculative, there are some advantages that tell in favour of 
using it to make sense of the resemblances involved in the formation of the 
idea of time. Firstly, this kind of resemblance would seem to allow us a 
powerful way of explaining how otherwise very disparate ideas could be felt 
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to resemble in spite of the property they have in common (their 
successiveness) being somewhat elusive. That a resemblance is elusive does 
not seem to bear upon whether or not ideas which exhibit it have a certain 
kind of experiential feel. Equally, and very importantly given the charge of 
circularity, feeling this kind of resemblance does not require any prior 
understanding of what you are experiencing, nor does it require any degree 
of reflection. It occurs as a result of the principles of association. If this is 
the sort of resemblance involved in moving from ideas of particular times to 
a general idea of time then it seems there is no need to accuse Hume of any 
circularity. Recognising this kind of resemblance does not require one 
already have an idea of time, or of the features relevant to time, it only 
requires that one be an associative creature who reacts to certain stimuli in 
certain kinds of ways. And Hume seems committed to humans being just 
that.  
 
Secondly, a huge advantage of this kind of resemblance is that there seems 
to be no barrier whatsoever to our feeling cross-modal resemblances. 
Whether two ideas are derived from the same sense-modality or different 
ones, the similarity in experiential feel stays just the same for it locks onto 
the aspect of the ideas which are instantiated by all: their successive manner 
of appearance. This kind of resemblance does not require sameness of 
content or even closeness of content. It requires only change and our 
temporally complex ideas all exhibit that.  
 
Thirdly, and as noted by Waxman, this kind of resemblance grants us a neat 
way of explaining why Humean resemblance differed to Berkelean 
resemblance in spite of their otherwise very similar approaches to general 
ideas.271 Furthermore, the way that their accounts of resemblance differ in 
light of this explains exactly why Hume, but not Berkeley, took there to be 
an acceptable form of cross-modal resemblance. For Hume, there is a kind 
of resemblance that depends on experiential feel rather than the content of 
the ideas themselves and so Humean resemblance does not always require 
sameness or similarity in the content of the ideas. For Berkeley, on the other 
                                                 
271 For discussion of this see Waxman (1996) pp. 138-9.  
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hand, the absence of anything like qualitative similarity between ideas of 
visible space and ideas of tangible space meant there could be no 
resemblance between them. Instead, he explains why we imagine them to 
resemble by appeal to experience and custom:    
  
That which I see is only variety of light and colours. That which I feel is hard 
or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth. What similarity, what connexion have 
those ideas with these? Or how is it possible that anyone should see reason to 
give one and the same name to combinations of ideas so very different before 
he had experienced their coexistence? We do not find there is any necessary 
connexion betwixt this or that tangible quality and any colour whatsoever. 
And we may sometimes perceive colours where there is nothing to be felt. All 
which doth make it manifest that no man, at first receiving of his sight, would 
know there was any agreement between this or that particular object of his 
sight and any object of touch he had already been acquainted with… [T]here 
is no discoverable necessary connexion between any given visible magnitude 
and any particular tangible magnitude; but…it is entirely the result of custom 
and experience, and depends on foreign and accidental circumstances that we 
can by the perception of visible extension inform ourselves what may be the 
extension of any tangible object connected with it.272 
 
With the focus in at least some cases being on what it is like to have an idea, 
rather than the intrinsic features of the idea itself, there seems no bar to this 
resemblance holding between ideas of different sense-modalities so long as 
the act or operation of the mind is sufficiently close and, for successive ideas 
just as for the unchanging ideas Hume discusses, it seems plausible that this 
is the case. Appealing to Hume’s recognition of this kind of resemblance 
and applying it to this case then allows us to explain why their different 
views on resemblance resulted in different views on the resemblances 
relevant to space.  
 
In sum, though the textual under-determination means this approach can 
only ever be something of a reconstruction rather than an interpretation, if 
we do adopt this route we find a way by which we can explain the 
resemblances Hume was committed to, by appeal to a process that could 
plausibly generate them, and by employing only tools he himself employed. 
The kind of resemblance is a kind that he recognised and saw to be 
potentially influential. Though he did not appeal to it as a unifying force in 
                                                 
272 Berkeley (1948), Theory of Vision, sections 103-4.  
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the idea of succession, he did use it to explain the association of the ideas 
which effectively form the contrast class to the successive. On the whole I 
would argue that, in spite of the speculative nature of this, we have reason to 
think this kind of resemblance a could be a helpful tool in understanding 
Hume’s account of the general idea of time.  
 
The merits of appealing to this kind of resemblance make it a tempting 
route: it allows us to explain how we might feel a resemblance between 
otherwise disparate ideas and across sense-modalities. It also, I suggest, 
offers a satisfying response to the challenge of circularity and presupposition 
in that we do not need to presuppose possession of a prior idea in order to 
explain how we come to feel these resemblances. Given the textual evidence 
that Hume thought this sort of resemblances could provoke association in 
different but comparable cases, we might reasonably expect it to do so here 
as well. We may, at a later time, come to reflect on these experiences and 
form a more conscious understanding of their similarities, perhaps in virtue 
of a recognition of the structural resemblances the related experiences bear 
to each other, but we do not need to do this in order to form the idea itself.  
 
Once again then, the picture that emerges is one on which the mind does a 
great deal of work pre-reflectively and prior to the possession of the idea of 
time. The principles of association both allow us the means to feel a 
resemblance and the tools to associate in virtue of this feel. The idea of time 
at this general level is highly reliant on the mind for its formation, just as we 
might think all general ideas are, for they all equally require association for 
their functioning. At both stages of the formation of the idea of time then, 
the ideas formed are heavily reliant on the mind and in particular, the 
principles of association. Without the appropriate stimulation in terms of the 
properties of experience we could not form these ideas. However, were we 
not the kinds of creatures that we are, with the associative dispositions we 
have, we would be equally incapable. Here we find a great deal of the 
complex interplay between us and the world as we experience it. That this is 
so is hardly a surprising conclusion to draw from Hume’s work, but the case 
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of the idea of time does seem to offer a striking view of exactly how deep 



































8. Conclusion  
 
8.1. Summary of Arguments   
In summarising my conclusions it will once again be helpful to remind 
ourselves of the two-part system Hume proposes as summarised at T 1.2.4.  
 
Our system concerning space and time consists of two parts, which are 
intimately connected together. The first depends on this chain of reasoning. 
The capacity of the mind is not infinite; consequently no idea of extension or 
duration consists of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas, but of a 
finite number, and these simple and indivisible: ’Tis therefore possible for 
space and time to exist conformable to this idea: And if it be possible, ’tis 
certain they actually do exist conformable to it; since their infinite divisibility 
is utterly impossible and contradictory.   
 
The other part of our system is a consequence of this. The parts, into which 
the ideas of space and time resolve themselves, become at last indivisible; and 
these indivisible parts, being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable when 
not fill’d with something real and existent. The ideas of space and time are 
therefore no separate or distinct ideas, but merely those of the manner or 
order, in which objects exist: Or, in other words, ’tis impossible to conceive 
either a vacuum and extension without matter, or a time, when there was no 
succession or change in any real existence.273 
 
The first part of Hume’s system tells us that our ideas provide a coherent 
model for the spatio-temporal structure of the world in terms of a 
foundation of simple indivisibles. We find we have a consistent model for 
space and time conceived in this way and, through his negative arguments 
against infinite divisibility, Hume suggests the same cannot be said for 
infinitely divisible space and time. Since we know the first model to be 
consistent and conceivable, Hume would say we know it to be possible, for: 
“whatever we can conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense.”274 
Since he judges the alternative not to be possible, he concludes that that 
space and time themselves actually do conform to this finitely divisible 
model. I have suggested that there is a degree of conditionality that is 
inherent in his analysis: I read him as suggesting that if there exists anything 
which can be appropriately called spatial or temporal, then it must be 
                                                 
273 T 1.2.4.2; SBN 39-40.  
274 T Abstract 11; SBN 650.  
201 
 
structured in his way. Although Hume does not highlight this conditional 
element in his summary here, I have argued it is a natural result of his 
methodology, and rules that seem to govern when and how our ideas can be 
called adequate representations. This is a point I will discuss in more depth 
below.  
 
I focused my discussion first on the negative arguments against infinite 
divisibility and then on the positive proposal and its adequacy. My aims were 
to address both the interpretive questions regarding the workings of the 
argument and the nature of Hume’s solution, and to critically evaluate the 
account that emerged. The way I sought to do this was primarily to reassess 
the methodology Hume is employing in T 1.2.1. I argued his approach here 
was to use the only tools available to us: our ideas, and that, as above, the 
broad nature of the argument was conditional, that is, aimed at delineating 
the spatio-temporal structure of the world should it be such as to conform 
to our ideas of space and time at all (and so, should it be such as to be 
appropriately called spatial or temporal).  
 
One of the big questions I was concerned to address in my examination of 
the negative arguments was why the coexistence of moments was viewed as 
contradictory. On this I argued that this is best understood by thinking 
about his concept of time. Specifically, that in order for something to be 
appropriately called temporal it must exhibit change. In spite of appealing to 
features of the concept of time which are set out only after these arguments 
as a way of illuminating this, I suggested that both the concept of time and 
the nature of moments relied upon here get their deeper motivation and 
explanation by considering commitments that emerge in T 1.1. In particular, 
his rejection of abstraction by separation means time and moments require 
existing things, and changes in what exists. Recognising this allows us to 
explain both the contradictory nature of coexisting moments appealed to in 
the third argument, and the underlying commitment to aggregation in the 
first argument. I was especially keen to highlight through this that the 
distinctness of moments is important, but also derivative. We do not need to 
appeal to distinct moments which exist prior to the whole in order to explain 
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Hume’s arguments. The distinctness of moments is parasitic upon what I 
called their intrinsic features, essentially, the features of the existing things 
which exhaustively characterise them. In virtue of this, we can explain 
Hume’s arguments merely by appeal to a propertied whole. This is of crucial 
importance for it is what means he does not simply beg the question against 
either the infinite divisibility theorist or those who espouse potential parts.   
 
In chapter 3 we saw a further way in which the intrinsic properties of 
moments came into play: I explored two challenges that arise for moments 
conceived as components of durations given that they are both simple, and 
ontologically fundamental. Hume’s solutions to these problems initially 
seemed somewhat inadequate. He focused on intrinsic properties and yet it 
seemed that the problem was one of extrinsic relation; it was not clear how 
these intrinsic properties could possibly address the problems on the table. I 
suggested that we could, just as we did in chapter 2, make more sense of this 
by appeal to the simplicity of moments and their intrinsic features (alongside 
an understanding of the concept of time and what it requires). I argued that 
the simplicity of moments alongside their necessarily contrasting intrinsic 
features dictated both that any temporal manifold must be discrete and that 
the moments of this manifold cannot coexist. From this, I contend that 
simple moments are perfectly capable of playing the role that Hume requires 
of them.  
 
Considering this first part of Hume’s system, I suggest we can draw out a 
few points of note: firstly, both the structure of the whole section (set out as 
it is in terms of conceivability to possibility, and consistent models illustrated 
by our ideas), and the workings of each individual argument, rely heavily on 
the use of ideas as models. This we should expect given the methodology he 
proposed in T 1.2.1. Limited though this methodology is, it does provides 
adequate grounding for his investigation, and it requires only tools that we 
have available to us: our ideas. Secondly, what drives his arguments forward 
in this first part are, more than anything else, the commitments of T 1.1. and 
the constraints these basic principles place on the concept of time and the 
possible nature of a temporal world. Time requires not only existing things, 
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but also difference in what exists. These existing things provide the intrinsic 
content for any moment, and the change that grounds the existence of any 
duration. This is the third point that seems especially worthy of note: that 
what emerges is an interesting interplay between the intrinsic features of 
moments and their extrinsic relations. By appeal to moments having a 
certain intrinsic nature certain things must be true regarding how moments 
can exist in relation to each other. This complex interplay between intrinsic 
features and extrinsic relations is exactly what is not captured by any 
interpretation which concentrates only on distinctness of moments at the 
expense of considering their internal nature. Equally, any such interpretation 
will seem to neglect Hume’s own response to these problems. He clearly 
thinks intrinsic features are important, on this reading we can see one reason 
why this might be.    
  
The second part of Hume’s system aims to make sense of what our ideas of 
time and space are in light of their finite divisibility. It is important to note 
that, when Hume tells us the second part of his system is a consequence of 
the first he limits the antecedent to only the first part of the first part of the 
system. That is, to the arguments against the infinite divisibility of our ideas 
offered in T 1.2.1. rather than the arguments against the infinite divisibility 
of time itself as set out in T 1.2.2. (“The parts, into which the ideas of space 
and time resolve themselves, become at last indivisible; and these indivisible 
parts, being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable when not fill’d with 
something real and existent.”) As such, although the first part of the system 
really does seem to draw a distinction between our ideas of time and space 
and the implications of this for time and space themselves (hence “’Tis 
therefore possible for space and time to exist conformable to this idea: And 
if it be possible, ’tis certain they actually do exist conformable to it”), the 
implications of the first part of the system that bear upon the second 
concern the ideas we form of time and space, rather than time and space 
themselves. Having reduced the ideas of parts and moments to something 
utterly simple and indivisible, Hume must make sense of how these can 
nevertheless convey the ideas of time and space to us, and what the content 
of the ideas conveyed are. In my discussion of the second part of his system 
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I considered a number of challenges that presented themselves, both 
interpretive and critical, to the two-step process of forming the idea of time.  
 
In chapter 4 I presented a challenge to the act of forming ideas of particular 
times which arose as a result of the successive nature of our experience. I 
considered several routes to forming ideas of particular times from 
temporally simple experiences and argued they could explain this process 
without circularity: they all required us to interpret as temporally complex 
content which was, in truth, temporally simple. This, I suggest, we are in no 
position to do prior to forming (at the least) these most basic ideas of time. 
By showing the inadequacy of these approaches I aimed to lend indirect 
support to approaches which reinterpret the nature of the Copy Principle in 
other terms.   
 
In chapter 5 I considered two such approaches: on the first, the role of the 
mind is significant (and recognised), on the second, the role of the mind is 
presented as being reduced. I posed some problems for this second route 
with an eye to showing that a more pronounced role for the mind in the 
formation of these ideas is unavoidable. I argued that, whichever attitude we 
take towards the Copy Principle, we must accept that Hume’s idea of even 
particular times requires a considerable degree of mental activity. These ideas 
can be formed without circularity, however, they cannot be explained 
without the mind. To stress the role of the mind and, in particular the 
principles of association, in Hume’s work is in a sense nothing new. 
However, to see that these ideas require such a degree of involvement is 
interesting. More interestingly still is that this level of involvement does not 
require supposing that these ideas are not in some important sense derived 
from experience; I argued there is no problem of circularity, nor must we 
suppose them innate. In spite of this broad derivation from experience 
though, ideas of particular times contain crucial elements which are 
contributed by the mind as a result of the kinds of cognisers that we are and 
how we are inclined to respond to certain kinds of stimuli. This is perhaps 




In chapters 6 and 7 I examined the importance of resemblance-association 
to the idea of time and the problems this generates. Even given the disparate 
and cross-modal nature of the associated ideas, I proposed Hume has the 
resources available to account for their resemblance, and, indeed, how we 
come to think of them as resembling. I contend that he can explain the 
formation of this elusive general idea without circularity then and, indeed, 
using only tools that he has already recognised. Once again though, it is only 
by accepting the increased role of the mind that this is possible for, at both 
stages in the formation of the idea of time, the mind plays a substantial role 
in its creation. The idea of time that comes to the fore is, in one sense, an 
imaginative construct in that, without the imagination and the connections 
afforded by the principles of association, we would have no such idea (nor 
would we have any general ideas, for they all rely on the principles of 
association for their creation). However, though created in this way, the idea 
of time is equally reliant on the properties of experience to provoke these 
reactions in us. The emerging idea is shaped by our natures and which 
properties we are sensitive to, but it is far from cut loose from experience.          
 
 
8.2. Emergent Themes 
I stated in the introduction that my methodology in writing this piece was, as 
far as is possible, to allow Hume’s commitments regarding time and our idea 
of it to come to the fore. By considering what he appears to be committed 
to regarding these topics we were in a position where we could then allow 
these commitments to reflect back upon other themes in his work in a way 
that might prove illuminating. In this section I will briefly consider two 
emerging themes: the nature of Hume’s empiricism and the role he requires 
of the mind, and the conditionality I noted above and the way that our ideas 
constrain the possible nature of the world if it is to be called temporal at all. 
 
 
8.2.1. Empiricism and the Role of the Mind 
In the epistemology chapters I argued that the idea of time was heavily 
reliant at every stage of its formation on the role of the mind: were we not 
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associative creatures we could not interpret impressional content as 
structured, or as connected, and so could not form ideas of particular times. 
Were we not associative creatures we could not feel the resemblances that 
ground the general idea. Equally, in the metaphysics the role of the mind is 
not absent: the nature of thought places a kind of constraint on our idea of 
time which, in turn, places a constraint on what kinds of things in the world 
can properly be called temporal. The role of the mind is heightened 
throughout Hume’s discussion of time and the picture that emerges is one 
on which our associative natures and way we as creatures respond to certain 
kinds of stimuli are paramount.  
 
At every step, then, the role of the mind is pronounced. Regarding the 
general idea of time this is perhaps less surprising, for Humean general ideas 
are explicitly stated to have their structure (the structure that allows them to 
play their roles) in virtue of patterns of association. Without the mind 
supplying links between the related particular ideas we would have no 
general idea for we would not have an idea that could represent generally. 
This is a consequence of the fact that it is not the content of a single idea 
that affords the general idea of time its generality. Its generality is grounded 
in the relations between our ideas. General ideas enable us to think about 
features beyond those of the particulars ideas involved because they enable 
us a means to bring to mind, or at least have available through a developed 
custom, ideas which can tell for or against the inclusion of new ideas in the 
resemblance class.  
 
That the role of the mind should be so pronounced even in our forming 
ideas of particular times is perhaps more surprising and yet, in chapter 5, we 
saw that such a consequence was hard to avoid. Our most basic ideas of 
succession are successive and, in order to be successive ideas of temporal 
complexity, they require a form of binding which is provided by the mind. 
Equally, impressional content, though complex, does not appear to be given 
as a complex. Even if we think that the mind is capable of copying 
complexes of things then, I suggested we must still see that the mind is 
required to make such a complex available to us. In evaluating the 
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implications of this increased role for the mind, some might already be 
worried. Appealing to ideas that are spread out in time (and perhaps even 
appealing to ideas that are spread out in space) seems to require the 
existence of an enduring mind to take them in and to do the essential 
relating. However, Hume’s explicit discussion of the mind contains a 
worrying note of scepticism regarding its existence, or at least regarding our 
knowledge of its existence. This might be thought to be dangerously in 
tension with the proposals I make here. Personally, I am inclined to read 
Hume’s comments regarding the mind as placing only an epistemic 
challenge, rather than an ontological one; I see them as a nod to the essential 
unknowability of the perceiver and an avocation of caution in ascribing 
properties and roles to something beyond our experience in this way. 
However, we might take Hume’s claim to be a deeper one: that there really is 
no mind to play any role. On either interpretation, there seems there could 
be a tension with any account on which the mind was highly involved and 
active.  
 
One possible line of response to this is to go the way that Stroud considers: 
that we can simply translate talk of a mind into talk of the patterns exhibited 
in perceptions: “For me to think, to feel, to reflect, to attribute identity to 
something – in short, for me to perform any of these ‘mental acts’ – is just 
for certain perceptions to occur in my mind. The mind’s ‘activity’ consists in 
nothing more than the occurrence of perceptions in it.” So we translate the 
claim that the mind forms a certain idea after being presented with certain 
stimuli into the claim that after certain perceptions occur (whichever ones 
constitute the stimuli in this case), other perceptions tend to occur 
(whichever ones constitute the idea).275 Here all that is appealed to are 
perceptions and what is highlighted is that a simple pattern, as a matter of 
fact, emerges. If we go down this route it seems we can translate talk of the 
mind into talk of the patterns of occurrence amongst perceptions. If one is 
squeamish about allowing for talk of the mind in Hume’s work, this line of 
response does seem to be available.  
 
                                                 
275 Stroud (1977), see especially pp. 129-131, and pp. 134-136.  
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Personally, I am not so squeamish in this regard. As I said above, I take 
Hume’s caution regarding the mind to be an appeal to an epistemic 
challenge rather than an ontological one. As such, I am happy enough to talk 
more loosely in terms of the role of the mind so long as we take care to infer 
about the mind only what is apparent from these patterns that emerge in our 
thought. We can then, I suggest, infer several things about the role of the 
mind and the way we as creatures are inclined to associate perceptions 
indirectly by examining carefully the ideas we find ourselves to have. And 
affording an increased role to the mind need only do this much. By 
proceeding in this way we can be sensitive to Hume’s advocated caution 
whilst still explaining, on some level, how we are capable of forming the 
ideas that we do.   
 
A second thing is perhaps worth highlight as well, specifically in relation to 
the account I have forwarded: although I posit an increased role for the 
mind, that role does not involve it doing work of any kind that it is not 
already recognised as doing by Hume. The principles of association are at 
work, as is our tendency to form distinguish what is different. However, 
these are not new roles for the mind. The basic nature and function of these 
mental activities remains entirely the same, I have only suggested we require 
their assistance in more places than we might have previously thought.  
 
In virtue of this role for the mind there is a core of subject-dependence that 
runs through our formation of the idea of time and, were we to remove this, 
the idea itself would be unachievable. This subjectivity might be seen as a 
threat to some: a step too far in making time an ideal phenomenon. 
However, we can also see, in particular from the results of chapters 6 and 7, 
that there are clear benefits to thinking of these ideas in this way. If 
association in virtue of perceived resemblance, for example, were not 
afforded this subjective element it has, it would face a great barrier to doing 





The principles of association are key then and, what is more, the idea of time 
demonstrates the substantial and interesting role played by resemblance-
association. Although, causation often seems to play the starring role in 
characterising our understanding of the world and the way we perceive it to 
be, when we consider the idea of time, causation plays a lesser role and 
resemblance does the lion’s share of the work. Resemblance, though, is 
arguably the most subjective, varied, and permissive of all the natural 
relations, provoked by a real variety of different circumstances. In chapter 7 
I looked at a few examples of resemblance in Hume and we saw it admits of 
several different triggering factors. A resemblance can strike us where we did 
not see it before in light of a change in our ideas, or even in changes in the 
relations between our ideas. As a philosophical relation, resemblance is 
ubiquitous and depends on the qualities of the ideas, but, as a natural, 
associative relation, resemblance can depend on everything from what ideas 
we have formed to how having certain ideas feels to the mind. Considering 
the idea of time allows resemblance to come to the fore as a really strange 
and interesting element in Hume’s work and one that would certainly benefit 
from greater consideration.  
 
Even in the case of resemblance though, features of our experience are not 
unimportant. The interplay between, on the one hand, us as creatures (the 
ways our minds work and the natural dispositions we have), and, on the 
other hand, the nature of experience and the properties it has becomes 
apparent. Natural associations relies on our responding in certain ways to 
certain kinds of stimulus: without the appropriate provocation from 
experience, we would not come to feel resemblances. Experience must 
exhibit the elements that are required to compel us towards forming such 
connections, however, the work of forming them is nonetheless reliant on 
us. We might have formed different ideas were we or the world different, 
however, in virtue of how we are and how experience is, we are contingently 
compelled towards thinking in certain kinds of ways. In this respect, a 
powerful dependence on experience remains important in Hume’s work and 
its features are, given what we are like, what press us one way rather than 
another. The kind of empiricism that emerges, then, is one that cannot be 
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captured by mere reference to something like the Copy Principle. 
Nevertheless something in the spirit of this principle remains core. The 
nature of his empiricism is clearly complex, however, his commitment to the 
idea of time does not have us floating entirely loose from the world of 
experience.    
 
 
8.2.2. Conditionality and the Relationship Between Ideas and 
the World 
In spite of our being strongly informed by experience and deeply reliant on 
it even given the influence of human psychology, there is a second way the 
mind and ideas constrain any world beyond them which is core: throughout 
Hume’s discussion, the idea of time itself places bounds upon what can be 
appropriately taken to be temporal. This does not tell us that the external 
world is some way and not others, it does not even tell us that there exists 
such a world. It seems that the world, should there be one, could still be any 
number of ways. However, what does seem to emerge is a constraint on 
how the world can be if it is appropriate to call it temporal at all. Here Hume 
limits what the world can be like if it is to instantiate the kind of structure 
that we can possibly call “temporal”: if, for example, the world is not 
successive, then it is not temporal. Or better, it is not temporal in any sense we 
can understand the idea. This, perhaps initially quite surprising, thread of 
conditionality and constraint runs right the way through Hume’s discussion 
of time and its results are interesting. However, the mind’s role in forming 
the idea of time perhaps allows us to make this conditionality a little clearer. 
  
We could ask: could the world be temporal in some sense beyond our 
understanding of what it is to be temporal? Hume’s answer, I suggest, must 
be: no. We have an idea of time that is derived from the particular nature of 
our experience and, I have suggested, very much the product of the kind of 
creatures that we are with our particular mental dispositions and habits. Our 
idea of time is a very human one. However, it is the only idea we have of 
time. To ask whether the world can be temporal in a way that does not fit 
with this is not to ask whether it is temporal. Though our concepts are 
211 
 
human and relative to us, they still seem to place bounds on the kinds of 
things we can look for in the world and on the ways we can understand the 
world as being. Here then, is another kind of limitation that broadly occurs 
as a result of his empiricism: our investigations into the nature of the world 
are deeply informed by our ideas and our sensory and rational capacities. 
There may be an interplay of a number of factors in our having the ideas we 
have but there is a real empiricism driving the whole project for it is entirely 
grounded in our ideas and our experience. Should we sever our investigation 
from this grounding we will lose the only tools that we have available to us.   
 
This conditionality also encourages me to draw back from applying familiar 
categorising terms to the picture I have argued emerges. Talk in terms of 
realism or phenomenalism, say, would lose the interesting subtleties here. 
On the whole, I take Hume to be interested in reaching beyond our 
perceptions in a certain sense, though nothing I have said here puts Hume 
into either of these camps. The conditionality makes either inappropriate: I 
take him to be telling us about the possible structure of an external world 
but not taking a firm side of whether such a world exists. There does seem 
to be a latent kind of realism which flows through all of the first part, 
though I take it we cannot apply any contemporary notion of realism to an 
early modern author unproblematically. We might think this thread is merely 
a reflection of the pressure that Hume himself noted: “’tis in vain to ask, 
Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for 
granted in all our reasonings.”276 The way I have sought to characterise him 
avoids attributing a commitment to an external world, or to external time 
and space to him. It also avoids staking his position out as only accepting a 
phenomenal reality. By appealing to this conditionality we can accept that 
experience pulls us in both directions, without requiring that we come down 




                                                 
276 T 1.4.2.1; SBN 187. 
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8.3. The Relationship Between the Two Parts Re-Visited 
To conclude I want to briefly return to considering the relationship between 
the two parts of the system Hume sets out. From the above, I suggest that 
the relationship between them is interesting and deep, and Hume’s 
characterisation of the connection as “intimate” is entirely correct. I have 
argued that a unified understanding of the two parts of the system is 
possible, for they are tightly connected in a few different ways. Firstly, I 
suggest that the core motivating principles in both parts are primarily 
commitments set out in T 1.1., commitments that gain their support from 
his brand of empiricism and the introspective method he espouses. His 
rejection of abstraction by separation, for instance, clearly has a role to play 
in the second part of the system. However, I argued it also has a role to play 
in the first. We can see elements of it involved in the conditionality as I 
discussed above, but also in the arguments themselves. These commitments 
inform him directly in his epistemology and still inform him, albeit more 
indirectly, in his metaphysics.  
 
Secondly, the parts exhibit a kind of unity in their broader conditional 
methodology for, on such an approach, the metaphysics cannot help but be 
informed and constrained by the idea of time and our particular 
epistemological position in the world. The kinds of creatures we are, our 
limited sensory access, our limited powers of conception, even the 
association inherent in our ideas, all come in to play in constraining our 
investigation into the temporality of the world, should there be one. The two 
parts of Hume’s system, given such a project, cannot help but be connected. 
However, by using our perceptions in careful ways, as I advocated in 
chapters 2 and 3, we can form a kind of bridge between our experience and 
the world. Adequate representations are available and they open the door to 
a conditional knowledge of things. This knowledge is conditional and it is 
limited, nevertheless it is there.  
 
I have argued then that the parts of Hume’s system of time and space are 
not only “intimately connected” but that being sensitive to the ways they are 
connected can be a useful tool in itself. If we proceed cautiously, we can 
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allow each part of the system to illuminate the other. What emerges is a 
complex and interesting account of time and our idea of it. However, we 
also find an interesting account of ourselves. An examination of Hume’s 
account of time, then, does not just offer a way of understanding our 
experience, and how that experience could relate to a world beyond it. It also 
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